Riley, J.
Appellant-Plaintiff/Cross-Appellee, the State of Indiana (State), and Appellee-Defendant/Cross-Appellant, Tala Jones (Jones), appeal the trial court’s rulings on Jones’ Motion to Suppress.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for trial.
The State presents this court with one issue, which we restate as: Whether our federal or state Constitution required suppression of physical evidence obtained through a Miranda violation.
Jones raises one issue on cross-appeal, which we restate as: Whether her federal or state constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure was violated when her vehicle was searched after she admitted marijuana was located there.
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The State contends that the Fifth Amendment does not require the suppression of the heroin and cocaine garnered from Jones’ unwarned statement that she had drugs in her bra. The trial court’s suppression ruling was grounded chiefly on state constitutional grounds. We address the State’s argument, as it was preserved for our review, Jones has raised arguments in response, and it will inform our subsequent analysis under the Indiana Constitution.
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The State’s Fifth Amendment argument relies chiefly on United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 124 S.Ct. 2620, 159 L.Ed.2d 667 (2004). In Patane, the United States Supreme Court considered whether law enforcement’s failure to provide a criminal suspect with the warnings prescribed by Miranda requires suppression of the physical fruits of the suspect’s unwarned but voluntary statements. Patane, 542 U.S. at 633-34. While investigating Patane’s alleged violation of a restraining order, officers became aware that Patane, a convicted felon, might be in illegal possession of a firearm. Id. at 634-35. The officers went to Patane’s house, and after speaking to Patane, placed him under arrest for violating the restraining order. Id. at 635. Patane interrupted an officer who was attempting to provide him with his Miranda advisements, and the officer never completed the warnings. Id. Patane was then asked about the firearm, which he admitted was in his bedroom. Id. The firearm was seized, and Patane was indicted on a federal firearm possession charge. Id. Patane successfully sought suppression of the firearm evidence, a ruling which was upheld by the Circuit Court based on its reasoning that a failure to warn pursuant to Miranda was itself a violation of a suspect’s Fifth Amendment self-incrimination rights which warranted application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine and the exclusionary rule to any physical evidence garnered from the Miranda violation. Id. at 635-36.
Upon the Government’s appeal, the Supreme Court held that a Miranda violation does not require the suppression of any physical evidence flowing from that violation. Id. at 636-37. Focusing on the use of the word “witness” in the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause, the Court held that the “core protection” provided by the Clause, which the prophylactic Miranda rule is designed to protect, is a prohibition on compelling a criminal defendant from testifying against himself at trial, a right which “cannot be violated by the introduction of nontestimonial evidence obtained as a result of voluntary statements.” Id. at 637, 641, 643-44. The Court affirmed that the Self Incrimination Clause, and the Miranda rule by extension, is fundamentally a trial right, and that, therefore, a mere failure to warn a suspect of his Miranda rights does not violate a suspect’s constitutional rights or even the Miranda rule. Id. at 641.
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Here, the parties do not dispute that Jones’ statement that she had drugs in her bra was a Miranda violation. However, in light of Patane, we agree with the State that the Fifth Amendment does not require the suppression of the physical evidence garnered as a result of that Miranda violation, namely, the heroin and cocaine retrieved from Jones’ bra.
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Jones also argues that “Patane applies to the admission of physical fruits from voluntary statements” and that her “statements about drugs were involuntary because police pressured her into complying by showing their power over her and twice pressing her for evidence while she was in the officers’ complete control.” (Appellee’s Br. pp. 10, 11). In assessing the voluntariness of a defendant’s self-incriminating statement, we look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the statement was procured through “coercion or other improper influence so as to overcome the free will of the accused.”
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Because Jones’ statements were voluntary, we conclude that even though the heroin and cocaine located in her bra were found after she gave statements in violation of Miranda, that physical evidence was not subject to suppression under the Fifth Amendment. Patane, 542 U.S. at 636-37.
The State also challenges the trial court’s conclusion that our state Constitution required suppression of the heroin and cocaine found in Jones’ bra. Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution provides in relevant part that “[n]o person, in any criminal prosecution, shall be compelled to testify against himself.” The State contends that Article 1, Section 14 is interpreted in the same manner as the Fifth Amendment and urges us that Patane is equally applicable to a state constitutional claim. Jones contends, and the trial court concluded, that the right to be free from self-incrimination conferred by the Indiana Constitution is broader than that provided by the Fifth Amendment, Patane does not control, and that the heroin and cocaine were properly suppressed. Neither this court nor our supreme court has decided the issue of whether Article 1, Section 14 requires the suppression of physical, nontestimonial evidence procured in violation of Indiana’s Self-Incrimination Clause.
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We find the language used in Section 14 to be unambiguous for our present purposes. To “testify” is to “give evidence as a witness.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). This definition, coupled with the context of Section 14’s application to “any criminal prosecution[,]” leads us to conclude that the text of Indiana’s Self-Incrimination Clause is concerned only with testimonial evidence presented at a criminal trial. Therefore, a plain reading of the constitutional provision does not support an argument that we should interpret Section 14 to mandate exclusion of nontestimonial evidence flowing from a violation of its privilege against self-incrimination.
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In light of this long-standing Indiana precedent and the text of Section 14 itself, we cannot conclude that Indiana’s Self-Incrimination Clause was designed to prevent the admission of nontestimonial evidence resulting from its violation. The drugs found in Jones’ bra are physical evidence and are nontestimonial in nature. See Smith v. State, 496 N.E.2d 778, 784 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (collecting cases for examples of physical, nontestimonial evidence such as handwriting samples, fingerprints, and urinalysis results). Therefore, they were not subject to exclusion, and we conclude that the trial court’s suppression order was contrary to law. See Diego, 169 N.E.3d at 116.
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We conclude that, given the lack of discussion, application, or analysis of Section 14 in Callender, the Mers decision, and Jones by extension, overstates Callender’s reliance on Section 14, and we are not convinced that these cases support Jones’ proposition that Section 14 mandates the exclusion of physical evidence in the manner she proposes.
Neither are we persuaded by Jones’ citation to other jurisdictions that have rejected Patane on state constitutional grounds.
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Having examined the text of Section 14, its purpose, and the relevant Indiana case law, we conclude that it is most appropriate under the Indiana Constitution to conclude that physical evidence must not be excluded from trial if it was procured from a violation of the Section 14 privilege against self-incrimination.
On cross-appeal, Jones challenges the trial court’s conclusion that her car was properly searched and that, therefore, the marijuana found there need not be suppressed… The State counters that Jones’ vehicle was validly searched based on probable cause after Jones admitted there was marijuana located there.
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…Jones’ admission to Officer Hutchinson that there was marijuana in her car provided the officer with probable cause to search the vehicle. See Gibson v. State, 733 N.E.2d 945, 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that Gibson’s admission that he had marijuana in his van provided the police with probable cause to search his van for contraband). After Jones informed the officer there was marijuana in her car, establishing probable cause to search, it became immaterial that the officer had originally intended to conduct an inventory search. Jones’ car was mobile, as evinced by the fact that she had been observed driving it, and she was stopped on a public street. There was no violation of Jones’ Fourth Amendment right resulting from the search of her car.
Jones contends that we must examine the propriety of Officer Hutchinson’s decision to tow the car. However, although Officer Hutchinson had originally intended to tow Jones’ car and informed her of that fact, there was no requirement that the tow decision be made before the officer was permitted to ask Jones whether she had anything in the car. See State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1204-05 (Ind. 2008) (concluding that under the Fourth Amendment, an officer engaged in a valid traffic stop may ask whether the driver has any weapons, drugs, or anything else that could harm the officer, even if those questions are unrelated to the purpose of the stop). Therefore, we do not find the officer’s decision to tow to be relevant. In addition, inasmuch as Jones contends that this was an inventory search because the officer assisting Officer Hutchinson had already started searching her car before she made the admission to the marijuana, we disagree with her factual premise. Officer Hutchinson did not testify that the assisting officer had already begun searching Jones’ car when she admitted to the marijuana. Rather, he testified that the search of Jones’ car took place after he had decided to tow, he told Jones her car would be towed, he asked her if there was anything in the vehicle, she made the admission, and the assisting officer then found the marijuana. This evidence supports a reasonable inference that the search of Jones’ car had not begun before she made the admission to the marijuana, and it is the reading we must give to the evidence pursuant to our standard of review. Marshall, 117 N.E.3d at 1258. Accordingly, we conclude that the search of Jones’ vehicle did not violate her Fourth Amendment rights.
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Based on the foregoing, we conclude that any violation of Jones’ right to be free from self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment or Article 1, Section 14 did not require suppression of the physical fruits of that violation. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s suppression of the suspected heroin and cocaine. We further conclude that the search of her vehicle violated neither her federal nor her state constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. As a result, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Jones’ request to suppress the suspected marijuana found in her car.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for trial.
May, J. and Tavitas, J. concur