Brown, J.
Brooklyn Powers appeals the trial court’s order denying her motion to suppress evidence. We reverse.
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Powers argues that the purpose of the traffic stop was complete prior to the canine sniff and there was no reasonable suspicion to extend the stop to conduct the canine sniff. She asserts that Sergeant Slayback “did not have reasonable suspicion to detain [her] beyond the reason for the stop, which was to issue a warning to the driver.” Appellant’s Brief at 17. The State acknowledges that an officer must have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to detain an individual beyond what is necessary to complete a traffic stop related to the reason for that stop, but argues that Sergeant Slayback had reasonable suspicion and the dog sweep occurred in the time necessary to complete the officer’s work related to the traffic violation.
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In Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015), the United States Supreme Court addressed dog sniffs in the context of traffic stops. The Court held that “a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.” 575 U.S. at 350, 135 S. Ct. at 1612. The Court held that “[a] seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation, therefore, ‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” Id. at 350-351, 135 S. Ct. at 1612 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005)). The Court observed that it had “so recognized in Caballes” and “adhere[d] to the line drawn in that decision.” Id. at 351, 135 S. Ct. at 1612.
The Court held that, because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, “it may ‘last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.’” Id. at 354, 135 S. Ct. at 1614 (citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407, 125 S. Ct. 834). The Court further held that “[a]uthority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” Id. The Court observed that its decisions in Caballes and Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 S. Ct. 781 (2009), heed these constraints. Id…The Court held that, beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop which typically include checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance. Id. at 355, 135 S. Ct. at 1615. The Court held that the critical question is whether conducting the sniff prolongs or adds time to the stop. Id. at 357, 135 S. Ct. at 1616. This Court has previously held that the burden is on the State to show the time for the traffic stop was not increased due to a canine sniff. Wells v. State, 922 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.
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Based upon the record, we conclude that the purpose of the traffic stop was complete when Sergeant Slayback did not observe any indications of an impaired driver and issued the driver the warning for the traffic violations. Thus, continuing the traffic stop for any additional period of time required reasonable suspicion.
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Accordingly, we must determine whether Sergeant Slayback had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
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To the extent Sergeant Slayback testified that he “felt like [he] developed reasonable suspicion at that point just based on their . . . nervous behavior of both of the occupants,” Transcript Volume II at 13, we note that the Indiana Supreme Court has observed that “[s]ome courts have found nervousness on the part of the occupants is a factor leading an officer to form reasonable suspicion of criminal activity” but the Court placed “little weight on that fact alone.” Finger v. State, 799 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Ind. 2003). The Court observed that “nervousness is of limited significance when determining reasonable suspicion . . . it is common for most people ‘to exhibit signs of nervousness when confronted by a law enforcement officer’ whether or not the person is currently engaged in criminal activity.” Id…We also note that the record does not reveal any evidence regarding whether Sergeant Slayback had experience observing people under the influence or whether persons under the influence or in possession of illegal substances have sores on their face or arms. It also does not reveal furtive movements by the driver or Powers or reveal any indication that Sergeant Slayback had safety concerns. Under the totality of the circumstances and in light of the State’s burden, we cannot say that Sergeant Slayback had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Accordingly, we conclude that the actions of having Powers exit the vehicle, questioning her, and performing the canine sniff were improper under the Fourth Amendment.
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For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the denial of Powers’s motion to suppress.
Reversed.
Mathias, J., and Molter, J., concur.