Molter, J.
Jacqueline Mastellone slipped and fell at the YMCA when she was returning to the locker room from a swim class, and she sued the YMCA to recover damages for her personal injuries. During a jury trial, the YMCA twice moved for mistrial—first based on an overruled objection to testimony that the floor was replaced after Mastellone’s fall, and then when defense counsel learned after the jury reached its verdict that an exhibit inadvertently was not sent to the jury room during deliberations. The trial court denied both motions. But three days after the jury returned a verdict for Mastellone, the trial court ordered a new trial through a short order stating the court had sua sponte reconsidered a mistrial motion without specifying which of the two mistrial motions it was reconsidering and without explaining why a mistrial was warranted. Because that was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to set aside a verdict and order a new trial, we reverse and direct the trial court to reinstate the jury’s verdict.
The YMCA cross-appeals the trial court’s rulings denying its mistrial motions, and it challenges the jury’s verdict as excessive. We conclude the mistrial rulings do not reflect an abuse of discretion, and the jury’s award is not excessive, so we affirm as to those issues.
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Mastellone argues the trial court erred in declaring a mistrial because it no longer had the authority to reconsider its rulings on the two mistrial motions, and it failed to comply with Trial Rule 59’s requirements for a motion to correct error. We agree.
The trial court titled the order Mastellone appeals as an Order Reconsidering Motion for Mistrial, but we determine the nature of the order from its substance rather than its title…Here, the appealed order came three days after the trial court entered a final judgment, so the trial court no longer had the inherent authority to reconsider its prejudgment rulings.
In particular, when the jury returned its verdict, the trial court stated it would “enter judgment on that verdict,” Tr. Vol. 3 at 128, and then it reflected that judgment through its CCS notation…“[I]t is well settled that the trial court speaks through its CCS or docket,” City of Indianapolis v. Hicks, 932 N.E.2d 227, 233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied, and that the CCS is the official record of the trial court. Ind. Trial Rule 77(B). Thus, “[a]s expressly stated in both Trial Rule 59(C) and Appellate Rule 9(A)(1), a judgment is ‘final’ when it is noted in the CCS.” Waldrip v. Waldrip, 976 N.E.2d 102, 109 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
Treating the trial court’s CCS entry here as the final judgment for purposes of Trial Rule 59 is consistent with the trial court’s understanding of its orders. In its Order Reconsidering Motion for Mistrial, it stated that it was setting aside the “jury verdict and judgment.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 13 (emphasis added). This treatment is also consistent with the deadline to file a motion to correct error, which is triggered by the notation of a final judgment on the CCS. See Ind. Trial Rule 59(C) (providing that a motion to correct error is due within thirty days “after the entry of a final judgment is noted in the Chronological Case Summary”). It would be incongruous for the CCS entry to trigger the deadline to file a motion to correct error under Trial Rule 59, but not trigger the trial court’s obligation to adhere to Trial Rule 59 when setting aside the jury verdict and ordering a new trial.
So, because the trial court had entered judgment, it was required to adhere to Trial Rule 59 before setting the judgment aside. Under Trial Rule 59(B), a “motion to correct error, if any, may be made by the trial court, or by any party.” But any error “shall be stated in specific rather than general terms and shall be accompanied by a statement of facts and grounds upon which the error is based.” Ind. Trial Rule 59(D) (emphases added). “Like parties who file a motion to correct error, the trial court, too, is required to comply with the rule when it sua sponte finds error.” Haggard v. Hayden, 494 N.E.2d 338, 339 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); see also Lake Mortgage Co. v. Federal National Mortgage Ass’n, 321 N.E.2d 556 (Ind. 1975) (concluding the trial court erred in granting a new trial on its own motion because it failed to provide a statement of facts supporting its conclusion of error as required by then-numbered Trial Rule 59(B)). This requirement is important for procedural fairness because failing to provide the reasons for setting aside the judgment impedes the aggrieved party’s ability to formulate an appeal and this court’s ability to review the trial court’s decision. See Lake Mortgage Co., 321 N.E.2d at 560 (explaining “the party aggrieved by the court’s granting of the motion to correct errors would not be able to properly formulate his appeal[ ] nor would the Court of Appeals or this Court be able to pass upon the propriety of the trial court’s actions”).
Here, the trial court’s Order Reconsidering Motion for Mistrial is, in substance, an order on a sua sponte Trial Rule 59 motion to correct error, but it does not provide any specificity as to why the court was setting aside the verdict. The order does not even specify which mistrial motion it was reconsidering and granting, and it does not provide any reasoning….
Further, Trial Rule 59(J) provides that the trial court, “if it determines that prejudicial or harmful error has been committed, shall take such action as will cure the error, including” granting a new trial or altering, amending, modifying, or correcting the judgment. However, if it grants corrective relief, the trial court “shall [then] specify the general reasons therefor.” Ind. Trial Rule 59(J) (emphasis added). The trial court failed to comply with this portion of Trial Rule 59 too by not identifying which mistrial motion it was reconsidering and not providing any reasons for granting the unspecified motion and ordering a new trial.
Having concluded the trial court did not comply with Trial Rule 59 when setting aside the judgment, we must determine the appropriate remedy. Our Supreme Court has directed that when a trial court sets aside a jury verdict as against the weight of the evidence but fails to make the special findings required by Trial Rule 59, our court must reverse and direct the trial court to reinstate the verdict. Weida v. Kegarise, 849 N.E.2d 1147, 1152–53 (Ind. 2006). This is because, among other reasons, compliance with Trial Rule 59’s specificity requirements “is necessary to assure the public that the justice system is safe not only from capricious or malicious juries, but also from usurpation by unrestrained judges.” Id. at 1153. Remanding to the trial court for further “[e]xplanations crafted after appellate remand [ ] six months or a year after the trial court heard the evidence” is inadequate to fulfill the rule’s requirements. Id.
Moreover, remanding for the entry of a more specific order rather than reinstating the verdict “makes the party who won the jury’s verdict pay for the cost of appealing to enforce the requirement of findings (findings whose function is to vitiate the very verdict that party already won).” Id. While the burden to provide sufficient specificity rests with the trial court, the party benefiting from the court’s decision “could legitimately take any number of steps to protect [their] interest in securing an adequate order for a new trial should the trial judge be persuaded to set aside the jury’s verdict.” Id. Those steps include that “counsel might file a post-order request of the sort not mentioned in the Trial Rules, but regularly recognized in actual practice (denominating it, say, as a request for clarification or a request for a more particular order).” Id.
While the Supreme Court discussed these considerations in the context of a new trial order based on a verdict against the weight of the evidence, the logic is equally compelling in the context of an order like the one at issue here directing a new trial based on an unspecified mistrial motion. At bottom, if a “court overrides the jury in its special domain and substitutes its verdict for theirs without a clear showing that the ends of justice require it, it is likely that they did not.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s Order Reconsidering Motion for Mistrial and remand to the trial court with instructions to reinstate the jury’s verdict.
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Reversed and remanded.
Riley, J., and Robb, J., concur.