Massa, J.
Unlike most of the country, Indiana generally allows criminal defendants to depose prosecution witnesses. But this right is neither constitutional nor absolute. In 2020, our General Assembly, without a single vote in opposition, restricted this statutory right for defendants accused of sexual offenses against children. This statute sought to protect children from being deposed by their alleged assailants. Here, a criminal defendant charged with several counts of child molesting unsuccessfully sought to depose the child victim after this statute went into effect. He then appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding the statute is procedural and impermissibly conflicts with our Trial Rules. Even though the statute has procedural elements, we conclude it is substantive, as it predominantly furthers public policy objectives of the General Assembly, as opposed to judicial administration objectives characteristic of a procedural statute. Because we also reject his other arguments, we affirm the trial court.
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In Indiana, depositions are a “routine component of pre-trial practice, both in civil and criminal matters.” Hale v. State, 54 N.E.3d 355, 357 (Ind. 2016); I.C. § 35-37-4-3 (“The state and the defendant may take and use depositions of witnesses in accordance with the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure.”); see also Ind. Trial Rule 26; T.R. 30; Ind. Crim. Rule 21. However, Indiana is an outlier as one of only seven states that permit criminal defendants to depose prosecution witnesses. Moreover, even this small minority of jurisdictions allowing regular depositions in criminal cases “often carve out special categories of witnesses who are not subject to that procedure,” including child sex crime victims and children in general. Wayne R. LaFave et al., 5 Criminal Procedure § 20.2(e) (4th ed. 2015); see, e.g., Vt. R. Crim. P. 15(e)(5)(A) (providing no deposition shall be taken of a victim under the age of 16 in prosecutions for sexual assault cases unless agreed upon by the parties or ordered by the court after it finds the deposition is necessary, “the evidence sought is not reasonably available by any other means, and that the probative value of the testimony outweighs the potential detriment to the child being deposed”); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 517:13(V) (providing that “no party in criminal case shall take the discovery deposition of a victim or witness who has not achieved the age of 16 at the time of the deposition”).
In addition to being rare, Indiana’s statutory right to take depositions in criminal cases has never been absolute. Under our Trial Rules, and explicitly referenced in Indiana Code section 35-37-4-3, courts can limit criminal defendants’ discovery privileges—including depositions—if they find “the defendant ha[s] no legitimate defense interest . . . or that the State ha[s] a paramount interest to protect.”
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This Court “has repeatedly ‘refused to adjudicate constitutional questions when presented with other dispositive issues.’” State v. Katz, 179 N.E.3d 431, 441 (Ind. 2022) (quoting Ind. Wholesale Wine & Liquor Co. v. State ex rel. Ind. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 695 N.E.2d 99, 108 (Ind. 1998)). Adhering to this doctrine of judicial restraint, we first address Church’s two non-constitutional arguments—that the statute is impermissibly retroactive as applied to him and that it conflicts with the Trial Rules. See Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 402 (Ind. 1991). Because we reject both these arguments, we will then address Church’s two constitutional arguments—the statute violates the Indiana Constitution’s separation of powers provision, and it violates Church’s rights under both the Indiana Constitution and the United States Constitution. Because we find no constitutional violation under either argument, we affirm the trial court here.
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I. Because the operative event of the statute— seeking to take a deposition—occurred after the statute became effective, the statute is being applied prospectively to Church.
Because the statute went into effect eight days after he was charged, Church argues it cannot apply retroactively to him. In response, the State argues the statute is being applied prospectively, because it was in effect several months before Church first sought to depose the child victim. In Indiana, “[a]bsent explicit language to the contrary, statutes generally do not apply retroactively.” N.G. v. State, 148 N.E.3d 971, 973 (Ind. 2020). While there are exceptions to this general rule, Martin v. State, 774 N.E.2d 43, 44 (Ind. 2002), we only need to consider them if we determine the statute is being applied retroactively. Answering this question involves an issue of first impression—what event is determinative for the prospective application of a statute? Because we ultimately conclude the operative event of a statute—here, seeking a deposition—is determinative, the statute is being applied prospectively to Church.
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II. The statute is substantive because it predominantly furthers the legitimate public policy objectives within the General Assembly’s exclusive purview.
To the extent a procedural statute is at odds with one of our procedural rules, the rule governs. Garner v. Kempf, 93 N.E.3d 1091, 1099 (Ind. 2018).
The statute here is substantive because it predominantly furthers public policy objectives. As the State argues, this statute “creates substantive protections for child victims of sex crimes that guard against needless trauma inflicted through compelled discovery depositions” by “declining to grant defendants in this limited set of circumstances the substantive right to take discovery depositions.” Pet. to Trans. at 9–10. Victims in Indiana have a constitutional “right to be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect throughout the criminal justice process . . . to the extent that exercising these rights does not infringe upon the constitutional rights of the accused.” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 13(b). As we soon explain, criminal defendants have no constitutional right to discovery depositions. And crime victims have the statutory right to be “treated with fairness, dignity, and respect,” and be “free from intimidation, harassment, and abuse” “throughout the criminal justice process.” I.C. § 35-40-5-1. The deposition statute implicates these substantive, constitutional rights granted to crime victims in Indiana, as evidenced by, among other things, its location in the “Victim Rights” Chapter of the Indiana Criminal Code.
On the other hand, defendants generally have the substantive right “to take and use depositions of witnesses in accordance with the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure.” I.C. § 35-37-4-3. The deposition statute limits this substantive right, as it provides: “A defendant may depose a child victim only in accordance with” it. I.C. § 35-40-5-11.5(c). The statute then provides the three circumstances in which a defendant’s substantive right to take depositions may outweigh the child victim’s substantive right not to be deposed. I.C. § 35-40-5-11.5(d). The statute then lays out the procedure for how these competing rights interact, but this does not alter the statute’s true nature as a substantive right for this class of victims, and as a limitation on the substantive rights of defendants. And the procedural aspects of this statute do not deal with the “method and time of asserting such right,” but rather explain the procedure for determining whose right prevails—the defendant’s right to depose or the child victim’s right not to be. Blood, 239 Ind. at 400, 157 N.E.2d at 478. The deposition statute reflects “clear legislative policy” to secure these rights and is not a statute that merely controls the “judicial dispatch of litigation.” McDougall, 597 N.W.2d at 156 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). It reflects “a careful legislative balancing of policy considerations.” Id. at 158 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, because the statute is substantive, we need not consider whether it conflicts with our procedural rules.
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Denying Church the opportunity to conduct a pretrial deposition—a limitation defendants routinely operate under in most jurisdictions in this country—does not deny him fundamental fairness or the ability to prepare a defense. We have chosen to provide broader discovery in criminal cases, but “the Constitution surely does not demand that much.” Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109. And discovery rights under our Trial Rules have never been absolute; a trial court has always been empowered to prohibit depositions or place limitations on the way it is taken to “protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” See T.R. 26(C). Church will have broad access to the facts against him before trial, and the opportunity to cross-examine the victim at trial, but his due process rights are not violated by this statute.
The General Assembly—through its exclusive power to enact laws protecting the health and safety of an extremely vulnerable class of citizens—passed this statute to protect alleged child sex-crime victims from unnecessary re-traumatization. This statute is not being retroactively applied to Church. It is not a procedural statute that could conflict with our Trial Rules, nor does it violate the separation of powers enshrined in our Constitution. Finally, it does not violate any of Church’s rights under the state and federal constitutions. Having rejected Church’s arguments, we affirm the trial court.
Rush, C.J., and David and Slaughter, JJ., concur.
Goff, J., concurs in part and in the judgment with separate opinion.
Goff, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the trial court properly denied Church’s petition to depose the child victim. However, I part ways with the Court on the grounds for sustaining that conclusion. In my view, Indiana Code section 35-40-5-11.5 (the Act) is a procedural law in conflict with our trial rules governing pre-trial discovery. But because the Act corresponds with this Court’s long-held concern for child welfare, and because it retains the trial court’s discretion, I would consider the Act, as our precedent permits, an exception to the relevant trial rules.
On all other issues—the retroactivity question, the separation-of powers question, the right-to-confrontation question, and the due-process question—I concur in full.
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Typically, when a statute conflicts with our rules of trial procedure, the latter supersedes the former. McEwen v. State, 695 N.E.2d 79, 89 (Ind. 1998). But even when presented with such a conflict, this Court may, in its discretion, decide to treat the otherwise incompatible statute as an exception to the rules of court.
In Humbert v. Smith, we considered whether to invalidate a section of Indiana’s paternity statute expediting the admission of blood tests by eliminating—in conflict with our rules of evidence—the need to establish a proper foundation. 664 N.E.2d 356, 356–57 (Ind. 1996). While the statute and the rule “create[d] two different standards,” thus precluding dual application in “a given situation,” we treated the statute as an exception to our rules of evidence. Id. at 357. The statute, we reasoned, was “consistent with the special care” that our “courts have taken toward the expeditious resolution” of matters involving “paternity, custody, and support of children.” Id. What’s more, we explained, the statute eliminated the need for an evidentiary foundation only when a party failed to object to the admission of evidence within thirty days of trial, thus accommodating those with “particularized grievances.” Id.
Here, as in Humbert, the otherwise conflicting Act harmonizes with our long-held concern for the welfare of children, thus warranting, in my view, an exception to the relevant rules of court. In Jones v. State, for example, we held that a trial court may bar a criminal defendant from personally attending the deposition of a child-molest victim without violating the defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses. 445 N.E.2d 98, 100 (Ind. 1983) (citing Bowen v. State, 263 Ind. 558, 334 N.E.2d 691 (1975)). Despite the lack of a record noting the reasons for excluding the defendant, we found it “reasonable to assume” that the trial court expected his presence to “be intimidating to the witnesses because of their relationship to him and their tender age.” Id. While rules governing pretrial discovery in Indiana typically entitle a party to attend a deposition, the circumstances in Jones, we later opined, warranted an exception to those rules. Rita v. State, 674 N.E.2d 968, 971 (Ind. 1996).
In addition to reflecting our concerns for the welfare of children, the Act, as with the statute at issue in Humbert, doesn’t eliminate entirely the procedural apparatus of our judicial rules, thus accommodating those with a legitimate need. While the Act requires a defendant to petition the trial court to authorize a deposition, and while the defendant must make a sufficient showing of need, such procedural requisites aren’t unheard of. In fact, neither our case law nor our trial rules grant a defendant an unlimited right to depose a victim. And the State’s interest may subordinate the interests of the defendant in certain circumstances.
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In short, while our trial rules entitle a criminal defendant to discovery, including the taking of depositions, the trial court may deviate from those rules upon “a showing that the defendant had no legitimate defense interest in support of his petition or that the State had a paramount interest to protect.” Murphy, 265 Ind. at 119, 352 N.E.2d at 481–82. And while our trial rules and the Act present “two different standards” governing depositions, thus precluding dual application in “a given situation,” see Humbert, 664 N.E.2d at 357, the Act doesn’t abrogate the judicial discretion to limit the scope of discovery or to prohibit depositions entirely.
For the reasons above, I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the trial court properly denied Church’s petition to depose the child victim, but because I consider the Act a procedural (rather than a substantive) measure, I part ways with the Court on the grounds for sustaining that conclusion. In my view, the Act, which otherwise conflicts with our court rules governing pre-trial discovery, warrants an exception because it harmonizes with our concern for child welfare and because it ultimately retains the trial court’s discretion. Had the measure advanced a policy not conducive to our own, I likely would have come to a contrary conclusion. After all, by permitting the legislature “to impose [procedural] regulations and restrictions upon the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,” Blood, 239 Ind. at 401, 157 N.E.2d at 478 (internal quotation marks omitted), we risk blurring—if not collapsing—that fine line separating the “independent branches of our government,” see Bridenhager, 257 Ind. at 703, 279 N.E.2d at 796.
On all other issues— the retroactivity question, the separation-of-powers question, the right-to-confrontation question, and the due-process question—I concur in full.