Vaidik, J.
Case Summary
Krys Szalasny (“Landlord”) sued his three former tenants, Clarence L. White, Folabi E. Oshinubi, and Denzel J. Lewis (“Tenants”), for breach of contract. Tenants brought a counterclaim under the Indiana Security Deposit Statute, ultimately prevailed on that claim, and later asked for attorney’s fees under a fee-shifting provision in the statute. The trial court awarded Tenants fees for work done on the claims but denied fees for work preparing and prosecuting the fee petition. Tenants now appeal, arguing fees relating to the fee petition are permissible under the statute and should have been awarded here. We agree that the Indiana Security Deposit Statute does not limit a fee award to certain stages of the proceeding and that an award of fees relating to the fee petition is reasonable here. Therefore, we reverse and remand. [Footnote omitted.]
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We agree with Tenants that the statute’s language “does not limit [fee] recovery to any specific phase of the proceedings.” Appellants’ Br. p. 9. And while this Court has not addressed whether the ISDS’s fee-shifting provision allows for the recovery of attorney’s fees for preparing and prosecuting a fee petition, in Walton v. Claybridge Homeowners Association, Inc., 825 N.E.2d 818, 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), we held such recovery is permitted under a contractual fee-shifting provision. In doing so, we noted that “the overriding concern in determining whether a fee-shifting provision should be upheld is whether enforcement makes the prevailing party whole,” and that “[r]equiring the [prevailing party] to absorb any fees or costs its attorneys incurred in establishing the fees would not fully compensate it for enforcing its rights.” Id.
The same can be said under the ISDS’s fee-shifting provision. Denying attorney’s fees for time spent on fee claims dilutes the value of the fee award and does not fully compensate the wronged tenant. This circumvents one of the main aims of the statute—protecting tenants. In the event of wrongful withholding, a full award of fees ensures tenants are fully compensated for having to bring suit. Additionally, the possibility of a full fee award discourages landlords from wrongfully withholding a tenant’s security deposit in the first place. If landlords know they may have to pay not only their own attorney’s fees, but also all the fees incurred by the tenant, they will hopefully think twice before wrongfully withholding a security deposit.
And importantly, an expansive reading of the fee-shifting provision of the ISDS provides relief to indigent tenants. “Access to justice” is an empty phrase without the help of an attorney. And although many attorneys generously provide free or reduced legal services, there remains a crisis in the representation of indigent civil litigants. Relief under statutes, such as the ISDS, that encourage attorneys to represent the indigent by providing attorney’s fees to successful parties should be liberally applied. See Husainy v. Granite Mgmt., LLC, 132 N.E.3d 486, 499 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (noting fee awards that do not fully compensate the successful party “discourage attorneys from representing parties without financial means to pay attorney’s fees, even where the legislature created a remedy for the same”) (citation omitted).
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Given this record, we believe fees for time spent on the fee petition are reasonable. The fee issue alone demanded briefing and a hearing. And as the trial court noted, Attorneys Keller and Burns won substantial relief for their clients in this case—within months of being hired Landlord dismissed his $30,000 claim for damages and stipulated to liability on Tenants’ claims. Besides being experienced and in high demand, the record shows the attorney services were exceptionally valuable here, given that Tenants had a difficult time finding counsel willing to represent them.
For these reasons, we conclude attorney’s fees for time spent on fee recovery are warranted here. We therefore reverse the denial of those fees and remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to award Tenants an additional $3,937 in attorney’s fees to compensate for their time on the fee claim. [Footnote omitted.]
Reversed and remanded.
Mathias, J., and May, J., concur