Najam, J.
Statement of the Case
Following the dissolution of her marriage to Charles T. Ramey, III, Ashley Ping (f/k/a Ashley Day) retained sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ minor child (“Child”), with Ramey exercising parenting time. On August 20, 2017, following Ramey’s parenting time, Ping noticed a blister on Child’s genitals. Ping notified the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) of the blister and sought medical treatment for Child. Then, on August 28, Ramey and his girlfriend, Jordan McHenry, observed a blister on Child’s genitals. McHenry took a picture of the blister and texted it to a DCS family case manager. McHenry reported that the blister was new. The following day, McHenry called the DCS child abuse and neglect hotline and reported the injury. As a result, two DCS employees removed Child from Ping’s care and filed a petition alleging Child to be a Child in Need of Services. Following a CHINS hearing, the court denied the DCS petition and ordered that Child be returned to Ping’s care. In total, Child was removed from Ping’s care for forty-four days.
Thereafter, Ping filed a complaint in federal court against the two DCS employees who had removed Child from her care. Ping alleged that the DCS employees had violated her constitutional rights when they removed Child. The employees and DCS settled the case with Ping, and, in exchange, Ping signed a release and agreed to forgo her right to a trial on the issues raised in her complaint. Ping then filed a complaint against Ramey and McHenry in the Johnson Superior Court. Ping alleged, in relevant part, that Ramey and McHenry had made a false report of child abuse in violation of Indiana Code Section 31-33-22-3 (2021) (the “False Reporting Statute”).
Ramey and McHenry filed a motion for summary judgment in which they alleged that Ping’s complaint was barred under the doctrine of res judicata and the prohibition against double recoveries. The trial court denied that motion and the case proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the trial, Ramey and McHenry filed their first motion for judgment on the evidence, in which they alleged that the release agreement Ping had signed to settle the federal complaint precluded her from bringing the instant lawsuit. The trial court denied that motion. The jury found in favor of Ping and against Ramey, McHenry, and DCS, which was named as a nonparty, and awarded Ping damages. Ramey and McHenry then filed a joint motion for judgment on the evidence and motion to correct error, which motions the court denied.
Ramey and McHenry now appeal and present the following revised issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court misinterpreted the False Reporting Statute and, thus, erred when it instructed the jury.
2. Whether Ping presented sufficient evidence to overcome the statutory presumption of good faith and qualified immunity.
3. Whether Ping presented sufficient evidence to support the award of punitive damages.
4. Whether the trial court erred when it denied their motion for summary judgment and motion for judgment on the evidence based on Ping’s settlement of the federal case.
We affirm.
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Issue One: Jury Instructions
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As detailed above, the False Reporting Statute provides that a “person who intentionally communicates” to DCS “a report of child abuse or neglect knowing the report to be false is liable to the person accused of child abuse or neglect for actual damages.” I.C. § 31-33-22-2(b). On appeal Ramey and McHenry specifically contend that the court erred when it interpreted the statute and: (1) instructed the jury that a communication to DCS can be direct or indirect, (2) declined to instruct the jury that Ramey and/or McHenry could only be liable if they had explicitly accused Ping of child abuse, and (3) instructed the jury on reputational damages. Ramey and McHenry maintain that the court’s decisions were in error because the court misinterpreted the False Reporting Statute. As such, to resolve this issue on appeal, we must interpret the statute.
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Whether Communication Can be Direct or Indirect Under the Statute
On this issue, Ramey and McHenry first contend that the court erred when it interpreted the False Reporting Statute and instructed the jury, over their objection, that, “[f]or purposes of Indiana Code [Section] 31-33-22-3 communication may be direct or indirect.” Tr. Vol. 5 at 191. Ramey and McHenry assert that that “blanket instruction” “expanded the concept of ‘communicating a report’ to encompass any communication with DCS despite the plain language of the statute.” Appellants’ Br. at 28. As such, they contend that the instruction “was in error and constituted a misinterpretation of the statute.” Id. In other words, they contend that the jury instruction was an incorrect statement of the law. And Ramey and McHenry assert that, under the statute, only a person who directly communicates to DCS can be held liable under the statute and that Ramey should not be held liable because he “did not communicate” with DCS. Id. at 32. We cannot agree.
First, we note that the False Reporting Statute provides, simply, that a person can be liable for making a false report if that person communicates a report to DCS knowing the report to be false. See I.C. § 31-33-22-3(b). The statute does not require that the communication be direct. Under Ramey and McHenry’s interpretation, we would be required to add words to the statute that do not exist. But it is well settled that we may not add new words to a statute which are not the expressed intent of the legislature. Bergman v. Big Cicero Creek Joint Drainage Bd., 137 N.E.3d 955, 963 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Had the legislature intended that communication only be direct, it would have said so. But it did not, and we cannot read that limitation into the statute.
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Whether the Statute Requires the Reporter to Accuse a Specific Person
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On appeal, Ramey and McHenry contend that, under the statute, “only the person accused of child abuse or neglect is entitled to damages.” Appellants’ Br. at 34 (emphasis in original). And they maintain that, because they “made no effort to blame or identify Ping as the perpetrator,” Ping “should not be considered a ‘person accused[.]’” Id. Thus, Ramey and McHenry contend that their proffered instruction requiring Ping to prove that Ramey and McHenry had named her as the accused was a correct statement of the law and that the court erred when it declined to give that instruction and instructed the jury as it did. We cannot agree.
The False Reporting Statute provides that a person who intentionally makes a report of child abuse to DCS knowing the report to be false “is liable to the person accused of child abuse” for actual damages. I.C. § 31-33-22-3(b). Based on the plain language of the statute, a person who is falsely accused of child abuse can hold the reporter liable…
Rather, in order for the reporter to be liable for damages, the reporter must have acted intentionally to make a false report of child abuse and that report must have caused a person’s damages. Here, the facts demonstrate that Ramey and McHenry acted intentionally when they made a false claim of child abuse. And that false report resulted in damages to Ping when DCS accused Ping of Child abuse and removed Child from her care based on Ramey and McHenry’s false report. As such, under the facts of this case, the trial court properly instructed the jury that, in order to hold Ramey and McHenry liable, the jury must determine that the report was a responsible cause of Ping’s injuries.
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Conclusion
In sum, the trial court did not err when it interpreted the False Reporting Statute and, as such, it did not err when it instructed the jury. Further, Ping presented sufficient evidence to negate the statutory presumption of good faith and qualified immunity and to support the jury’s award of punitive damages. And Ping was not precluded from bringing the instant lawsuit under either the principle of res judicata or the terms of the Release Agreement. We therefore affirm the trial court.
Affirmed. Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.