Riley, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Plaintiff, Donnelle Goston, Sr. (Goston), individually and on behalf of his minor children, D.G. Jr. and Do.G. (collectively, Children), appeals the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Appellees-Defendants, State of Indiana, et al., on Goston’s Complaint that the Department of Child Services (DCS) had been negligent in failing to notify him of its assessment into the allegations of abuse and neglect as to Children.
We affirm.
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Goston’s chief theory of liability on summary judgment and on appeal is that DCS violated Indiana Code section 31-33-18-4 (the Notice Statute)… While it is undisputed that DCS conducted multiple investigations of child abuse with respect to Children, it is also uncontested by DCS that at no point was Goston notified of the reports and information resulting from these investigations until June 4, 2008. Neither DCS nor the trial court ever directly responded to Goston’s contention that DCS breached its duty of notifying him of the investigations, preferring to resolve this claim based on statutory immunity grounds instead. For the first time in these proceedings, DCS now tackles Goston’s allegation head-on—not by disputing that a violation of the Notice Statute occurred—but by arguing that Goston cannot assert a private right of action for such violation. Because the issue is supported by the record, it is appropriate for our review since “[w]e may affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment upon any basis supported by the record.” Boushehry v. City of Indianapolis, 931 N.E.2d 892, 895 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
“When a civil tort action is premised upon a violation of a duty imposed by statute, the initial question to be determined by the court is whether the statute in question confers a private right of action.”…
To answer this question, we must look to the language of the statute and the Legislature’s intent….
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As in Borne and Doe #1, the Notice Statute at issue here, I.C. § 31-33-18-4, is part of the child-centered framework of Article 31, the ‘Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse and Neglect’ scheme, which intends to create a more effective, efficient, and accessible system to deal with the issue of child abuse and neglect for the public’s benefit as a whole, not just a particular individual’s benefit. “[W]hen the legislative purpose is general in nature, the mere fact that the statutory language refers to a class of people does not create a private cause of action.” Americanos, 728 N.E.2d at 898. The Notice Statute is designed to alert parents of potential allegations of abuse with the overall aim to encourage effective child protection and services to protect the alleged victims. Thus, when noncustodial parents, such as Goston, learn their children are involved in an assessment of abuse or neglect, the parents are in a better position to protect their children. “[A] private cause of action will generally be inferred where a statute imposes a duty for a particular individual’s benefit but will not be where the Legislature imposes a duty for the public’s benefit.” Blanck, 829 N.E.2d at 509. Given that the Legislature did not explicitly create a private cause of action and the intent of the Notice Statute is to benefit the public generally by protecting alleged victims of abuse, we again refuse to create a private right of action where one does not exist. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to DCS.
This is not meant to suggest that we condone the way that this matter was handled by DCS. We sympathize with Goston and understand his frustration of not being timely notified, as was DCS’ mandate. However, our Legislature has not afforded a private right of action in these situations, so we must hold accordingly.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to DCS.
Affirmed.
May, J. and Tavitas, J. concur