David, J.
Today, we resolve an appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Illinois Casualty Company (“Illinois Casualty”) in this declaratory judgment action. The underlying dispute between the parties arises from a series of unfortunate events involving an intoxicated patron and his decision to drive after he was served alcohol at Big Daddy’s Show Club in Kokomo, Indiana. For our purposes, we examine whether an insurer has a duty to defend and indemnify its insured, such as Big Daddy’s, when the policy specifically excludes coverage for bodily injury for which an insured may be liable by (1) causing or contributing to a person’s intoxication, or (2) furnishing alcoholic beverages to a person under the influence of alcohol.
In doing so, we adopt the efficient and predominant cause analysis from our Court of Appeals and conclude that the liquor liability exclusion absolves Illinois Casualty of a duty to defend or indemnify its insured under its general businessowners policy. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Illinois Casualty.
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First, we determine whether the liquor liability exclusion is ambiguous. Second, in concluding that the exclusion is unambiguous, we analyze whether it excludes coverage for the claims set forth in the Eberts’ second amended complaint. E.g., Prop.-Owners, Ins. Co. v. Ted’s Tavern, Inc., 853 N.E.2d 973 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
A. The liquor liability exclusion in the businessowners policies is unambiguous.
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B. The unambiguous language of the Big Daddy’s businessowner policy excludes coverage for the Eberts’ claims.
An unambiguous insurance policy must be enforced according to its terms, even if those terms limit an insurer’s liability. Sheehan Const. Co., Inc., 935 N.E.2d at 169. Whether an insurer has a duty to defend a particular lawsuit is determined by examining the nature of the underlying complaint. Transamerica Ins. Servs. v. Kopko, 570 N.E.2d 1283, 1285 (Ind. 1991). And an insurer’s duty to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify. Seymour Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Com. Union Ins. Co., 665 N.E.2d 891, 892 (Ind. 1996). Consequently, if an insurer does not have a duty to defend, then it does not have a duty to indemnify.
We find that the unambiguous language of the businessowners policy excludes coverage for the claims asserted in the Eberts’ second amended complaint. In doing so, we adopt and apply the efficient and predominant cause analysis set forth by our Court of Appeals. See Ted’s Tavern, Inc., 853 N.E.2d at 980; Wright v. Am. States Ins. Co., 765 N.E.2d 690, 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Wiegand, 808 N.E.2d 180, 189 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.
1. The businessowners policy expressly excludes coverage for claims that Big Daddy’s carelessly and negligently served alcohol to and failed to obtain alternative transportation for Spence.
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2. The businessowners policies either exclude or do not provide coverage for the remaining claims.
In concluding whether the liquor liability exclusion applies to the Eberts’ remaining claims, we apply the efficient and predominant cause analysis originally set forth by our Court of Appeals. See Ted’s Tavern, Inc., 853 N.E.2d at 980; Wright, 765 N.E.2d at 697; Wiegand, 808 N.E.2d at 189, trans. denied. In doing so, we adopt the guidance set forth in Ted’s Tavern.
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After determining the policy was unambiguous, the Court of Appeals concluded the allegations within the claims of negligently hiring, training, and supervising employees and nuisance “are general ‘rephrasings’ of the core negligence claim for causing/contributing to Wickliff’s drunk driving,” and the claims were “so inextricably intertwined with the underlying negligence that there [was] no independent act that would avoid [the] exclusion.” Id. at 983. Because “the immediate and efficient cause of the injuries was drunk driving precipitated by the negligent service of alcohol,” the trial court committed reversible error by concluding the policy provided coverage for these counts. Id. at 983–84.
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In line with the foregoing, we restate the Eberts’ allegations as follows: Big Daddy’s served Spence alcohol, and he subsequently drove his vehicle from the premises while intoxicated and collided with the Eberts’ vehicle. Thus, the efficient and predominant cause of the collision was Spence’s drunk driving after he was served alcohol at Big Daddy’s.
At the trial level, the Parks defendants argued, “The Eberts’ allegations are not ‘inextricably intertwined’ with dram shop liability because the Parks Defendants could be liable regardless of whether they provided any alcohol to Spence.” Id. at 123. As an example, the Parks defendants contended they could still be liable for failing to prevent Spence from driving or calling the police if he arrived intoxicated from narcotics or made violent threats to another patron.
The Court of Appeals similarly noted that “[t]he critical commonality to all the counts in Ted’s Tavern was not just that the patron was intoxicated, but that the bar and its employees had caused the patron to be intoxicated.” Slip op. at 19–20. The Court of Appeals distinguished the present circumstances from Ted’s Tavern, because while “all of the Eberts’ claims relate factually to Spence’s intoxication, some of them do not legally rely on the bar causing or contributing to that intoxication,” as required to fall within the exclusion. Id. at 20. By contrast, liability could attach under the failure to intervene theories if Spence had arrived at Big Daddy’s already intoxicated or suffered impairment from “an epileptic seizure, the throes of delusion, or a diabetic incident.” Id.
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Here, the claims that the Parks defendants were negligent in allowing Spence to leave Big Daddy’s in his vehicle and failing to call police “are so inextricably intertwined with the underlying negligence,” Ted’s Tavern, Inc., 853 N.E.2d at 983, and could not have resulted in injury but for Spence’s driving while intoxicated after Big Daddy’s served him alcohol. See also Wiegand, 808 N.E.2d at 191. Plainly, the Eberts essentially claim the Parks defendants were negligent for failing to intervene. But we cannot ignore the circumstance necessitating intervention in the first place: the service of alcohol to an intoxicated Spence. Therefore, like the trial court, we find that Spence’s intoxication was the efficient and predominant cause of the Eberts’ injuries. See also Wright, 765 N.E.2d 690.
Further, in affirming the trial court, we are not persuaded by the Eberts’ argument that summary judgment was improper on the issue of coverage under the Little Daddy’s businessowners policy. The Eberts concede the Little Daddy’s liquor liability policy does not apply to their claims because neither France nor Little Daddy’s served Spence any alcohol. Instead, they argue that because material questions of fact exist regarding the scope of France’s employment on the night in question, and neither France nor Little Daddy’s caused or contributed to Spence’s intoxication or furnished any alcohol to him, Illinois Casualty may owe a duty to defend the Parks defendants under the businessowners policy issued to Little Daddy’s.
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Finally, it is significant that the liquor liability exclusions in the businessowners policies are even broader than the exclusion in Ted’s Tavern. For example, the exclusion applies to allegations of negligence or other wrongdoing in the monitoring of others by an insured or failing to provide transportation for a person who might be under the influence of alcohol. While the Court of Appeals remarked, “If Illinois Casualty wished to exclude coverage for any and all claims arising from intoxication generally or from intoxicated patrons, then it would have drafted a contract that said so,” slip op. at 20, we cannot ignore the unambiguous language of the exclusion in relation to the allegations pled by the Eberts. See Kopko, 570 N.E.2d at 1285; Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Mallon, 409 N.E.2d 1100, 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (“In other words, it is the nature of the claim and not its merits that determines the duty to defend.”).
We find that the efficient and predominant cause of the Eberts’ injuries was drunk driving precipitated by the negligent service of alcohol, and because the insurance policy excluded coverage for claims of bodily injury after causing or contributing to a person’s intoxication or furnishing alcohol to a person under the influence of alcohol, the policy excludes the Eberts’ claims from its coverage.
Conclusion
Consistent with our findings, we conclude that Illinois Casualty does not owe a duty to defend or indemnify the Parks defendants under the businessowners policies issued to either show club and the liquor liability policy issued to Little Daddy’s. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in Illinois Casualty’s favor.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.