Baker, S. J.
Zachary Miller appeals the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the Appellees (“Providers”). Concluding the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Providers, we reverse and remand.
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On several occasions in December 2016 and early January 2017, Providers rendered care and treatment to Miller regarding his mental health issues. On January 9, Miller killed his grandfather. As a result, the State charged Miller with murder, aggravated battery as a Level 3 felony, and voluntary manslaughter as a Level 2 felony. Miller pleaded guilty but mentally ill to voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced to twenty years, twelve of which was executed.
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Miller contends the trial court erred by granting summary judgment for Providers. Providers allege that Miller should not be permitted to relitigate his criminal responsibility for the killing of his grandfather in this civil suit. In support of this assertion, Providers argued to the trial court that Miller’s claim for damages is barred as a matter of public policy and by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. We address each in turn
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With regard to the public policy concerning these types of cases, the parties cite Rimert v. Mortell, 680 N.E.2d 867 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied.
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On appeal, this Court acknowledged the general rule of public policy that a person cannot maintain an action if, in order to establish the cause of action, he must rely, in whole or in part, on an illegal or immoral act or transaction to which he is a party or on his violation of the criminal statutes. Id. at 871-72. We further noted that the purpose of this rule is to prevent those who knowingly and intentionally engage in serious illegal acts from imposing liability upon others for the consequences of their own behavior. Id. at 872. Finally, we held it to be the public policy of this state that:
an individual who has been convicted of a crime should be precluded from imposing liability upon others, through a civil action, for the results of his or her own criminal conduct. Consequently, a person may not maintain an action if, in order to establish the cause of action, he or she must rely, in whole or in part, upon an illegal act or transaction to which he or she is a party or upon a violation by him or herself of the criminal laws.
Id. at 874. Simply stated, it is against public policy to allow a criminal defendant to shift responsibility for the consequences of his or her criminal acts to third parties.
With our adoption of this public policy, we noted an important limitation—the controlling consideration to imposing this policy is the plaintiff’s legal responsibility for the criminal act in question. Id. By that we mean, to the extent that a plaintiff was not responsible for the underlying criminal act, for example by reason of legal insanity, the plaintiff’s action would not be barred as violative of public policy. Id. at 874-75. Thus, a problem arises when it is unclear whether the plaintiff is legally responsible for the criminal act in question. Id. at 874.
We encounter just such a problem in the present case—it is unclear whether Miller is legally responsible for his criminal act. Although Miller entered a plea of guilty but mentally ill to his criminal charge, in this civil action he claims that he was insane at the time of the killing. The rationale behind this claim is that an insane person is not held criminally responsible for his acts. Galloway v. State, 938 N.E.2d 699, 708 (Ind. 2010); Ind. Code § 35-41-3-6(a) (1984) (“A person is not responsible for having engaged in prohibited conduct if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct at the time of the offense.”). Miller bases his claim on the report of Dr. Frank H. Krause, a psychologist who evaluated Miller pursuant to court order to determine his sanity at the time of the offense. Dr. Krause concluded that Miller was insane at the time of the killing, and Miller designated his report in response to Providers’ motion for summary judgment in this case.
Further, Miller has not based his civil claims against Providers on his criminal act. Rather, his complaint, which is included in his designated evidence, alleges damages based on Providers’ failure to comply with the appropriate standard of care. While Miller’s felony conviction may be admitted into evidence in the civil action, it is not necessarily conclusive proof therein of the facts upon which his conviction was based….
…our courts acknowledge that it is for the trier of fact to determine whether the defendant appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the offense. Myers v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1069, 1075 (Ind. 2015). Therefore, in a summary judgment setting where the movant has the burden of demonstrating that the designated evidentiary matter shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment on this issue is inappropriate. See Young, 24 N.E.3d at 423-24. Moreover, this Court has stated that the public policy of precluding a convicted individual from imposing upon others civil liability for his criminal conduct is not justified and should not operate to preclude a civil action when the convicted individual-plaintiff is not responsible for the act in question. Rimert, 680 N.E.2d at 874-75. Accordingly, our public policy should not preclude Miller from attempting to rebut the facts as established by his criminal conviction and prove that he was criminally insane at the time of the killing and thus not responsible for the act.
B. Collateral Estoppel
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We turn our focus now to the present case and our inquiry into Miller’s incentive to litigate. In doing so, we are mindful that, as the Illinois Supreme Court so eloquently articulated, “the refusal to give [a defendant’s] criminal judgment preclusive effect should not occur without a compelling showing of unfairness, nor should it be based on a conclusion that the criminal judgment was erroneous.” Talarico, 685 N.E.2d at 330 (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28, cmt. j (1982).
Unlike the defendants in both Rimert and Heil, Miller did not exercise his right to a criminal jury trial. Instead, he pleaded guilty but mentally ill. Consequently, a trier of fact has not heard evidence or passed judgment on Miller’s sanity or intent with regard to the killing of his grandfather.
To oppose Providers’ motion for summary judgment, Miller designated the transcript of his sentencing hearing…
In mitigation, defense counsel offered the statutory factor that there are substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the crime, though failing to establish a defense….In pronouncing sentence, the trial court found Miller’s mental health issues to be a mitigating circumstance that established substantial grounds to excuse or justify the offense. Id. at 196. It also included a recommendation and specific request that Miller “be placed in the most appropriate facility and the most appropriate programs that will help him to continue his mental health treatment.” Id. at 197.
Next, we undertake an examination of the second factor: whether it would be otherwise unfair under the circumstances to permit the use of collateral estoppel. In Heil, we found it was not unfair to apply collateral estoppel against Heil under the circumstances—i.e., a once-criminal-defendant-now-turned-civil-plaintiff presenting in her civil action the same defense (i.e., non-consensual contact) as she presented in her criminal action and “which was expressly rejected on the same issue by a jury.” 756 N.E.2d at 566.
Miller has not presented evidence of his insanity to a trier of fact; however, in his designation of evidence he included the report of Dr. Frank H. Krause, the psychologist who performed a psychiatric evaluation of Miller in May 2018 pursuant to court order….
…Furthermore, Miller included in his designation the Medical Review Panel Opinion. It sets forth the unanimous decision of the medical review panel that Providers failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care in their treatment of Miller and that their conduct was a factor of the resultant damages. See id. at 120-23.
In light of the evidence of both the State’s and the trial court’s awareness concerning the role the lack of mental health treatment had in Miller’s actions and the consideration given by the trial court to the mitigating evidence of substantial grounds that excused or justified the crime, we conclude Miller did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of his criminal responsibility in the criminal case. Additionally, under the circumstances presented here it would be otherwise unfair to apply collateral estoppel to preclude Miller from attempting to rebut the inference of his sanity established by his plea of guilty but mentally ill. Consequently, Providers, whose burden it was to show they were entitled to the use of collateral estoppel, have failed, and the trial court’s application of collateral estoppel to preclude Miller’s civil claim was in error.
While we recognize that our holding allows for potentially inconsistent determinations of fact in a criminal trial and a subsequent civil action, we nonetheless believe that, in the circumstances before us, affording Miller the opportunity to have his day in court to fully litigate his medical malpractice claim overrides our apprehension about the potential for inconsistent determinations. As did our colleagues in Illinois, “we believe it would be unfair to create a situation in which a criminal defendant who, after balancing the costs and risks of trial, chooses to accept a plea negotiation is said to automatically forfeit his right to a civil trial.” Talarico, 685 N.E.2d at 331. Indeed, we are mindful that our open courts clause mandates, “All courts shall be open; and every person, for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. Justice shall be administered freely, and without purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, and without delay.” IND. CONST. art. 1, § 12. This clause thus “‘guarantees access to the courts to redress injuries to the extent the substantive law recognizes an actionable wrong.’” Escamilla v. Shiel Sexton Co., Inc., 73 N.E.3d 663, 666 (Ind. 2017) (quoting Smith v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 883 N.E.2d 802, 807 (Ind. 2008)). Additionally, we are concerned that to rule otherwise and refuse “to look behind the curtain of the negotiated guilty plea” would require every criminal defendant with a potential civil suit to proceed with a criminal trial, regardless of the risks. Talarico, 685 N.E.2d at 331. This would result in the acceptance of fewer plea agreements, which would, in turn, cause our trial courts to function less efficiently.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude Providers failed to show that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the allegations of Miller’s complaint and that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, summary judgment was not proper. We reverse and remand this matter for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
May, J. and Pyle, J., concur.