Najam, J.
Statement of the Case [1] B.A. (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of D.D. and C.D. (collectively, “Adoptive Parents”) on Adoptive Parents’ claim that Father’s consent to the adoption of P.A. (“Child”) is not required. Father raises two issues for our review, which we revise and restate as follows:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it ordered Father to submit to a DNA test.
2. Whether the court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of Adoptive Parents.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
….
Father contends that the court erred when it entered summary judgment in favor of Adoptive Parents on the ground that Father’s consent to the adoption is not required. It is well settled that a petition to adopt a child may be granted only if written consent to the adoption has been executed by certain individuals. See Ind. Code § 31-19-9-1(a) (2021). As relevant here, a petition to adopt a child may only be granted if written consent has been executed by the “mother of a child born out of wedlock and the father of a child whose paternity has been established” by “a court proceeding other than the adoption proceeding” or “a paternity affidavit executed under IC 16-37-2-2.1.” I.C. § 31-19-9-1(a)(2).
….
…On appeal, Adoptive Parents contend that, because the designated evidence reveals that Father is not Child’s biological father, they have met their burden as summary-judgment movants to demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that Father’s consent is not required. We cannot agree.
….
Adoptive Parents assert that Father’s exclusion as Child’s biological father, without more, demonstrates that Father’s consent is not required, regardless of whether he has executed a paternity affidavit. In essence, Adoptive Parents contend that a paternity affidavit can be nullified simply by proof that the affiant is not the biological father. However, a man’s execution of a paternity affidavit “establishes paternity” and “gives rise to parental rights and responsibilities,” including the right of the child’s mother to obtain child support and the right of the man to have parenting time. I.C. § 16-37-2-2.1(j). And except as otherwise provided, “if a man has executed a paternity affidavit in accordance with this section, the executed paternity affidavit conclusively establishes the man as the legal father of a child without any further proceedings by a court.” I.C. § 16-37-2-2.1(p). It is clear that, if a man executes a paternity affidavit and does not rescind it, he is by all accounts the father of the child. As such, we cannot agree with Adoptive Parents that the exclusion of a father as the biological father necessarily means that his consent is not required. Rather, the plain language of Indiana Code Section 31-19-9- 1(a)(2) requires consent from a man whose paternity has been established through the execution of a paternity affidavit, subject to other provisions of the Indiana Code that may apply, including the best interests of the child. See I.C. § 31-19-11-1(a) (allowing the court to grant an adoption petition if, among others the court finds that the adoption is in the best interests of the child), see also I.C. § 31-19-9-8 (enumerating circumstances when consent to an adoption is not required).
….
In addition, Adoptive Parents assert that Father is a not a “parent” under the adoption statute. See Appellees’ Br. at 27. Adoptive Parents are correct that a “parent” for purposes of the adoption statute is defined as “a biological or an adoptive parent.” I.C. § 31-9-2-88(a). However, while the legislature used the word “parent” in other parts of Indiana Code Section 31-19-9-1, it did not use that word in the relevant subsection. Indiana Code Section 31-19-9-1(a)(2) requires the consent of the “mother of a child born out of wedlock and the father of a child whose paternity has been established” by a court proceeding or a paternity affidavit. Again, had the legislature intended that only a “parent” of a child born out of wedlock be required to consent to an adoption, it would have said so. We therefore hold that Indiana Code Section 31-19-9-1(a)(2) requires the consent of any man who has established his paternity in one of the two methods before an adoption can occur, including through the execution of a paternity affidavit.
The designated evidence demonstrates that Father is not Child’s biological father. However, as the summary-judgment movants, it was Adoptive Parents’ initial burden to designate evidence that would, if proven, exclude Father as Child’s legal father such that his consent was not required under Indiana Code Section 31-19-9-1(a)(2). Had they done so, the burden would have shifted to Father to designate evidence that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding his paternity. But the burden never shifted to Father because Adoptive Parents did not designate any evidence to exclude Father as Child’s legal father.
Here, Adoptive Parents filed their motion for summary judgment on the faulty premise that excluding Father as Child’s biological father negated the need for his consent to the adoption. However, as we have discussed, the fact that a man is not a Child’s biological father does not demonstrate that he is not Child’s legal father or that his consent is not required. [Footnote omitted.] Thus, Adoptive Parents are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Trial Rule 56(C).
In sum, the facts alleged by Adoptive Parents fail to demonstrate that Father’s consent to the adoption is not required. Adoptive Parents’ designated evidence did not exclude Father as Child’s legal father. As a result, they did not meet their burden, and a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether Father has established his paternity such that his consent is required under Indiana Code 31-19-9-1(a)(2). Thus, we reverse the court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Adoptive Parents. And we remand with instructions for the court to determine whether Father is, in fact, Child’s legal father and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. [Footnote omitted.]
Conclusion
Father has not met his burden on appeal to demonstrate that the court erred when it ordered him to submit to a DNA test. Further, evidence that a man is not a child’s biological father, without more, is not dispositive of whether he is the child’s legal father or obviate the need for his consent to an adoption. And Adoptive Parents have failed to designate evidence that would exclude Father as Child’s legal father such that Father’s consent would not be required under Indiana Code Section 31-19-9-1(a)(2). We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
Bradford, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur