Goff, J.
Burglary is the breaking into and entering of a building or structure of another person with the intent to commit a felony. Because the burglar need not actually carry out the underlying intended felony for criminal liability to attach, the offense is complete, for purposes of prosecution, at the moment the building or structure is broken into and entered. But does the offense itself end simply because the State has established criminal liability? We conclude that it does not, and hold that burglary is an ongoing crime that encompasses a defendant’s conduct inside the premises, terminating only when the unlawful invasion ends.
So, despite the defendant here having armed himself after the breaking and entering, we affirm his conviction for level-2 felony burglary while armed with a deadly weapon. But because the length of the defendant’s aggregate sentence exceeds the consecutive-sentencing cap imposed by Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2, we reverse and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
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We begin our decision by summarily affirming Part II.A of the Court of Appeals opinion. See App. R. 58(A)(2). Because we disagree with the panel’s holding on the elevated burglary offense, we vacate that portion of its opinion (Part II.B) instructing the trial court to enter judgment of conviction for level-3 felony armed robbery. See App. R. 58(A). But because the trial court withheld judgment of conviction for that offense, there’s no double-jeopardy issue for us to resolve.
We write, then, to address two issues: (I) whether the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Fix of level-2 felony burglary; and (II) whether the aggregate sentence for Fix’s felony convictions (burglary, armed robbery, and theft) exceeds the sentencing cap imposed by Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2.
I. Fix committed the elevated burglary offense by arming himself after entering the victim’s home.
Indiana Code section 35-43-2-1 defines burglary, a level-5 felony, as the breaking and entering of a “building or structure of another person, with intent to commit a felony or theft in it.” The offense becomes a level-2 felony if it “is committed while armed with a deadly weapon.” Id. The question here centers on the scope of the phrase “committed while armed.”
Fix argues that the statute’s “plain language” precludes his conviction for the elevated offense “because he was not armed at the time [the] act of burglary was committed.” Resp. to Pet. to Trans. at 6. According to his theory, the burglary offense was complete once he crossed the threshold of Mudd’s residence, and because he wasn’t armed at that precise moment, there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for the elevated offense.
The State, on the other hand, argues that burglary is “an ongoing crime” which doesn’t end “until the unlawful invasion ends and the burglar exits the premises.” Pet. to Trans. at 10. So, for the statutory enhancement to apply, the State submits, it makes no difference whether Fix was armed at the threshold of the premises or whether he armed himself after entering the home. In support of its argument, the State cites the language of the statute itself, its underlying goals and policies, “basic principles underlying common-law burglary,” and judicial construction of similar enhancing language in other criminal statutes.
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On first impression, the language of our burglary statute seems clear enough. Rather than contemplating acts committed after the breaking and entering of a premises, the statute elevates the offense only if “committed while armed with a deadly weapon.” See I.C. § 35-43-2-1 (emphasis added). Consistent with this reading of the statute is the view that culpability “is established at the point of entry, with the criminal transgression” complete “at the moment the building or structure is broken into and entered.” Swaynie v. State, 762 N.E.2d 112, 114 (Ind. 2002). On the other hand, “[t]his Court has long declined to define the phrase ‘while committing’ in terms of the chronological completion of the statutory elements of the underlying felony.” Eddy v. State, 496 N.E.2d 24, 28 (Ind. 1986).
So where does that leave us? Does the “doctrine of completion” apply simply because the State has established the burglar’s criminal liability? See Callahan v. State, 246 Ind. 65, 69, 201 N.E.2d 338, 340 (1964). Or is burglary an ongoing offense that encompasses a defendant’s conduct so long as he remains in the premises?
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In Bissot v. State, the defendant stood convicted of felony murder after shooting a marshal who confronted him during a break-in of a local pharmacy. 53 Ind. 408, 410–11 (1876). The Court, in what has become a widely cited opinion, upheld the conviction, rejecting the defendant’s argument that the burglary was “consummated” before the killing. Id. at 412. “Although we must construe criminal statutes strictly, adhere closely to the definition of crimes, and interpret technical words according to their fixed meaning,” the Court explained, adopting the defendant’s theory would render it “quite impracticable to ever convict” for felony murder—whether committed during a burglary, robbery, arson, or rape. Id. at 412–13. When “the homicide is committed within the res gestae of the felony charged,” the Court concluded, “it is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, the felony within the true intent and fair meaning of the statute.” Id. at 413. This statutory construction, the Court reasoned, “is safe to the State and the citizen, and the only one by which the intention of the legislature can be practically carried into effect.” Id. at 414. “It has long been the law in Indiana,” we observed more than a century after the decision in Bissot, “that the shooting of a person by a robber or burglar while leaving the premises in an attempt to complete the crime is part of the res gestae of the [offense] such that the shooting is, for felony murder purposes, committed in the perpetration of the robbery or burglary.” Seeley v. State, 544 N.E.2d 153, 157 (Ind. 1989) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
This well-established precedent leads us to conclude that burglary— even if “complete” for purposes of establishing culpability—is an ongoing crime that encompasses a defendant’s conduct after the breaking and entering, not just at the threshold of the premises.
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Still, the policy of public safety embodied in the burglary statute persuades us that the legislature intended for the armed enhancement to apply, even if the enhancing event followed the act of breaking and entering. Indeed, whether the offender arrives with a deadly weapon or whether he arms himself once inside the premises, the danger posed is the same. And to terminate culpability at the threshold would circumvent the enhancement for any burglar wise enough to retrieve a deadly weapon (e.g., a standard kitchen knife) once inside the premises, effectively defeating the statutory goal of ensuring public safety. Our construction of our burglary statute, we believe, “is safe to the State and the citizen, and the only one by which the intention of the legislature can be practically carried into effect.” See Bissot, 53 Ind. at 414.
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For the reasons above, we conclude that burglary is an ongoing crime that encompasses a defendant’s conduct inside the premises, terminating only when the unlawful invasion ends. We thus affirm the trial court’s conviction of Fix for level-2 felony burglary while armed with a deadly weapon. But because Fix’s commission of level-5 felony robbery and level-6 felony theft amounted to a single episode of criminal conduct, we hold that the length of his aggregate sentence exceeds the maximum aggregate sentence permitted by our Sentencing Cap Statute. We thus remand for the trial court to resentence Fix to consecutive terms of imprisonment for those two non-violent offenses “not exceed seven (7) years,” see I.C. § 35-50-1-2(d)(2), capping his aggregate term for all offenses at thirty-seven years.
Rush, C.J., and David and Massa, JJ., concur.
Slaughter, J., concurs in Part I and in the judgment without separate opinion.