Bradford, C.J.
In June of 2017, five-year-old C.L. reported to her grandmother that she had been sexually abused by Bryan Lyons, her father. Lyons denied the allegations but entered into an agreement with the State to take a stipulated polygraph examination, the results of which would be admissible at trial. During the prepolygraph screening, Indiana State Police Sergeant Dan Gress changed the polygraph from stipulated to non-stipulated due to concerns over Lyons’s mental state. Lyons made incriminating statements during the post-polygraph interview. At the time, the prosecutor was not made aware that the polygraph had been changed to non-stipulated and was therefore now inadmissible. In July of 2017, Lyons was charged with Level 1 felony child molesting and the case moved forward with Lyons operating on the assumption that the polygraph was stipulated.
On July 19, 2021, the first day of trial, Lyons filed a motion to continue due to the State’s failure to disclose that the polygraph was non-stipulated until a few days before trial. The trial court granted that continuance and ultimately suppressed any evidence of the polygraph results and Lyons’s post-polygraph statements. The State appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Lyons’s post-polygraph statements. Because the trial court has broad discretion to impose discovery sanctions, and a serious discovery violation occurred in this case, we affirm and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.
…
The State puts great emphasis on the distinction between the polygraph results and Lyons’s post-polygraph statements. The State argues in part that, because Lyons’s post-polygraph statements are separately admissible, the trial court abused its discretion in excluding them. However, the post-polygraph statements were not excluded simply because the trial court found them to be inadmissible, but rather because of the State’s discovery violation.
…
Lawrence County Local Trial Rule 108(C)(1)(h) requires that “The State shall disclose […] any material or information within its possession or control that tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to the offense charged or would tend to reduce the punishment for such offenses.” Indiana Trial Rule 37 provides the trial court with a mechanism to “ensure compliance with the trial rules and obedience to its orders.” Wright v. Miller, 989 N.E.2d 324, 327 (Ind. 2013) (citing Whitaker v. Becker, 960 N.E.2d 111, 116 (Ind. 2012), Rumfelt v. Himes, 438 N.E.2d 980, 982 (Ind. 1982)).
“Trial Rule 37 provides broad latitude for the trial court to impose sanctions to ensure cooperative discovery, and thus encompasses remedies which may be sought by or imposed against either party.” Id. “Trial Rule 37(B) permits the trial court to ‘make such orders… as are just,’ including ‘treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey,’ ‘prohibiting [the disobedient party] from introducing designated matters into evidence,’ ‘dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party’ when that party ‘fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery.’” Id. “Yet, in exercising this inherent power, ‘the trial court should seek to apply sanctions which have a minimal effect on the evidence presented at trial and the merits of the case,’” [Wiseheart, 491 N.E.2d at 990], keeping in mind ‘that sanctions should not be imposed when circumstances make sanctions unjust,’ Outback Steakhouse of Fla. Inc. v, Markley, 856 N.E.2d 65, 82 (Ind. 2006)[.]” Wright, 989 N.E.2d at 330.
The State argues that the prosecutor immediately informed Lyons upon learning that the polygraph was non-stipulated, that this is a case of “misfeasance not malfeasance[,]” and that the trial court was overbroad2 in excluding Lyons’s post-polygraph statements when only his non-stipulated polygraph should have been deemed inadmissible. Appellant’s Br. p. 2. While we understand that the prosecutor in this case may have acted as quickly as possible under the circumstances, we have little doubt that a discovery violation took place. “The individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432 (1995). Further, though the State argues that the exclusion of Lyons’s post-polygraph statements amounts to an unjust sanction, the State had ample opportunity to disclose this information in a timely fashion.
Sergeant Gress informed Detective Jones that he had changed the polygraph from stipulated to non-stipulated on the day the polygraph was taken. There was ample opportunity pre-trial for Sergeant Gress and Detective Jones, acting as agents of the State, to ensure that all parties were informed that the polygraph was non-stipulated, including a hearing concerning the admissibility of the polygraph at which the two testified. Further, the trial court held a hearing following the State’s late disclosure of the non-stipulated nature of the polygraph. At that hearing, Sergeant Gress and others testified concerning the State’s chain of communication and why the State had failed to disclose that the polygraph was non-stipulated until a few days before trial. At that hearing, Sergeant Gress stated that he brought up the non-stipulated nature of the polygraph “way before [a] week before trial.” Tr. Vol. II p. 197.
We are unconvinced by the State’s argument that the discovery violation resulted in no significant prejudice to Lyons’s defense because the argument fails to acknowledge the broader implications that pretrial discovery violations may have on a case. The State’s argument focuses solely on the fact that the disclosure, however late, revealed that damaging polygraph results were no longer admissible. “The purpose of Indiana’s discovery rules is ‘to allow a liberal discovery procedure’ for the purpose of providing litigants ‘with information essential to the litigation of all relevant issues, eliminate surprise and to promote settlement.’” Doherty v. Purdue Properties I, LLC, 153 N.E.2d 228, 235 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Canfield v. Sandock, 563 N.E.2d 526, 528 (Ind. 1990)). It is easy to imagine a scenario in which Lyons entered into a plea agreement with the State before ever finding out that the polygraph results would not have been admissible in a trial. For the above reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding all evidence related to the polygraph, including Lyons’s post-polygraph statements.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.
Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.