Per curiam.
At sentencing, a criminal defendant who enters an open guilty plea has a right to allocution distinct from the right to present evidence on his or her behalf. We grant transfer to clarify this distinction. But finding the trial court’s error was not reversible, we ultimately affirm Strack’s sentence.
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For an individual who enters an open guilty plea, the right to present evidence at sentencing and the right of allocution are distinct, as we clarify below. But we conclude Strack is not entitled to relief because he exercised both rights and any error by the trial court was harmless.
Before being sentenced for a felony, a criminal defendant is “entitled to subpoena and call witnesses and to present information in his own behalf.” Ind. Code § 35-38-1-3. A defendant is not required to testify at sentencing, but when a defendant chooses to testify for evidentiary purposes, he or she must be placed under oath and subject to cross-examination. Biddinger v. State, 868 N.E.2d 407, 413 (Ind. 2007).
“But a statement in allocution is not evidence. Rather it is more in the nature of closing argument where the defendant is given the opportunity to speak for himself or herself” to the trial court before the court pronounces the sentence. Id. Through allocution, the defendant may explain his or her views of the facts and circumstances without being “put to the rigors of cross-examination.” Id.
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But the “Indiana Constitution places a unique value upon the desire of an individual accused of a crime to speak out personally in the courtroom and state what in his mind constitutes a predicate for his innocence of the charges.” Biddinger, 868 N.E.2d at 412 (quoting Vicory, 802 N.E.2d at 429). Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution provides, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right…to be heard by himself and counsel[.]” Informed by these principles, we have found that defendants who ask to give allocution in guilty plea and probation revocation cases also have the right to do so. Biddinger, 868 N.E.2d at 412; Vicory, 802 N.E.2d at 429. And where the defendant has pleaded guilty without a plea agreement, as here, this right to allocution is separate and distinct from the right to present sentencing testimony.
Here, though, Strack ultimately exercised both these discrete rights— first testifying for evidentiary purposes, then after closing arguments, accepting the trial court’s invitation to give allocution. Although Strack was not denied either right, he claims that the trial court committed fundamental error by incorrectly advising, before he testified, that if he had “anything to say he need[ed] to testify.” Strack argues that, instead of informing him of his right to allocution, the trial court essentially forced him to testify and submit to cross-examination or lose the ability to speak on his own behalf.
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Strack complains that cross-examination elicited evidence that he endangered his young daughter riding with him when he operated a vehicle while intoxicated and that he continued using alcohol after the incident. But other sentencing testimony had already introduced that information. Likewise, the presentence investigation report disclosed Strack’s pending domestic battery charges, and the trial court took care not to allow testimony about the elements of that charged offense.
Excluding the charges dismissed on double jeopardy grounds, Strack faced a maximum of 11 years of incarceration. See I.C. § 35-50-2-7; I.C. § 35-50-3-3; I.C. § 9-30-15.5-2. Strack was sentenced to an aggregate of six years, only four of which were to be executed.
We find that Strack has not proved his sentence would have been different had he not testified and been subject to cross-examination. As we did in Williams v. State, 164 N.E.3d 724, 725 (Ind. 2021), we remind trial courts to be clear and accurate in their sentencing hearing colloquies. But here, Strack was able to exercise both his right to present evidence and his right to allocution. We therefore find any error was harmless and did not affect his substantive rights such that reversal is warranted. Having granted transfer, we affirm Strack’s sentence.
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.