Tavitas, J.
Zachary Woodward appeals his convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Level 4 felony; possession of methamphetamine, a Level 5 felony; and possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. We conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting the laboratory report and that there was sufficient evidence to sustain Woodward’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine. We further conclude, in accordance with the precedent of our Supreme Court, that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence of Woodward’s identity with respect to the prior felony underlying the possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon conviction. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Woodward raises several issues, and we address the following: I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a laboratory report concerning methamphetamine. II. Whether the State produced sufficient evidence to sustain Woodward’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine III. Whether the State produced sufficient evidence to establish the requisite prior felony for Woodward’s conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon.
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Woodward argues that the State failed to submit sufficient evidence to demonstrate that he is a serious violent felon. The State did submit documents evidencing that a person named Zachary Woodward was convicted for dealing in a controlled substance in 2008. Those records included a date of birth and a social security number. But the State did not introduce evidence of the defendant Woodward’s social security number nor any other evidence linking defendant Woodward to the previous conviction. Woodward contends that the State did not prove that he was the same Zachary Woodward listed in those documents.
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Woodward argues that the only evidence of the requisite prior conviction that the State introduced were certified records of the 2008 conviction. Those records are insufficient, Woodward contends, because “[o]ur appellate courts have held that a matching name and date of birth, absent other identifying evidence, are not sufficient to prove identity” when comparing a prior offense with a present defendant. We agree with Woodward’s assessment of this aspect of our jurisprudence.
With respect to proving the existence of a prior conviction, our Supreme Court has held:
In regard to the use of documents to establish the existence of prior convictions we have stated: Certified copies of judgments or commitments containing a defendant’s name or a similar name may be introduced to prove the commission of prior felonies. Schlomer v. State, 580 N.E.2d 950, 958 (Ind. 1991) (citing Andrews v. State, 536 N.E.2d 507 (Ind. 1989)). While there must be supporting evidence to identify the defendant as the person named in the documents, the evidence may be circumstantial. Id.; see also Coker v. State, 455 N.E.2d 319, 322 (Ind. 1983). If the evidence yields logical and reasonable inferences from which the finder of fact may determine beyond a reasonable doubt that it was a defendant who was convicted of the prior felony, then a sufficient connection has been shown. Pointer v. State, 499 N.E.2d 1087, 1089 (Ind. 1986)[;] Hernandez v. State, 716 N.E.2d 948, 953 (Ind. 1999). To prove the defendant was previously convicted of operating while intoxicated the State offered into evidence the information, plea agreement, and the minutes of the court for the guilty plea. Record at 495-96, 501, 504. The documents carry a consistent cause number for this offense, [ ] and the name the offender and other identifying information match the defendant. There was sufficient evidence from which a fact-finder could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was convicted of two separate and unrelated felonies.
Tyson v. State, 766 N.E.2d 715, 718 (Ind. 2002) (emphases added). see also Payne v. State, 96 N.E.3d 606, 613 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (“the only evidence the State introduced to prove Payne’s identity as the defendant in the robbery cause was the evidence of the robbery defendant’s name and birth date. As this Court has already held that a defendant’s name and birth date, alone, are not sufficient to prove identity, we conclude that there was not sufficient evidence to prove that Payne had previously committed the robbery and, therefore, qualified as an SVF.” (emphases added)).
The State—without objection—submitted exhibits 1-A through 1-G. Those exhibits included: (1) the charging information from a 2007 incident for which “Zachary A. Woodward . . . DOB: 10-26-1988” was charged with, among other things, dealing in a Schedule IV controlled substance, then a Class C felony (Ex. 1-A; Ex. Vol. I p. 6); (2) the probable cause affidavit underlying that charge, complete with police incident reports; (3) the attendant guilty plea, dated November 20, 2008; (4) the trial court’s order on the guilty plea; (5) the pertinent sentencing order; (6) the abstract of judgment; and (7) the bond record. Furthermore, the police incident reports included the 2007 offender’s height, weight, ethnicity, eye color, hair color, and social security number. Ex. Vol. I p. 11.
The State called no witnesses to identify defendant Woodward as the person who pleaded guilty to the 2007 charge. Neither did the State provide mugshots or fingerprints from the prior charge, from which an identification could be made or rejected by the jury. Although the records of the prior offense included a social security number, the State did not present evidence of Woodward’s social security number to the jury.
The State contends that it also provided additional corroborating circumstantial evidence. At trial, the State submitted a video recording of Woodward’s statements to police. Among those statements was an acknowledgement that Woodward was not allowed to possess firearms and that he would be in substantial trouble if caught possessing a firearm. St. Ex. 12 at 7:17. Accordingly, the jury learned of Woodward’s subjective awareness that: (1) he was not allowed to possess firearms, and (2) the consequences for violating that prohibition would be severe.
We conclude that neither of the State’s arguments is persuasive. Woodward’s subjective awareness that he was not allowed to possess firearms does not make it more likely that he is the perpetrator of the 2007 offense. It may make it more likely that he was the perpetrator of some prior offense. But the State carried a burden to prove that Woodward committed a specific offense, one chosen and presented by the State.
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Our review of the case law leads us to the firm conclusion that both our Supreme Court and this Court require more evidence than a date of birth and same name from the State to prove Woodward’s identity as the 2007 offender.
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Our review of the case law leads us to the firm conclusion that both our Supreme Court and this Court require more evidence than a date of birth and same name from the State to prove Woodward’s identity as the 2007 offender.
Accordingly, we reverse Woodward’s conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. Because the habitual offender finding, which Woodward does not challenge, attached to this reversed conviction, we must remand for resentencing. See, e.g. Hobbs v. State, 161 N.E.3d 380, 387 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“In Greer v. State, 680 N.E.2d 526 (Ind. 1997), our supreme court reversed Greer’s attempted murder conviction to which a habitual offender enhancement was attached. On resentencing, the trial court attached the habitual offender enhancement to Greer’s robbery conviction and resentenced Greer for his robbery conviction. Greer appealed his resentencing. Our supreme court held that the trial court on remand was not prohibited from revising the sentence for the surviving felony conviction to reflect the habitual offender enhancement.”) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied.
The trial court did not err in admitting the laboratory report, and the State produced sufficient evidence to sustain Woodward’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine. The State failed, however, to produce sufficient evidence to sustain Woodward’s conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Riley, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.