Najam, J.
Rodrick L. Davis appeals his convictions for burglary, as a Level 3 felony, domestic battery, as a Level 6 felony, and invasion of privacy, as a Level 6 felony. Davis raises two issues for our review, which we restate as: 1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of Davis’s subsequent bad acts. 2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction for Level 3 felony burglary.
We affirm.
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Davis maintains that the December 4 evidence should have been excluded under Evidence Rule 404(b) as “impermissible propensity evidence” because, according to Davis, the evidence “does not demonstrate [his] intent or motive” regarding the July 17 incident or his state of mind on that day. Davis acknowledges that “[p]rior assaults or confrontations that are close in time to the presently charged conduct are reflective of a defendant’s motive for the presently charged conduct.” Id. at 24. However, he argues that “when the uncharged acts occur after the presently charged conduct,” the acts “do not give rise” to the inference that the present conduct is part of a “series of events that led to the present charges.” Id. (emphasis added). Davis asserts that “successive assaults are materially different from prior assaults.” Id. And he maintains that “future hostility cannot show” that the parties were hostile “at the time of the presently charged conduct” or that “the present conduct was just the latest evidence of the parties’ past hostility.” Id. at 25.
The State contends that the challenged evidence was not admitted to show Davis’s propensity to commit the crimes that occurred on July 17; rather, it was admitted to explain Davis’s intent “when he forced his way into A.K.’s house . . . and committed domestic battery” and to explain to the jury “A.K.’s apparent decision to recant and then reverse her recantation and testify against Davis.” Appellee’s Br. at 11. The State further contends that, if there was any error in the admission of the evidence, the error was harmless.
We note that, although Rule 404(b) cases typically involve the issue of whether prior bad acts of the defendant are admissible, the wording of Rule 404(b) does not suggest that it only applies to prior bad acts and not subsequent ones. Southern v. State, 878 N.E.2d 315, 322 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (emphasis in original), trans. denied. Therefore, when determining the admissibility of evidence of subsequent crimes, wrongs, or other acts, it is appropriate to use the Evidence Rule 404(b) test. Id. (citations omitted).
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While the December 4 evidence was undoubtedly prejudicial, we find that the evidence was also highly relevant both to disprove Davis’s claim that he was acting in self-defense on July 17, and to illustrate Davis’s motive to commit the crimes. Further, the admission of the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial. The jury was not told that Davis had been charged with any crimes related to the December 4 incident. The testimony and discussion regarding the contested evidence comprised only a short amount of time during the course of Davis’s three-day trial. And, during final instructions, the court provided a limiting instruction and advised the jury that the December 4 evidence was admitted “solely on the issue of the relationship of the parties” and that it “should not be considered on the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence of the Defendant[.]” Tr. Vol. 3 at 43. “When the jury is properly instructed, we will presume they followed such instructions.” Weisheit v. State, 26 N.E.3d 3, 20 (Ind. 2015) (citations omitted), cert denied, 577 U.S. 1106 (2016). As such, we cannot say that the probative value of the December 4 evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Davis. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the December 4 evidence of Davis’s subsequent bad acts under Evidence Rule 404(b).
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We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of Davis’s subsequent bad acts, and the evidence was sufficient to support Davis’s conviction for Level 3 felony burglary. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Bradford, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur