Vaidik, J.
Case Summary
Indiana Code section 31-15-4-8 authorizes a trial court in a dissolution-of-marriage action to issue a provisional order governing the affairs of the parties while the action is pending. The provisional order can include, among other things, “an order for possession of property.” The issue in this appeal is whether this provision allows a trial court to order the sale of property. We hold it does not.
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Husband contends the provisional-order statute does not allow a court to order the sale of property. No Indiana appellate court has decided this issue. Statutory interpretation is a pure question of law, so our review is de novo. Miller v. Patel, 174 N.E.3d 1061, 1064 (Ind. 2021).
Provisional orders in dissolution-of-marriage actions are governed by Indiana Code chapter 31-15-4…. Husband argues that the provision authorizing “an order for possession of property” does not allow an order for sale of property. Wife responds that an order requiring the sale of property is, in effect, “an order for possession of property”—an order that “neither party should possess it.” Appellee’s Br. p. 12. We agree with Husband.
In the context of a pending marriage-dissolution action, the plain meaning of the phrase “an order for possession of property” is an order declaring which spouse will possess particular property during the pendency of the action. The idea is that the parties shared the property when they were together, but they are now separated and the court must decide which of the two will possess the property until the dissolution is finalized.
This reading of the statute is consistent with the nature of a provisional order. Such an order is “temporary,” in place during the pendency of the dissolution proceedings and terminating when the final dissolution decree is entered…
Moreover, when the legislature wants to authorize an order for sale of marital property, it says so. Indiana Code section 31-15-7-4, which governs the division of marital property in a dissolution action, provides… If the legislature wished to give trial courts the power to order the sale of property in a provisional order, it could have done so explicitly in the provisional-order statute, such as by authorizing “an order for possession or sale of property.”
Wife identifies several reasons why an order for the sale of property could be a good idea at the provisional stage. The property might be decreasing in value. The parties might need to pay attorneys, a mediator, a guardian ad litem, or other professionals. Or the property might be at imminent risk of foreclosure. See St. Angelo v. St. Angelo, 496 N.Y.S.2d 633 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985). But those are arguments for the legislature. We must apply the provisional-order statute as it is currently written, and that statute allows only an order for the possession of property, not the sale.1 We therefore reverse the order for the sale of the house, the tractor, and the camper and remand this matter to the trial court for the entry of a revised provisional order.
Reversed and remanded.
Najam, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.