Robb, J.
Case Summary and Issue
Isabella Reynolds fell while performing a cheerleading routine for William Henry Harrison High School (“Harrison High School”) in early 2019. As a result, Reynolds suffered extensive injuries to her face and mouth. Harrison High School is part of the Tippecanoe School Corporation (“TSC”) and in the fall of 2019, Reynolds filed a negligence claim against TSC, among others, that was based, in part, on the failure of TSC to provide proper supervision. TSC filed a motion for summary judgment on Reynolds’ negligence claim. The trial court denied TSC’s motion for summary judgment as it pertained to whether TSC provided negligent supervision.
TSC filed a motion to reconsider and, in the alternative, argued that Reynolds’ claim for negligent supervision was barred by the doctrine of incurred risk. The trial court again denied summary judgment. TSC brings this interlocutory appeal, raising multiple issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying TSC’s motion for summary judgment on reconsideration. Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion, we reverse and remand.
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II. Negligent Supervision in Sport
A. The Pfenning Rule
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Whether a defendant breached a duty is typically a question of fact for the jury. Matter of C.G., 157 N.E.3d at 546. However, in Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392, 403-04 (Ind. 2011), our supreme court established a limited new rule in regard to negligence claims “arising from ordinary sports activity.” Megenity v. Dunn, 68 N.E.3d 1080, 1082 (Ind. 2017). “[A]s a matter of law, when a sports participant injures someone while engaging in conduct ordinary in the sport— and without intent or recklessness—the participant does not breach a duty.” Id. “[U]nder Pfenning ordinary conduct in the sport turns on the sport generally— not the specific activity.” Id.
Here, at issue is whether the cheerleading routine Patton had Reynolds and her teammates perform was ordinary for the sport of cheerleading. [Footnote omitted.] Also at issue is whether negligent supervision is a separate cause of action capable of escaping a Pfenning analysis.
B. Ordinary Behavior
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Although Reynolds’ designated evidence suggests that Patton’s individual actions associated with coaching and supervision were inappropriate, nothing suggests that this routine was outside the ordinary conduct observed in the sport of cheerleading as a whole….
We conclude that the routine Patton had Reynolds and her teammates perform was ordinary within the sport of cheerleading as a whole. Therefore, TSC satisfies the ordinary behavior element of the Pfenning analysis. However, prior to determining that TSC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we must address whether negligent supervision is a separate claim that is outside the reach of Pfenning.
C. Negligent Supervision as a Separate Cause of Action
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Conversely, Reynolds has consistently argued that Pfenning expressly allows for a separate analysis of negligent supervision. See Appellant App., Vol. II at 97- 99; see also Br. of Appellee at 17. According to Reynolds, Pfenning applies only to “routine accidents” and not the negligent failure to supervise. See Br. of Appellee at 18. In making her argument, she adopts the reasoning of the trial court that everyday decisions differ from circumstances where a coach places an athlete in a new situation and fails to provide ideal levels of supervision including failing to focus more on the new athlete and use additional safety measures. See id. at 19; see also Appellant App., Vol. II at 14-15.
Although we are sympathetic to Reynolds’ situation and the injuries she suffered, Reynolds’ argument is incompatible with Megenity. As the routine Patton had the cheerleading squad perform was ordinary under a general analysis of the sport, we cannot now separate out a coach’s specific conduct related to supervision of the routine as a separate cause of action. Instead, Megenity details that once an analysis of “ordinary” for the sport as a whole is conducted, then, if raised by a party, that same conduct is evaluated for recklessness and intent. 68 N.E.3d at 1085. And both recklessness and intent consider a participant’s individual actions and thought processes during the conduct that caused the injury. Id. Therefore, it stands to reason that an analysis of a coach’s individual actions related to supervising her athletes and the choices made therein are subsumed by a review of whether that coach was intentional or reckless in her conduct. To hold otherwise would leave us without a framework for evaluating a negligent supervision claim against a participant. As a result, a claim for negligent supervision cannot be considered a separate cause of action capable of eluding an analysis under the Pfenning rule.
We have already concluded the cheerleading routine performed by Reynolds and her teammates was ordinary as a whole for the sport of cheerleading. Because there is no separate cause of action for negligent supervision and there is no claim that Patton was intentional or reckless in her conduct, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying TSC’s motion to reconsider as to Reynolds’ negligent supervision claim and TSC was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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Conclusion
TSC’s designated evidence demonstrated that the routine Patton had Reynolds and her teammates perform was ordinary and no evidence designated by Reynolds demonstrates otherwise. We also conclude that negligent supervision is not a separate claim capable of eluding the Pfenning rule. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in denying TSC’s motion to reconsider its summary judgment ruling. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to enter summary judgment for TSC.
Reversed and remanded.
Riley, J., and Weissmann, J., concur