Tavitas, J.
Following a jury trial, Latuwan Anthony Partee was convicted of dealing in cocaine, a Level 2 felony, and possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor, and was also found to be an habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Partee to an aggregate sentence of twenty-seven and one-half years, with five years thereof suspended. Partee appeals and claims that: (1) the trial court committed reversible error by failing to inform him that he could reclaim his constitutional right to be present in the courtroom if he agreed to conduct himself in an appropriate manner; and (2) the trial court’s sentencing order erroneously refers to the original charges instead of the amended charges. Concluding that the trial court did not err by failing to inform Partee that he could be brought back into the courtroom but that the sentencing order needs to be corrected, we affirm and remand.
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Partee makes no claim that the trial court erred by removing him from the courtroom. Instead, Partee argues that the trial court erred by failing to advise him that he could return to the courtroom if he promised to conduct himself in an appropriate manner. The trial court’s failure to do so, Partee claims, deprived him of the right to be present at trial under both the state and federal constitutions. The State argues that Partee forfeited this argument for purposes of appeal. We agree with the State.
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In Allen, the United States Supreme Court noted that: “It would degrade our country and our judicial system to permit our courts to be bullied, insulted, and humiliated and their orderly progress thwarted and obstructed by defendants brought before them charged with crimes.” Allen, 397 U.S. at 346, 90 S. Ct. at 1062. The Allen Court elaborated:
We accept [] the statement of Mr. Justice Cardozo who [] said: “No doubt the privilege (of personally confronting witnesses) may be lost by consent or at times even by misconduct.” Although mindful that courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the loss of constitutional rights, we explicitly hold today that a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom. Once lost, the right to be present can, of course, be reclaimed as soon as the defendant is willing to conduct himself consistently with the decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts and judicial proceedings.
It is essential to the proper administration of criminal justice that dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country. The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated. We believe trial judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case. No one formula for maintaining the appropriate courtroom atmosphere will be best in all situations. We think there are at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to handle an obstreperous defendant like Allen: (1) bind and gag him, thereby keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly.
Id. at 342-44, 90 S. Ct. at 1060-61 (emphases added) (internal citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added); accord Wells, 176 N.E.3d at 983-84.
Focusing on the language in Allen that a trial court may remove a disruptive defendant “until he promises to conduct himself properly,” 397 U.S. at 344, 90 S. Ct. at 1061, Partee asserts that a defendant must “be advised he may reclaim this constitutional right and be afforded the opportunity to return to the courtroom if he promises to behave.”
We recognize that some courts have read the Supreme Court’s opinion in Allen as requiring trial courts to advise defendants that they may return to the courtroom if they promise to behave. See Biglari v. State, 847 A.2d 1239, 1247 (2004) (“[T]he defendant who is removed from the courtroom must be advised of the opportunity to return upon a promise to behave.”). The Court in Allen, however, did not explicitly require that a defendant be advised that he may return to the courtroom if he promises to behave; it merely stated that a trial court judge may remove an unruly defendant “until he promises to conduct himself properly.” Allen, 397 U.S. at 344, 90 S. Ct. at 1061. This does not create a requirement that a trial court advise the defendant that he may return to the courtroom if he promises to behave.
We find support for our conclusion in Scurr v. Moore, 647 F.2d 854 (8th Cir. 1981). In that case, the defendant argued that a state trial court judge erred because, at the time the judge removed the defendant from the courtroom for disruptive behavior, it did not specifically advise the defendant that he could return to the courtroom if he behaved properly. The Eighth Circuit held that “such a procedure is desirable, but Illinois v. Allen makes no such absolute requirement.” Scurr, 647 F.2d at 858. Instead, “[t]he Allen Court stated only that once the confrontation right is lost it can be reclaimed as soon as the defendant is willing to conform his behavior consistent to the decorum required in judicial proceedings.” Id.
Here, Partee never indicated that he was willing to conform his behavior to that required in a judicial proceeding. To the contrary, the trial court repeatedly brought Partee back into court and attempted to warn him that he could be excluded from the trial. Nor did the trial court immediately expel Partee from the courtroom due to his behavior. Instead, the trial court attempted less-drastic measures: first warning Partee, then holding him in contempt, then placing him in administrative segregation. Even then, the trial court twice attempted to bring Partee back into the courtroom for the trial, only to have Partee continue to cause a disturbance. “[I]t boiled down to whether [the defendant], or the [trial court] judge, was going to conduct the trial.” United States v. Nunez, 877 F.2d 1475, 1478 (10th Cir. 1989). The trial court gave Partee numerous opportunities to behave in a respectful manner. Partee squandered these opportunities and continued in his disruptive conduct. Partee gave the trial court no indication that he was willing to conform his behavior consistent to the decorum required in judicial proceedings.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not commit error, let alone fundamental error, by failing to explicitly advise Partee that he could return to the courtroom if he promised to behave. We instead commend the trial court for its patience with a defendant as difficult as Partee.
Partee also claims that the trial court’s sentencing order erroneously refers to Count I as originally charged instead of as amended. The sentencing order describes Count I as “35-48-4-1(a)(2)/F2: Dealing in Cocaine Manufacture/ Deliver/Finance – between 5 & 10 grams/prior.” App. Vol. II p. 28 (emphasis added). As noted above, this is how the State initially charged Partee. The State later amended Count I to charge Partee with dealing in cocaine while possessing a firearm, not dealing cocaine with a prior dealing conviction. The State concedes this error. We, therefore, remand with instructions that the trial court correct this scrivener’s error in its sentencing order.
The trial court did not commit fundamental error by failing to explicitly advise Partee that he could return to the courtroom if he promised to behave in an appropriate manner. The trial court’s sentencing order does, however, contain a scrivener’s error, and we therefore remand with instructions that the trial court correct this error. We otherwise affirm the judgement of the trial court.
Affirmed and remanded.
Bradford, C.J., and Crone, J., concur.