Goff, J.
The division of marital property in Indiana involves a two-step process. The trial court must first identify the property to include in the marital estate, and then must distribute that property under the rebuttable presumption that an equal division between the parties is “just and reasonable.” But how much discretion does a trial court have in deviating from this process? Today, we hold that, so long as it expressly considers all marital property, and so long as it offers sufficient justification to rebut the presumptive equal division, a trial court need not follow a rigid, technical formula in dividing the marital estate and we will assume it applied the law correctly.
Because the trial court here substantially complied with the requisite process, we find no abuse of discretion. We also find no error in the trial court’s award of spousal maintenance. We therefore affirm the trial court on both issues.
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I. We find no error in the trial court’s award of spousal maintenance.
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The trial court here ordered Husband to pay Wife $100 per week for a period of eighteen months (or seventy-eight weeks), totaling $7,800. And in “lieu of additional ‘monthly maintenance’ payments,” the court further ordered Wife to “retain the $12,000 advance previously set aside to her.” Appellee’s App. Vol. II, p. 23. In settling on this award, the trial court cited several “relevant” statutory factors. Id. These factors included Wife’s role as the children’s primary caregiver, the interruption in employment she incurred as a result, and Husband’s “substantially” greater earnings and earning capability. Id. See I.C. §§ 31-15-7-2(3)(B), (C). The trial court also considered evidence related to the parties’ education levels and the time and expense necessary for Wife to find employment. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 36, 51, 57, 74. See I.C. §§ 31-15-7-2(3)(A), (D).
Despite these findings, Wife insists that Mason’s ongoing special needs render it nearly impossible for her to secure employment, and that the financial resources necessary to accommodate those needs justify her maintenance request. Appellant’s Br. at 15–16. While sympathetic to Wife’s argument, we affirm the trial court’s judgment on this issue. To be sure, the facts Wife relies on may be relevant to an analysis of a trial court’s award of custodial maintenance. See I.C. § 31-15-7-2(2) (permitting maintenance for the parent of a child whose physical or mental impairment requires the parent to forgo employment). But Wife challenges only the trial court’s award of rehabilitative maintenance, which aims to remedy a spouse’s earning capacity following an interruption in education and employment “during the marriage.” I.C. § 31-15-7-2(3). What’s more, Wife offered no evidence—and raises no arguments—on whether her future employment requires any education or training, let alone the time and expense necessary for that education or training. Cf. I.C. § 31-15-7-2(3)(D).
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II. We find no error in the trial court’s division of marital property.
Husband argues that the Court of Appeals ignored the standard of review by substituting its judgment for that of the trial court. Pet. to Trans. at 8. He acknowledges that “a trial court cannot, based solely on one factor, [e]ffect ‘an unequal distribution of the marital estate absent consideration of other factors necessary for the conclusion that such a distribution would be just and reasonable.’” Id. at 10 (quoting Eye v. Eye, 849 N.E.2d 698, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). He argues, however, that the trial court did, in fact, consider the relevant statutory factors—including “the premarital nature of certain assets and debts” and “the earning abilities of the parties.” Id. at 10–11.
Wife insists otherwise. Emphasizing her lack of education, limited earning capacity, and childcare responsibilities, she specifically faults the trial court for failing to adequately consider her financial standing. Appellant’s Br. at 18–19. These factors, she insists, demand “more assets” than the trial court awarded her. Id. at 19. Wife also argues that the trial court erred by excluding Husband’s premarital assets from the estate, emphasizing “that all marital property goes into the marital pot for division,” regardless of when or how it was acquired. Resp. to Trans. at 6; Appellant’s Br. at 16.
A. The trial court properly considered all relevant factors under the Division-of-Property Statute.
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While we agree in principle with the holding in Wallace, we find that precedent inapposite to this case. In dividing the martial estate, the trial court here expressly found that the marriage was short-term, that Wife acted as the children’s primary caregiver during the marriage, that she “brought very few assets to the marriage,” that she failed to advise Husband of the student-loan debt she incurred prior to the marriage, that Husband “received no benefit” from Wife’s education, and that Wife “is capable of earning income” of up to “$30,000.” Appellee’s App. Vol. II, pp. 20, 23. The trial court also cited the “disparity of the part[ies’] income and earning abilities” to justify its division of property. Id. at 22.
These findings either correspond with the relevant factors under our Division-of-Property Statute or find support in our case law. See I.C. § 31- 15-7-5(1) (contribution of each spouse to the property’s acquisition), I.C. § 31-15-7-5(3) (spouse’s economic circumstances at the time of divorce), I.C. § 31-15-7-5(5) (earnings or earning ability of the parties). See Boschert, 758 N.E.2d at 591 (short-lived marriage may rebut the presumption of equal division).
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B. So long as it considers all assets and debts, and so long as it offers sufficient findings to rebut the presumptive equal division, the trial court need not apply a technical formula in dividing the marital estate.
Finally, we address Wife’s argument that the trial court erred by excluding Husband’s premarital assets from the estate. Husband notes the “inartful” and “somewhat confusing” language of the trial court’s dissolution decree. OA at 20:16, 21:19–20. But nothing in that decree, he insists, “clearly excluded assets from the marital pot.” Id. at 21:21–26. And to the extent the trial court departed from the proper statutory procedure in dividing the estate, Husband submits, any error was harmless, and a simple remand for a clarified order would suffice as a remedy. Pet. to Trans. at 9; OA at 20:35–45.
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Here, we’re faced with somewhat different circumstances. Unlike in Lulay and Capehart, the trial court expressly considered all property in the marital estate—the “total gross assets and liabilities,” as the court categorized it—which included the retirement accounts, life-insurance policies, and student-loan debt. Appellee’s App. Vol. II, p. 21. The court then set aside to Husband the life-insurance policies and the premarital value of the IRA and 401K before calculating the value of the “remaining divisible marital pot” and awarding Wife her share of the “net marital estate.” Id. at 21–22.
The better approach, we believe, would have been for the trial court to include all assets and liabilities in the divisible marital pot, rather than setting aside those assets and liabilities at issue before dividing the estate. Such an approach offers greater transparency to the parties, potentially averting further litigation. But, in the end, a trial court’s judgment is “tested by its substance rather than by its form.” Shafer v. Shafer, 219 Ind. 97, 104, 37 N.E.2d 69, 72 (1941) (internal quotation marks omitted). So long as it expressly considers all assets and liabilities, and so long as it offers sufficient findings to rebut the presumptive equal division, a trial court need not follow a rigid, technical formula in dividing the marital estate and we will assume that it applied the law correctly. See Luttrell, 994 N.E.2d at 305. That’s precisely what happened here.
Conclusion
For the reasons above, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its award of spousal maintenance or in its division of property.
Affirmed.
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Slaughter, JJ., concur.