Goff, J.
Today, we’re asked to extend the reach of the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA or Act) to include a claim for indemnification by one medical provider against another. We decline that invitation because indemnification sounds in contract, and because neither the text of the MMA nor precedent interpreting the Act support categorizing such a claim as one for medical malpractice. We therefore hold that a breach-of-contract claim for failure to indemnify need not follow the procedures contained within the Act.
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Lake Imaging maintains that Franciscan’s claim for breach of contract falls within the claims the MMA was intended to address. Therefore, Lake Imaging argues, the MMA’s two-year statute of limitations applies and Franciscan’s claim is time-barred. Franciscan counters that the claim does not fall under the MMA because the claim is one for breach of contract rather than for medical malpractice. And because the breach of the Agreement’s indemnity clause is a general breach-of-contract claim, Franciscan contends, the ten-year statute of limitations for breach of contract applies. See I.C. § 34-11-2-11.
We begin our analysis with the applicability of the MMA. See Pt. I, infra. We then turn to the issues of subject-matter jurisdiction and the applicability of the MMA’s statute of limitations. See Pt. II, infra. Next, we address Lake Imaging’s claim that the Agreement’s expiration caused the indemnification clause to terminate. See Pt. III, infra. Finally, we turn to the issue of liability on the part of ProAssurance, Lake Imaging’s insurer. See Pt. IV, infra.
I. The MMA does not apply to Franciscan’s breach-of-contract claim.
Lake Imaging contends that, because Franciscan is defined as a “patient” under the MMA, its indemnification claim is subject to the Act’s two-year statute of limitations. Resp. to Pet. to Trans. at 9. For its part, Franciscan argues that, by its plain terms, the MMA applies only to “‘a patient or the representative of a patient who has a claim for bodily injury or death on account of malpractice.’” Pet. to Trans. at 18–19 (quoting I.C. § 34-18-8-1) (bold emphasis added).
We agree with Franciscan’s reading of the Act.
A. Neither the text of the MMA nor precedent interpreting the Act support categorizing Franciscan as a “patient.”
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B. Expanding the MMA’s application to the type of claim at issue here conflicts with the purpose of the Act.
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II. Because the MMA doesn’t apply, the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction and the MMA’s statute of limitations does not apply.
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III. The Agreement’s indemnification clause had not expired.
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IV. The trial court should consider ProAssurance’s potential liability on remand. Finally, we turn to an issue raised by ProAssurance
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Conclusion
Because Franciscan’s claim for breach of contract was not one for medical malpractice, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of that claim. We also direct the trial court to consider and resolve the issue of ProAssurance’s obligation to indemnify Lake Imaging. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Franciscan’s claim that Lake Imaging breached their contract by committing medical malpractice. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Slaughter, JJ., concur.