Pyle, J.
James Warren (“Warren”) appeals, following a jury trial, his convictions for Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, Level 6 felony possession of a controlled substance while in possession of a firearm, and Level 6 felony maintaining a common nuisance. Warren argues that the trial court: (1) abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence; and (2) erred by denying his request to exercise his right to be physically present in the courtroom during his sentencing hearing. Concluding that any error in the admission of evidence was harmless, we affirm Warren’s convictions. Additionally, concluding that the trial court erred by denying Warren’s request to exercise his right to be physically present during his sentencing hearing, we vacate the trial court’s sentencing order and remand with instructions for the trial court to hold a sentencing hearing where Warren is physically present.
We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
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Next, we turn to Warren’s argument that the trial court erred by denying his request to exercise his right to be physically present in the courtroom during his sentencing hearing and then holding a remote sentencing hearing. Specifically, Warren contends that the trial court failed to comply with Administrative Rule 14, which governs when and how a trial court may conduct sentencing proceedings remotely. Additionally, Warren asserts that the trial court failed to comply with the Indiana Supreme Court’s emergency Covid-19 order, dated May 13, 2020, which was in effect at the time of his January 2021 sentencing hearing. Warren argues that this Court should vacate his sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing at which he can be physically present. We agree.
It is axiomatic that a defendant has a right to be physically present when he is sentenced on a criminal conviction. Indeed, “[t]here is a lengthy history involving the common law and statutory right requiring a defendant’s actual physical presence at a sentencing hearing.” Gary v. State, 113 N.E.3d 237, 243 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (Pyle, J., dissenting), trans. denied. Indiana Code § 35- 38-1-4(a) requires that a defendant “must be personally present at the time [his] sentence is pronounced.” (Emphasis added). The Indiana Supreme Court interpreted “personally present” to refer to a defendant’s “actual physical presence.” See Hawkins v. State, 982 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (Ind. 2013). Our supreme court also noted that “subsection 4(a) is written in such a way that it conveys not only the defendant’s right to be present at sentencing, but also his obligation to be present.” Id. at 1003 n.4 (emphasis in original).
A defendant, however, may waive his right to be physically present at a sentencing hearing. Specifically, Administrative Rule 14(2)(a) provides that a “trial court may use audiovisual telecommunication to conduct . . . [s]entencing hearings . . . when the defendant has given a written waiver of his or her right to be present in person and the prosecution has consented[.]” (Emphases added). “Thus, a trial court may conduct a sentencing hearing at which the defendant appears by video, but only after obtaining a written waiver of his right to be present and the consent of the prosecution.” Hawkins, 982 N.E.2d at 1002-03.
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Here, the record before us reveals that Warren did not waive, in writing or otherwise, his right to be present at his sentencing hearing. Instead, Warren filed a written motion, asserting his desire to exercise his right to be physically present in the courtroom for his sentencing hearing. The trial court, however, denied Warren’s motion without an order or findings. Instead, it merely stamped “DENIED” on Warren’s motion. (App. Vol. 2 at 62). Because the trial court held a sentencing hearing in which Warren clearly did not waive his right to be present, we vacate the trial court’s sentencing order and remand for a new sentencing hearing in which Warren can exercise his right to be physically present at the hearing.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.