May, J.
Denver Lee Murray appeals following his conviction of Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine. He raises two issues for our review, which we revise and restate as:
1. Whether the trial court’s order directing Murray to show his teeth to the jury violated his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination; and
2. Whether Murray’s twenty-five-year sentence is inappropriate given the nature of his offense and his character.
We affirm.
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Murray challenges the trial court’s order granting the State’s motion to require him to show his face and teeth to the jury.
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In United States v. Hubbell, the United States Supreme Court further articulated upon this distinction: As Justice Holmes observed, there is a significant difference between the use of compulsion to extort communications from a defendant and compelling a person to engage in conduct that may be incriminating. Thus, even though the act may provide incriminating evidence, a criminal suspect may be compelled to put on a shirt, to provide a blood sample or handwriting exemplar, or to make a recording of his voice. The act of exhibiting such physical characteristics is not the same as a sworn communication by a witness that relates either express or implied assertions of fact or belief. 530 U.S. 27, 34-35, 120 S. Ct. 2037, 2042-43 (2000) (internal footnotes omitted).
Murray argues that, when the trial court ordered him to smile and show his teeth, the trial court compelled him to perform a testimonial act in violation of the Fifth Amendment. He likens his case to Seo v. State, in which our Indiana Supreme Court held the Fifth Amendment protection against compulsory self-incrimination prohibited the trial court from compelling Seo to unlock her smartphone. 148 N.E.3d at 958. The Court explained compelling Seo to unlock her smartphone would have allowed law enforcement to “scour the device for incriminating information” and “would provide the State with information that it does not already know.” Id. “Giving law enforcement an unlocked smartphone communicates to the State, at a minimum, that (1) the suspect knows the password; (2) the files on the device exist; and (3) the suspect possesses those files.” Id. at 955. In contrast, Murray’s act of showing his teeth did not implicitly convey any similar information. While smiles can convey messages in the ordinary course of life, any such emotional context is removed when the subject smiles because he is directed to do so.
Instead, we find the facts herein more like other cases in which we have held no constitution violation occurred. For example, in Springer v. State, we held that it was not a violation of the defendant’s right against compulsory self-incrimination to require him to hold up his hand to reveal he was missing a finger. 372 N.E.2d 466, 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978), reh’g denied. Similarly, in Flynn v. State, we held that it was constitutional to require a defendant to bare his forearm and display a tattoo to the jury. 412 N.E.2d 284, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). We therefore hold the trial court did not violate Murray’s Fifth Amendment protection against compulsory self-incrimination when it required him to show his teeth to the jury. See, e.g., Sholler v. Commonwealth, 969 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Ky. 1998) (holding defendant’s right against compulsory self-incrimination was not violated when trial court ordered him to show his teeth to the jury); State v. Gonzalez, 856 N.W.2d 580, 588 (Wisc. 2014) (same).
Substantial evidence aside from the appearance of Murray’s teeth indicates he was the individual who met with and sold methamphetamine to Romine. Initially, we note the perpetrator’s teeth were visible only in the video of the second transaction, and the jury found Murray not guilty of the theft charge associated with that transaction. Nonetheless, Romine identified Murray in court as the individual he met during both transactions. Detective Heckel and Detective Tipton also provided in-court identifications of Murray, and the State put into evidence two photographs of Murray. The State also presented testimony from law enforcement that Murray was the only person to enter Romine’s car during the controlled-buy operation on February 10, 2020. Further, the person Romine texted to arrange the transactions identified himself by Murray’s initials, “D.M.” (Tr. Vol. V at 3), and Romine communicated with the same phone number to set up both transactions. Thus, we can confidently say beyond a reasonable doubt the jury would have reached the same verdict had Murray not been ordered to show his teeth to the jury. See Hendricks v. State, 897 N.E.2d 1208, 1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding erroneous admission of statement the defendant made after invoking his right to counsel was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
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The trial court did not violate Murray’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when it ordered him to show the jury his teeth because doing so was a non-testimonial physical demonstration. Further, even if the trial court erred in ordering the demonstration, any such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the overwhelming evidence of Murray’s guilt. With respect to Murray’s sentence, we do not find it to be inappropriate considering the large quantity of methamphetamine he sold, his criminal history, and his continued criminal activity following the verdict. Therefore, we affirm the trial court.
Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.