Bradford, C.J.
On June 21, 2018, law enforcement responded to a 911 call, where they found Peggy Sue Higginson sitting on the side of Wade Road in Posey County with Troy Higginson, her husband, dead in a nearby black BMW. The State charged Peggy with murder. In October of 2018, Peggy filed her notice of intent to raise a claim of self-defense and introduce effects-of-battery evidence pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-41-3-11(b)(2) and retained Dr. Polly Westcott as her expert witness. In May of 2021, the State moved to exclude Dr. Westcott’s testimony on the basis that her anticipated testimony concerning Peggy’s PTSD diagnosis was inadmissible to support a claim of self-defense. The trial court granted the State’s motion, Peggy moved to certify the trial court’s order for interlocutory appeal, and the trial court granted Peggy’s request. We accepted jurisdiction, and now we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
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Peggy argues that she intends to use Dr. Westcott’s testimony to support “the reasonableness of her apprehension of imminent harm” and that the testimony “would not relate to the defense of insanity[,]” Appellant’s Br. p. 11, because the statute, specifically the self-defense portion, provides a “‘middle ground’ between insanity and sanity.” The Indiana Supreme Court stated in Marley,
Limiting the admissibility of battered women’s syndrome evidence in this manner is consistent with well-established principles of Indiana law. Over one hundred years ago, in Sage v. State, 91 Ind. 141, 145 (1883), this Court held that the current statutory scheme did not recognize a middle ground between sanity and insanity. Thus, insanity was recognizable as a defense, but not as a mitigating circumstance. Our current statutory scheme recognizes no “middle ground” between insanity and sanity. More recently, this Court summarized this principle, stating that, in Indiana we do not recognize degrees of insanity. Rather, within the ambit of the terms comprising the definition of legal insanity, complete mental incapacity must be demonstrated before criminal responsibility can be relieved. In short, as a general proposition Indiana has long held that a defendant may not submit evidence relating to mental disease or defect except through an insanity defense.
747 N.E.2d at 1128 (citations and quotations omitted).
Peggy further argues as follows: [Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-109] contemplates the use of psychological evidence to establish that a person is suffering from the effects of battery… While we are cognizant of our duty to follow our Supreme Court’s precedent, and do not believe that Indiana Code section 35- 41-3-11 provides a middle ground between sanity and insanity, we also agree with much of Peggy’s argument. It would make very little sense for Indiana Code section 35-41-3-11 to state that it allows the use of effects-of-battery evidence, which, again, “refers to a psychological condition of an individual who has suffered repeated physical or sexual abuse inflicted by another individual,” in self-defense claims while actually limiting the use of that evidence to insanity defenses. Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-109 (emphasis added). To entirely forbid the use of effects-of-battery evidence, or psychological trauma, in self-defense cases that fall under Indiana Code section 35-41-3-11, would render the self-defense portion of the statute superfluous. “[W]hen engaging in statutory interpretation, we ‘avoid an interpretation that renders any part of the statute meaningless or superfluous.’” ESPN, Inc v. Univ. Notre Dame Police Dept., 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1199 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Hatcher v. State, 762 N.E.2d 189, 192 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). “And we seek to give a practical application of the statute by construing it in a way that favors public convenience and avoids an absurdity, hardship, or injustice.” Suggs v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1190, 1194 (Ind. 2016).
Still, we strike a delicate balance between allowing appropriate effects-of-battery evidence for defendants invoking self-defense and preserving Indiana’s long held principle of disallowing degrees of insanity. While Marley outlines one such scenario in which evidence must be brought under the insanity defense, Marley does not completely foreclose the use of testimony regarding the psychological effects of battery in self-defense cases.
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In self-defense cases, the ultimate question of whether a specific defendant acted reasonably in responding to a perceived threat of violence still belongs to the factfinder. Hood v. State, 877 N.E.2d 492, 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that, when a defendant is claiming self-defense, “[w]hether the State has met its burden is a question of fact for the factfinder”). A defendant who is using effects-of-battery evidence in support of their claim of self-defense may not circumvent this rule. For instance, an expert witness may not testify that, given the specific defendant’s psychological trauma because of their battery, the defendant was justified in using reasonable force in their defense. Expert witnesses, as in all other cases, may still not testify as to “ultimate factual determination[s].” Douglas v. State, 484 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (“Nevertheless, the ultimate factual determination of whether the incident actually occurred should be made by the trier of fact.”).
While there are clearly limits to what a defendant may do in using effects-of-battery evidence when arguing self-defense, Peggy may use effects-of-battery evidence in her self-defense claim. Dr. Westcott may testify as to evidence which relates to the general reasonableness of one’s apprehension of fear, given the psychological trauma which comes from battery. However, as stated above, Dr. Westcott may not reach an ultimate factual determination exclusive to the jury: for instance, she may not testify that Peggy was, given the psychological trauma she suffered due to her battery, reasonable in using justifiable force. See Douglas, 484 N.E.2d at 612. In essence, Dr. Westcott may testify as to the objective component of a person’s reasonable belief that they were under threat of imminent harm, given their PTSD, but not Peggy’s specific subjective belief. See Littler, 871 N.E.2d at 280. We take special care in outlining the appropriate use of effects-of-battery evidence in self-defense cases under Indiana Code section 35-41-3-11 because an opposite ruling would effectively make the self-defense portion of the statute useless, which we strive to avoid. See ESPN, 62 N.E.3d at 1199.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and we remand for further proceeding consistent with this memorandum decision.
Robb, J., and Altice, J., concur.