Molter, J.
Jennifer Ivy and Tyler Bichler sued their stepmother, Wanda Bichler, alleging she killed their father, Jeffrey Bichler. Wanda then died, and her estate (“Wanda’s Estate”), through its personal representatives, intervened in the lawsuit. Wanda’s attorney, purporting to act on her behalf rather than on behalf of Wanda’s Estate or its personal representatives, moved to dismiss Jennifer and Tyler’s complaint under Trial Rule 12(B)(2) (lack of personal jurisdiction), Trial Rule 12(B)(6) (failure to state a claim), and Trial Rule 12(B)(7) (failure to join a necessary party) based on their failure to add the personal representatives of Wanda’s Estate as defendants. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case, but dismissal following a defendant’s death is evaluated under Trial Rule 25 and Trial Rule 41(E), not Trial Rule 12, so we reverse.
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The trial court granted the request of Wanda’s Estate to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint under Trial Rule 12(B) without specifying which of the rule’s subparts it believed compelled dismissal among those Wanda’s Estate cited— Trial Rule 12(B)(2) (lack of personal jurisdiction), Trial Rule 12(B)(6) (failure to state a claim), or Trial Rule 12(B)(7) (failure to join a necessary party). When a trial court grants a motion to dismiss without identifying which of the movant’s grounds the trial court accepted, we review all the bases cited. Lawson v. First Union Mortg. Co., 786 N.E.2d 279, 281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
We explain below why none of these subparts warrant dismissal, but, before doing so, we also explain that a threshold error was that a dismissal based on the plaintiffs’ failure to substitute the personal representatives of Wanda’s Estate as defendants should be evaluated under Trial Rule 25 (governing motions to substitute) and Trial Rule 41(E) (governing dismissals for failure to prosecute or comply with court orders), not Trial Rule 12 (governing defenses based on the pleadings). Indeed, while the motion to dismiss was based on Trial Rule 12, much of the analysis in the appellee’s brief is devoted to Trial Rule 25.
I. Motions to Substitute Following a Defendant’s Death
Although Indiana did not adopt the deadline for filing a motion to substitute, the obligation to substitute the proper defendant may still be triggered by filing a Suggestion of Death, which puts everyone on notice that the defendant has died. See, e.g., 10 Ind. Prac., Procedural Forms With Practice Commentary § 57.5 (3d ed.) (providing a form, “Suggestion of Death,” for use in Indiana state courts). The trial court may impose a deadline to file the motion, as some federal courts do,….
Here, no party filed a Suggestion of Death. Instead, Wanda’s Estate intervened, and the plaintiffs reasonably understood the intervention to act as a substitution of the personal representatives of Wanda’s Estate for Wanda as the defendants. The plaintiffs explained this understanding in their opposition to the motion to dismiss, stating that “the argument regarding failure to name a proper party is moot inasmuch as Defendants have intervened on behalf [of] Wanda Bichler’s Estate,” but “[i]f the Court deems it necessary, Wanda’s estate can be substituted for Wanda individually.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 75.
If Wanda’s Estate meant for its intervention to operate in some way other than a substitution for Wanda as a defendant, then their motion to intervene created confusion from which they cannot benefit with a dismissal… As both parties agree, intervention and substitution are not necessarily the same thing, but there is no reason an intervention cannot operate as a substitution when the sole purpose for intervening is to replace the defendant. Correctly identifying in the caption whether a party is merely a defendant (albeit a substituted one) or an intervening defendant is not an exercise where form trumps substance. [Footnote omitted.]
In short, the plaintiffs are required to substitute as defendants the personal representatives of Wanda’s Estate, and their failure to do so in a timely manner may subject their suit to dismissal. But there was no suggestion in the trial court that they failed to adhere to any deadline for substitution under Trial Rules 25 or 41(E), so their claims should not have been dismissed.
II. Indiana Trial Rule 12
The motion to dismiss was based on Trial Rule 12, but that rule does not govern the failure to substitute the personal representative for a deceased defendant. The trial court therefore erred by granting the motion.
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Wanda’s Estate has not cited any cases affirming the dismissal of a claim under Trial Rule 12(B) based on the failure to substitute the personal representatives of a defendant’s estate (or other substitute parties). Instead, dismissal is generally evaluated under Trial Rule 25, see, e.g., Russell, 338 F.3d at 665–67, and on appeal, much of the analysis Wanda’s Estate provides is under that trial rule. See Appellee’s Br. at 6, 10–16. This reflects a legal error in the trial court’s dismissal, and we must reverse and remand so that the plaintiffs may have the opportunity to substitute the personal representatives as defendants pursuant to Trial Rule 25. If they fail to do so, then dismissal should be evaluated under Trial Rules 25 and 41(E), not Trial Rule 12.
Reversed and remanded. Vaidik, J., and May, J., concur.