Goff, J.
The General Assembly’s recent codification of Criminal Rule 26 and the adoption of evidence-based practices in the administration of bail aim to strike the proper balance between preserving a defendant’s pretrial liberty interests and ensuring public safety. But these changes call into question the legal standards governing pretrial release, the level of discretion enjoyed by trial courts, and the standard of review on appeal.
Today, we hold that these statutory reforms enhance, rather than restrict, the broad discretion entrusted to our trial courts when executing bail. What’s more, a trial court can and should exercise that discretion to protect against the risk of flight or potential danger to the community. The trial court here did just that. And, so, we affirm its order denying the petitioner’s motion for bond reduction or conditional pretrial release. We emphasize, however, that neither our affirmance of judgment nor our grant of transfer affects the trial court’s order conditionally releasing the petitioner to pretrial electronic home detention with GPS monitoring. So, should either party seek modification of the petitioner’s conditional release, we remand with instructions for the trial court to conduct a hearing consistent with this opinion.
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…Criminal Rule 26 urges trial courts to use “the results of an evidence-based risk assessment” when determining whether to release a defendant before trial. Ind. Criminal Rule 26. This assessment, “based on empirical data derived through validated criminal justice scientific research,” aims to assist a court in evaluating the likelihood of a defendant committing a new criminal offense or failing to appear in court. I.C. § 35-33-8-0.5. Evidence-based practices in the criminal-justice system have shown “considerable promise” in recent years. See Malenchick v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 569 (Ind. 2010). Indeed, research indicates that the IRAS-PAT itself “has strong to moderate predictive validity when assessing risk for failure to appear and re-arrest during the pretrial stage.” Justice Reinvestment Advisory Council, Report on Bail Reform and Pretrial Issues 2 (2019) [hereinafter JRAC Bail Report].
Despite this progress, Indiana’s recent bail-reform initiatives call into question the legal standards governing pretrial release, the level of discretion enjoyed by trial courts, and the standard of review on appeal.
Our decision today aims to resolve these questions. To that end, we begin our discussion with an overview of Indiana’s statutory bail regime. See Pt. I, infra. Our analysis here leads us to conclude that Indiana’s recent bail-reform measures enhance, rather than restrict, the broad discretion entrusted to our trial courts. See id. Next, we analyze the bail decision here, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying DeWees’s request for reduction of bond or conditional pretrial release. See Pt. II, infra. Finally, we turn to a brief discussion of Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the implications of deviating from that Rule, and the need for appellate courts to exercise prudence and restraint—especially in developing areas of the law like we’re presented with today.
In 1980, Indiana amended its bail statutes by prohibiting trial courts from setting bail “higher than that amount reasonably required to assure the defendant’s appearance in court.” Pub. L. No. 202-1980, § 1, 1980 Ind. Acts 1640, 1642 (codified at I.C. § 35-33-8-4(b)). To ensure individualized assessment, these amendments required courts to consider “all facts relevant to the risk of nonappearance,” among which included “the length and character” of the detainee’s “residence in the community,” the detainee’s “employment status and history,” his “family ties and relationships,” his “criminal or juvenile record,” and anything else that “might indicate” a lack of recognition and adherence “to the authority of the court to bring him to trial.” Id. Sixteen years later, the General Assembly enacted additional amendments to its bail statutes. See Pub. L. No. 221-1996, 1996 Ind. Acts 2722. These revisions permitted trial courts to set conditions of pretrial release designed to “assure the public’s physical safety” upon finding by “clear and convincing evidence that the defendant poses a risk of physical danger to another person or the community.” Pub. L. No. 221-1996, § 2, 1996 Ind. Acts at 2722–23 (codified at I.C. § 35-33-8-3.2).
How Criminal Rule 26 affects this statutory framework is a question we turn to first.
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Though far from a model of clarity, this statutory scheme imparts considerable judicial flexibility in the execution of bail. What’s more, these statutes clearly permit—indeed mandate—a trial court to consider all “relevant factors” when setting or modifying bail. See I.C. § 35-33-8-3.8(a). See also I.C. § 35-33-8-4(b) (directing the court to “consider the bail guidelines described in section 3.8” along with “all facts relevant to the risk of nonappearance); I.C. § 35-33-8-5 (permitting modification of bail “based on the factors set forth in section 4(b)”). This reading comports with the very nature of a bail determination. Indeed, to tailor that decision to the individual offender, the trial court should consider the “widest range of relevant information in reaching an informed decision.” See Malenchick, 928 N.E.2d at 574 (quoting Dumas v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1113, 1120–21 (Ind. 2004)).
The codification of Criminal Rule 26 and the adoption of evidence-based practices in the administration of bail results in no change to this judicial flexibility. While Indiana Code section 35-33-8-3.8 mandates a trial court to “consider the results” of an IRAS (if available), there’s nothing in the statute that compels the defendant’s release or that requires the court to rely on the results of the IRAS assessment when setting bail. See I.C. § 35-33-8-3.8(a) (emphasis added). What’s more, the legislature qualified its mandate to include consideration of “other relevant factors.” I.C. § 35-33- 8-3.8(b). See also Crim. R. 26(B) (encouraging a trial court to “utilize the results of an evidence-based risk assessment . . . and such other information as the court finds relevant”); JRAC Bail Report at 13 (“The use of validated, empirically-based pretrial risk assessment tools can enhance the pretrial decision-making process when utilized in conjunction with professional judgment.”). And because the IRAS-PAT measures only the defendant’s risk of failure to appear and risk of re-offending, Indiana’s Pretrial Practice Manual “encourages trial courts to use risk assessment results and other relevant information about arrestees”—including the probable cause affidavit, victim statement(s), domestic violence screeners, substance abuse screeners, mental health screeners, and criminal history— to determine whether the defendant poses a “danger to self or others in the community.” Indiana EBDM Pretrial Work Group, Pretrial Practices Manual 62, 63 (2018).
To be sure, Criminal Rule 26 strongly encourages pretrial release for many accused individuals awaiting trial. This is especially true for persons charged with only non-violent and low-level offenses. And if a defendant presents no “substantial risk of flight or danger” to others, the court must consider releasing the defendant “without money bail or surety,” subject to any reasonable conditions deemed appropriate by the court. I.C. § 35-33-8-3.8(a); I.C. § 35-33-8-3.2(a). Releasing this category of defendants under suitable nonfinancial conditions—such as electronic monitoring, community supervision, no-contact orders, and restrictions on activities or place of residence—will often prove sufficient to ensure the defendant’s appearance at trial and to ensure community safety. But when a person poses a risk of flight or a risk to public safety, Criminal Rule 26 in no way hinders a trial court’s ability to set bond in an amount sufficient to curtail such risks.
DeWees argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion for reduction of bail or conditional pretrial release. She insists that the State presented no “objective evidence to support a finding that [she] posed a threat to Mullins or anyone else in the community.” Resp. to Trans. at 11. A victim’s statement of fear, standing alone, she contends, falls short of the clear-and-convincing standard necessary for the evidence to support such a finding. Id. at 11–12.
The State counters that, while the trial court got it right, the Court of Appeals ignored the standard of review by impermissibly reweighing Mullins’ testimony. Pet. to Trans. at 9–10. What’s more, the State contends, the panel mistakenly “concluded that there was no evidence DeWees posed a risk to the physical safety of the victim or that she was a flight risk.” Id. at 10.
While we consider this a close case, our standard of review prompts us to agree with the State. In reaching its decision, the trial court acknowledged DeWees’s “strong” family ties, her lack of criminal record, and no evidence of past bad character. App. Vol. II, p. 50. The court also cited the “extremely serious” nature of the offense; DeWees’s IRAS score and unemployment status; and her potential distance from the community, depending on living arrangements. Id. at 50. These factors, the trial court ultimately concluded, prevented it from saying that DeWees “is not a substantial flight risk” or “that she is not a danger to others.” In specifically finding that DeWees posed a risk of physical safety to Mullins, the court relied “[p]rimarily” on his testimony that he lived in fear. Id. at 51.
We find sufficient record evidence to support the trial court’s ruling.
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The trial court also relied on the “extremely serious” nature of the offense: level-2 felony aiding, inducing, or causing burglary with a deadly weapon. App. Vol. II, p. 50. See I.C. § 35-50-2-4.5. DeWees attempts to shield herself from the gravity of this charge. Rather than directly participating in the crime, she insists that she acted only as the getaway driver, “never possessed a weapon, never entered the residence,” and fully cooperated when detained by law enforcement. Appellant’s Br. at 15. We find this argument unpersuasive. If convicted, DeWees’s actions make her just as responsible for the offense as any of her accomplices. See I.C. § 35-41-2-4 (“A person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense.”). And even if she remained in the car while the crime took place, she knew that Mullins faced potential harm—if not death—when her accomplices exited the vehicle and entered the home armed with a shotgun.
Finally, in its written order, the court specifically noted the proximity (less than thirty miles) from DeWees’s hometown of Fillmore to Mullins’ residence in Brazil. This factor reasonably increases the likelihood that DeWees, despite her assurance of complying with the no-contact order, could inflict harm on Mullins to prevent him from testifying.
The evidence likewise supports the trial court’s determination that DeWees posed a flight risk.
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In sum, the evidence, taken together, supports the trial court’s conclusion that DeWees posed a “substantial flight risk” and a “danger to others,” including Mullins. See App. Vol. II, p. 51. What’s more, the trial court’s decision—factoring in the applicable statutory factors, setting forth its reasons in writing, and issued after a timely hearing at which DeWees, represented by counsel, testified on her own behalf—rested on appropriate procedural safeguards necessary to protect the rights of the accused.
To be sure, several factors—DeWees’s strong family ties, her lack of criminal record, and no evidence of past bad character—certainly militate against denying DeWees’s motion. But when, like here, the trial court followed the appropriate procedural safeguards and the evidence provides sufficient support for its ruling, we refrain from interfering with the trial court’s discretion—even when, like here, we consider it a close call.
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Because the State met its burden of proof in showing that DeWees posed a flight risk and a risk to Mullins’ physical safety, and because the trial court applied the appropriate procedural safeguards, we affirm its order denying DeWees’s motion for bond reduction or conditional pretrial release. That said, we acknowledge the trial court (by order of the Court of Appeals) ordered DeWees “released to pretrial electronic home detention with GPS monitoring” on the condition that she “strictly obey all rules of Clay County Community Corrections.” App. Vol. II, p. 58. And neither our grant of transfer nor our affirmance of the trial court’s judgment changes DeWees’s status. But should either party seek modification of DeWees’s conditional release, we remand with instructions for the trial court to conduct a hearing consistent with this opinion.
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Slaughter, JJ., concur.