Vaidik, J.
Case Summary
About a decade after Lydia Rockey (“Mother”) and Brian Rockey (“Father”) divorced, a parenting-time issue arose. Robert E. Duff (“Attorney Duff”) entered an appearance for Mother. Father moved to disqualify Attorney Duff from representing Mother under Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 3.7 on grounds that he would likely be a necessary witness at the parenting-time hearing. The trial court disqualified Attorney Duff, and the parties reached an agreement about parenting time. About eight months later, a different post-dissolution issue—Father’s alleged overpayment of child support—arose. Attorney Duff entered an appearance for Mother, and Father moved to disqualify him based solely on his first disqualification. The court disqualified Attorney Duff, and Mother and Attorney Duff now appeal.
We hold an attorney disqualified from one post-dissolution matter is not automatically disqualified from a second, later arising post-dissolution matter if the basis for the first disqualification no longer exists. Because the basis for Attorney Duff’s first disqualification no longer existed, the trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying him from representing Mother on the child-support matter. We reverse and remand.
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Mother and Attorney Duff contend the trial court erred in disqualifying him from representing her. A trial court may disqualify an attorney for a violation of the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct, and the court’s decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Reed v. Hoosier Health Sys., Inc., 825 N.E.2d 408, 411 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
Father sought to disqualify Attorney Duff based on Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 3.7, which provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless…
The primary purpose of Rule 3.7 is to avoid confusion at trial created by the dual role of an attorney as advocate and witness. Ind. Professional Conduct Rule 3.7, cmt. 2; see also Utilimaster Corp. v. Ind. Dep’t of State Revenue, 967 N.E.2d 92, 95-96 (Ind. T.C. 2012).
Father argues the trial court properly disqualified Attorney Duff in 2021 because the court had disqualified him in 2020 and that disqualification was “continuing” and “unqualified.” Appellee’s Br. p. 9. Father, however, cites no authority for the proposition that an attorney’s disqualification under Rule 3.7 is permanent. After parties divorce, post-dissolution issues can crop up at different times, even years apart. These issues can be vastly different, requiring different evidence and witnesses. Given this reality, an attorney disqualified from one post-dissolution matter is not automatically disqualified from a second, later arising post-dissolution matter if the basis for the first disqualification no longer exists. This is especially so considering motions to disqualify under Rule 3.7 are viewed with caution given the potential for abuse. See Utilimaster, 967 N.E.2d at 95-96; Mills v. Hausmann-McNally, S.C., 992 F. Supp. 2d 885, 895 (S.D. Ind. 2014).
Here, Attorney Duff was disqualified in October 2020 because he would likely be a necessary witness at a hearing on parenting time. A couple days later, the parties reached an agreement about parenting time. About eight months later, in June 2021, a different issue—Father’s alleged overpayment of child support—arose. Attorney Duff entered an appearance for Mother, and Father moved to disqualify him based solely on his first disqualification. Father did not raise any new grounds for disqualification or allege Attorney Duff would likely be a necessary witness at a hearing on child support. Because the second post-dissolution matter is different from the first post-dissolution matter and the basis for the first disqualification no longer existed, the trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying Attorney Duff from representing Mother in the second post-dissolution matter.
Reversed and remanded.
Najam, J., and Riley, J., concur.