Brown, J.
Jermaine Dewayne Marshall appeals his conviction for criminal trespass as a class A misdemeanor and asserts that his waiver of his right to counsel was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent and that he was denied due process. We agree and reverse.
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Marshall argues that his waiver of his right to counsel was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and that he was denied fundamental fairness and due process of law. He asserts that the trial court discharged his public defender and accepted his waiver of his right to counsel before giving any advisement under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975). He contends that he informed the court that he had not been provided necessary discovery and that the court’s promise to provide him discovery went unfulfilled. He quotes Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 954 n.2 (Ind. 2016), in which the Indiana Supreme Court noted: “It is quite possible that the State could violate a pro se prisoner’s due process rights by providing discovery solely in a format it knows the prisoner has no means of accessing. We hope never to see such a case.”
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At the March 18, 2021 pretrial conference when Marshall indicated that he wished to proceed pro se, the trial court did not inform him of any of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Rather, Marshall informed the court that he had not received “any information, the affidavit or nothing like that,” the prosecutor stated that “I’ll see how we can get discovery to the jail,” and the court then assured Marshall: “We’ll have the Prosecutor send you your case file from the Clerk, or somehow give you access to that.” Transcript Volume II at 18.
On May 13, 2021, which was the day of the bench trial, Marshall indicated he had not received any information, and the court stated that “by choosing to represent yourself and being in custody it made it difficult for you having access to that” and “being in custody makes that extremely difficult but that’s a choice that you have made. So we’ll go ahead and move forward with the trial here today.” Id. at 22. During closing argument, Marshall again stated that he did not receive the information the court had previously instructed the prosecutor to provide to him. The prosecutor did not dispute Marshall’s statement and merely stated “[e]verything that I might have is a PC affidavit that’s in the Court’s file.” Id. at 30.
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We also note that Indiana’s Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.8(B) requires judicial officers to be “patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants . . . .” While the pressure on trial courts to manage cases is immense, the requirement of Rule 2.8(B) is not optional, nor does it conflict with Rule 2.5. See Comment [1] to Ind. Code of Jud. Conduct, Rule 2.8 (“The duty to hear all proceedings with patience and courtesy is not inconsistent with the duty imposed in Rule 2.5 to dispose promptly of the business of the court. Judges can be efficient and businesslike while being patient and deliberate.”).
Marshall was denied due process, and under these circumstances we reverse his conviction.
Reversed.
May, J., and Pyle, J., concur