May, J.
The Indiana Repertory Theatre (“IRT”) appeals the trial court’s decision denying IRT’s motion for partial summary judgment and granting partial summary judgment for Cincinnati Casualty Company (“Cincinnati Casualty”). [Footnotes omitted]
IRT presents multiple issues on appeal, one of which we find dispositive: whether the trial court erred when it determined the contract language “direct physical loss or direct physical damage” did not encompass IRT’s claim for loss of use of its facilities during the COVID-19 pandemic. While we sympathize with the plight of IRT as well as other small businesses and not-for-profit entities in similar situations, the plain language of the insurance contract does not support coverage for COVID-19-related loss of use. We affirm.
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As part of its “BUILDING AND PERSONAL PROPERTY COVERAGE FORM (INCLUDING SPECIAL CAUSES OF LOSS)” (Appellant’s App. Vol. III at 27) (formatting in original), as part of “SECTION A. COVERAGE” (id.) (formatting in original), the Policy states, “We will pay for direct ‘loss’ to Covered Property at the ‘premises’ caused by or resulting from any Covered Cause of Loss.” (Id.) In the introduction to the policy, there is language indicating, in relevant part, “words and phrases that appear in quotation marks have special meaning. Refer to SECTION G. DEFINITIONS.” (Id.) (formatting in original). Under “SECTION A. COVERAGE[,]” (id.) (formatting in original), the phrase “Covered Causes of Loss” is defined as “direct ‘loss’ unless the ‘loss’ is excluded or limited in this Coverage Part.” (Id. at 29.) “SECTION G. DEFINITIONS” (id. at 38) (formatting in original) defines loss as “accidental physical loss or accidental physical damage.” (Id.)
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IRT contends the Policy language is ambiguous because “physical loss or physical damage” is subject to different interpretations not only by a reasonable policyholder, but also by courts. IRT asserts the Policy language “accidental physical loss or accidental physical damage” encompasses the alleged presence of COVID-19 on its premises and thus the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.
IRT first points to the dictionary definitions of “loss” and “damage” and notes those definitions do not require an observable change in the condition of the property. “Loss” is defined as “the act or fact of losing : failure to keep possession : deprivation.” Webster’s Third Int’l Dictionary 1338 (Unabridged ed. 1966) (definition in the context of property). “Damage” is “loss due to injury : injury or harm to person, property, or reputation : hurt, harm.” Id. at 571 (formatting in original). Based on those definitions, IRT contends that a claimant, such as IRT, could have “physical loss or physical damage” without the premises being “altered or impacted” as “IRT could not physically use the theatre to host live performances because doing so would expose patrons to a lethal disease.” (Br. of Appellant at 41, 45) (emphasis in original).
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We find Roundabout Theatre Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 302 A.D.2d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002), instructive. In that case, Roundabout, a theater company, had to cancel all its performances for a month due to a street closure resulting from a nearby construction accident. Id. at *3. The court held Roundabout’s damages did not stem from “direct physical loss or damage” to its property, but instead stemmed from damage at the nearby construction site, id. at *6-*7, and the loss of use of the theatre was not covered under the policy language requiring “direct physical loss or damage.” Like here, Roundabout’s building did not suffer any damage or alteration. Rather, the building was unusable for its intended purpose because of an outside factor. The COVID-19 pandemic in the instant case is like the construction accident in Roundabout.
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Finally, IRT’s interpretation of “physical loss or physical damage” is unreasonable because it parses and dichotomizes the Policy language. IRT’s interpretation of the Policy does not take into account the Policy as a whole, as it does not rectify its interpretation of “physical loss or physical damage” with the “period of restoration” provision of the Policy, which outlines the time when coverage begins and ends based on when the covered premises is “repaired, rebuilt or replaced” or the “business is resumed at a new permanent location.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 34.) Without physical alteration or impact to IRT’s premises, there can be no period of restoration, and thus IRT’s interpretation of “physical loss or physical damage” does not take into account the language of the Policy as a whole. [Footnote omitted.]
IRT is not alone in its plight. Millions of small business owners suffered losses due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the ensuing worldwide financial crisis is dire. At the same time, we cannot ignore well-established principles of insurance contract interpretation and add provisions in the Policy that do not exist. IRT did not suffer physical loss or physical damage under the language of the Policy because the premises covered, that is the theater building located at 140 W. Washington Street in Indianapolis, was not destroyed or altered in a physical way that would require restoration or relocation. Based thereon, the trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of Cincinnati Casualty because the plain language of the Policy between the parties did not cover IRT’s claim.
Conclusion
IRT’s claim for loss of use of its theatre due to the COVID-19 pandemic was not physical loss or physical damage as defined by the terms of its insurance Policy with Cincinnati Casualty. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of Cincinnati Casualty. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.