May, J.
Kim M. Lloyd appeals the trial court’s denial of her Trial Rule 60(B) motion to set aside the dismissal of her complaint against Purdue University and Lawrence Kuznar and the entry of default judgment against her on Kuznar’s counterclaim. She presents five issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as:
i. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Lloyd’s Trial Rule 60(B) motion to set aside the order dismissing her complaint against Purdue University;
ii. Whether the trial court erred in denying Lloyd’s Trial Rule 60(B) motion to set aside its order dismissing Lloyd’s complaint against Kuznar; and
iii. Whether the trial court erred in denying Lloyd’s Trial Rule 60(B) motion to set aside its orders granting default judgment in favor of Kuznar on his counterclaim and awarding Kuznar over $600,000 in damages.
We affirm the denial of Lloyd’s Trial Rule 60(B) motion to the extent it sought to set aside the dismissal of her complaint. However, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s order denying Lloyd’s motion to set aside the default judgment on Kunzar’s counterclaim and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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However, moving to Kuznar’s counterclaim against Lloyd, a plaintiff who voluntarily abandons her complaint is differently situated from a defendant who is not provided with sufficient notice of actions being taken against her. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” Central to this protection is the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Pugel v. Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ill., 378 F.3d 659, 662-63 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The hallmarks of procedural due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard.”), reh’g en banc denied. We thus strongly prefer disposition of cases on their merits and resolve any doubt regarding the propriety of a default judgment in favor of the defaulted party. Ferguson v. Stevens, 851 N.E.2d 1028, 1030 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Nonetheless, we afford deference to a trial court’s decision not to set aside a default judgment, and we review such a decision for an abuse of discretion. Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 758 (Ind. 2014).
Just as the plaintiff in Front Row Motors was aware Johnson was not at his home address, Kuznar knew Lloyd was not receiving mail at her Fort Wayne Address. Kuznar filed his motion for default judgment after Lloyd’s counsel withdrew because of a breakdown in communication with Lloyd and after Lloyd failed to respond to the discovery requests Purdue served on her. The copy of the order granting Attorney Myers’ motion to withdraw mailed to Lloyd’s Fort Wayne Address was returned to the trial court with a forwarding address listed in Washington State. The order setting a sanctions hearing on Purdue’s motion to compel was similarly returned. Yet, Kuznar served Lloyd only at her Fort Wayne Address when he filed his motion for default judgment. Even though Attorney Myers relayed an email address for Lloyd, the certificate of service on Kuznar’s motion for default judgment does not indicate that he emailed Lloyd a copy. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 61.) “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct. 652, 657 (1950). Here, Kuznar’s notice to Lloyd of his intention to seek a default judgment was a mere gesture and not reasonably calculated to inform Lloyd of his action. Like in Moore, we cannot condone such an activity.
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However, this finding by the trial court was clearly erroneous. The trial court held Lloyd to a higher bar than she was required to clear. A Trial Rule 60(B)(8) movant “need not prove absolutely the existence of a meritorious defense. Rather, the party must make a prima facie showing of a meritorious defense.” Kretschmer v. Bank of Am., N.A., 15 N.E.3d 595, 601 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted), trans. denied. “[T]o successfully allege a meritorious claim or defense pursuant to Rule 60(B), a party seeking relief from a default judgment must state a factual basis for his purported meritorious claim or defense, but at this initial stage such a showing is not governed by the rules of evidence.” Logansport/Cass Cnty. Airport Auth. v. Kochenower, 169 N.E.3d 1143, 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).
Truth is an absolute defense to a claim of defamation. See Benson v. News-Sentinel, 106 N.E.3d 544, 545 (“Truth is a complete defense to defamation.”). The trial court only entertained argument at the hearing on Lloyd’s Rule 60(B) motion, and Lloyd contended at the hearing that the statements she made in the October 26, 2018, email were true. She also attached to her complaint the charge of discrimination she submitted to the EEOC under the penalties for perjury. The allegations Lloyd raised in the charge of discrimination are like the comments she made in the October 26, 2018 email, and we recognize a party’s sworn, self-serving affidavit as evidence. See Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1004 (Ind. 2014) (holding civil forfeiture defendant’s “perfunctory and self-serving” affidavit, which averred seized currency was not used in connection with criminal activity, raised a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment). Thus, Lloyd made a prima facie showing of a meritorious defense. See Logansport/Cass Cnty. Airport Auth., 169 N.E.3d at 1149-50 (holding letter from defendant asserting he was victim of identity theft along with argument presented at hearing on the defendant’s Rule 60(B) motion were sufficient to establish prima facie meritorious defense to fraud allegation). We hold the trial court erred in denying Lloyd’s Trial Rule 60(B) motion to set aside the default judgment entered against her on Kuznar’s counterclaim because she was entitled to relief under both Trial Rule 60(B)(6) and Trial Rule 60(B)(8). [Footnote omitted.] See Anderson v. Wayne Post 64, Am. Legion Corp., 4 N.E.3d 1200, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (holding property owner was entitled to have default judgment entered against it set aside pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B)(6) when plaintiff attempted to effectuate service by leaving a copy of her complaint at an outbuilding behind the property owner’s primary place of business), trans. denied; see also, First Chicago Ins. Co. v. Collins, 141 N.E.3d 54, 63 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (holding equitable considerations supported setting aside default judgment entered against motorist because motorist had substantial interest in the matter and would suffer significant loss if the default judgment was not set aside).
Conclusion
After initiating suit against both Purdue and Kuznar, Lloyd stopped participating in the litigation and failed to keep the trial court apprised of her address. As a result, the trial court dismissed her claims against both Purdue and Kuznar, and she cannot now revive them. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Lloyd’s Trial Rule 60(B) motion to the extent it sought to set aside the dismissal of her claims against Purdue and Kuznar. However, the trial court did err in denying Lloyd’s Trial Rule 60(B) motion with respect to the default judgment entered against her on Kuznar’s counterclaim. Kuznar’s method of serving Lloyd was nothing more than a mere gesture, and we reverse the trial court’s order denying Lloyd’s motion to set aside the default judgment on Kuznar’s counterclaim.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.