Riley, J.
Appellant-Defendant, Albert Guthery (Guthery), appeals his convictions and sentences for dealing in cocaine, a Level 2 felony, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(2), and for dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 2 felony, I.C. § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2). Guthery also appeals his sentence enhancement for being an habitual offender, I.C. § 35-50-2-8(a).
We affirm.
Guthery presents this court with three issues, which we restate as follows: (1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence obtained following a traffic stop which he contends was unreasonably extended; (2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it used the same prior conviction to find his conviction for dealing in methamphetamine to be non-suspendable and to adjudicate him as an habitual offender; and (3) Whether his sentence is inappropriate given the nature of his offenses and his character.
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Guthery contends that his sentences for Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine and for being an habitual offender constituted an impermissible double enhancement.
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Dealing in methamphetamine is a Level 2 felony if the drug involved is at least ten grams. I.C. §§ 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2), (e)(1). Indiana Code sections 35-50-2- 2.2(a) and (b) provide in relevant part that a trial court “may suspend any part of a sentence for a felony” unless the defendant is convicted of a Level 2 felony and has any prior unrelated felony conviction, in which case a trial court “may suspend only that part of a sentence that is in excess of the minimum sentence” for the Level 2 felony. The minimum sentence for a Level 2 felony is ten years. I.C. § 35-50-2-4.5. In addition, under our general habitual offender statute, a trial court “shall sentence a person found to be a[n] habitual offender to an additional fixed term that is between . . . six (6) years and twenty (20) years” if that person is convicted of a Level 2 felony. I.C. § 35-50-2-8(i)(1).
Here, Guthery was convicted of Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine. The trial court determined that Guthery was non-suspendable below the minimum sentence for that offense due to his prior felony conviction for Class A felony cocaine dealing. The trial court also found Guthery to be an habitual offender based on his two prior, unrelated convictions for Class A felony cocaine dealing and Class C felony cocaine possession, and it enhanced Guthery’s sentence for dealing in methamphetamine by six years as a result. Guthery argues that the trial court impermissibly used the same prior conviction to doubly enhance his sentence “once as a non-suspendable offense, then as a predicate to the habitual offender enhancement.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 13). Guthery urges us that his habitual offender enhancement must, therefore, be vacated.
In State v. Downey, 770 N.E.2d 794, 795-96 (Ind. 2002), our supreme court discussed the types of sentencing enhancement statutes which dictate when a court may impose a more severe sentence than would otherwise be the case on a defendant who has been proven to be a repeat offender, and it identified three categories of statutes: (1) the general habitual offender statute; (2) specialized habitual offender statutes such as the habitual substance offender, habitual traffic violator, and repeat sexual offender statutes; and (3) progressive penalty statutes. The court defined a progressive penalty statute as one under which “the seriousness of a particular charge (with a correspondingly more severe sentence) can be elevated if the person charged has previously been convicted of a particular offense.” Id. at 796. The Downey court acknowledged the general rule that “a sentence imposed following conviction under a progressive penalty statute may not be increased further under either the general habitual offender statute or a specialized habitual offender statute absent explicit legislative direction[.]” Id. at 794.
In Conrad v. State, 747 N.E.2d 575, 592-95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied, this court had previously held that Conrad’s sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon could not be enhanced under the general habitual offender statute using the same predicate felony. Id. at 594-95. In reaching that decision we observed that the defendant’s serious violent felon status does not serve to “enhance” a sentence in the traditional sense of the word. As a practical matter, though, the defendant’s serious violent [felon] status does realistically serve as an “enhancement” in that it increases the potential punishment for “possession of a firearm” from nothing at all to six to twenty years imprisonment and a fine of up to $10,000[.] Id. at 594. Our supreme court subsequently quoted this language in Mills v. State, 868 N.E.2d 446, 449-50 (Ind. 2007), in upholding Conrad’s result following amendments to the habitual offender statute. It also reiterated the principal that “absent explicit legislative direction, a sentence imposed following conviction under a ‘progressive penalty statute’ may not be increased further under either the general habitual offender statute or a specialized habitual offender statute.” Id. at 451.
Seizing on the quoted language from Conrad, Guthery argues that we should view the felony suspendability statute in the same manner as the serious violent felon statute, because he argues that “it increases the mandatory period of incarceration from nothing at all to a definitive amount of mandatory incarceration.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 19). Therefore, as Guthery’s argument goes, following the principals outlined in Downey and Mills, absent explicit legislative direction, any sentence imposed under the felony suspendability statute may not be further enhanced under the general habitual offender statute
We do not find Guthery’s argument to be persuasive. The felony suspendability statute is not a progressive penalty statute, as it does not elevate the seriousness of an offense and its corresponding penalty due to a previous conviction. See Downey, 770 N.E.2d at 796. Put another way, the suspendability statute does not expand the sentencing range for an offense. Rather, it merely limits the discretion of the trial court to order a sentence to be suspended, all within the existing sentencing range for the offense. Therefore, the felony suspendability statute is not a sentencing enhancement statute to which double-enhancement analysis applies. In addition, the quoted language of Conrad cannot be applied wholesale to the suspendability statute, as in Conrad, we relied upon the fact that the serious violent felon statute criminalized conduct that would otherwise be legal, something which cannot be said of the suspendability statute. Therefore, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in finding Guthery’s sentence for dealing in methamphetamine to be non-suspendable under the minimum for a Level 2 felony and for enhancing that sentence for being an habitual offender based in part on the same predicate felony.
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Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence garnered from the traffic stop. We also conclude that Guthery’s sentences for dealing in methamphetamine and for being an habitual offender did not constitute an impermissible double enhancement, nor is his sentence inappropriate in light of his offenses and his character.
Affirmed.
Robb, J. and Molter, J. concur