Goff, J.
Under Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3, a government entity is “not liable” for a loss or injury resulting from the “temporary condition of a public thoroughfare . . . that results from weather.” Immunity thus requires two things: that the loss or injury result from a condition (1) that is temporary and (2) that is caused by weather. Whereas our decision today in Ladra v. State turned on the question of causation, the outcome of this case hinges on whether the condition was “temporary.”
Because the evidence designated by the government here establishes that the weather-induced condition continued to worsen at the time of the accident, and because the plaintiffs failed to raise a reasonable inference to the contrary, we conclude that the condition was temporary and hold the government immune from liability. We thus affirm the trial court’s summary-judgment ruling in the government’s favor.
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Indiana has long held that the government “has a common law duty to exercise reasonable care and diligence to keep its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for travel.” Catt v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Knox Cty., 779 N.E.2d 1, 3–4 (Ind. 2002) (collecting cases). To meet this duty, the government must “adopt appropriate precautions—including warning of hazardous road conditions or temporarily closing roads—to prevent persons exercising due care from suffering injury.” Bules v. Marshall Cty., 920 N.E.2d 247, 250 (Ind. 2010). But, when an injury results from the “temporary condition of a public thoroughfare” caused by weather, the government is “not liable” for that injury. I.C. § 34-13-3-3(3).
Subsection (3) immunity requires two things: that the loss or injury result from a condition (1) that is “temporary” and (2) that is “caused by weather.” Bules, 920 N.E.2d at 250 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The question of causation asks “whether the loss suffered by the plaintiff was actually the result of weather” or whether it resulted from “some other factor.” Catt, 779 N.E.2d at 4. The focus of the temporary-versus-permanent inquiry, on the other hand, is whether the government entity “has had the time and opportunity” to remedy the dangerous condition “but failed to do so.” Id. at 5. In analyzing the former question, the Catt Court deemed irrelevant the government’s prior negligence in the design or maintenance of a public thoroughfare and its knowledge of “the frequency with which” a weather-related hazard may have occurred “in the past.” Id. Our decision today in Ladra reconsidered this analytical restriction. By prohibiting courts from accounting for the government’s prior negligence in the design or maintenance of a public thoroughfare, the rule in Catt, we opined, “effectively grants blanket immunity to the state in every circumstance involving inclement weather, leaving injured plaintiffs with virtually no remedy under Subsection (3).” Ladra v. State, No. 21S-CT-235, — N.E.3d — (Ind. 2021). We acknowledged, however, “the practical importance of government notice and opportunity to respond.” Id. “Mindful of these competing interests,” we clarified the rule in Catt, holding “that, when the government knows of an existing defect in a public thoroughfare that manifests during recurring weather conditions, and when it has ample opportunity to respond, immunity does not apply simply because the defect manifests during inclement weather.” Id.
Because the designated evidence establishes that the weather-induced condition here continued to worsen at the time of Staat’s accident, the outcome of this case depends on whether the condition was “temporary.” Our analysis, then, begins by asking whether the government entity “has had the time and opportunity” to remedy the dangerous condition “but failed to do so.” See Pt. I, infra. After determining that the period of reasonable response here had yet to lapse, we briefly turn to the question of causation, summarily concluding that—with no evidence of prior government conduct contributing to or causing the condition—that condition resulted from weather. See Pt. II, infra.
I. The condition of I-74 was temporary because of the ongoing storm.
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Once INDOT showed that there was no genuine issue of fact, the Staats had the opportunity to meet their own burden to “make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue.” Butler, 733 N.E.2d at 915. But rather than relying on any evidence, the Staats simply argue that the puddle may have stabilized by reaching its maximum capacity. While our summary-judgment standard requires us to make inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, those inferences must be “reasonable,” not mere “conjecture or speculation.” Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Cobb, 754 N.E.2d 905, 910 (Ind. 2001).
Because INDOT employees could not safely warn motorists of possible flooding, the trial court properly found that the condition was temporary. [Footnote omitted.]
II. The condition of I-74 resulted from the weather rather than from the government’s conduct.
In deciding whether Subsection (3) applies to a particular claim, the “relevant inquiry is whether the loss suffered by the plaintiff was actually the result of weather or some other factor.” Catt, 779 N.E.2d at 4. The Staats allege that the government’s failure to “maintain the roadway and warn motorists” of the pooling water “caused the accident.” Resp. to Pet. to Trans. at 8. In opposition to summary judgment, the Staats argued that the duty to maintain the roadway includes the duty to warn motorists of unsafe conditions or temporarily close the road. So, both claims for failure to maintain the roadway and warn motorists relate to the time during the weather event itself, not, as in Ladra, to alleged negligent conduct that occurred prior to the weather event. The duty to warn doesn’t arise during the period of reasonable response. Roach-Walker, 917 N.E.2d at 1228. Because we determine that the period of reasonable response had not elapsed, we find that the condition was a result of the weather.
Conclusion
Because the evidence designated by INDOT establishes that the temporary condition had continued to worsen at the time of the accident, and because the Staats’ mere speculation that the pooling may have stabilized despite the ongoing inclement weather fails to raise “conflicting reasonable inferences,” we conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of INDOT.
Affirmed.
Rush, C.J., and David and Slaughter, JJ., concur.
Massa, J., concurs in result.