Introduction
Parents across Indiana and the United States faced enormous challenges during the uncertainty and fluid state of affairs caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly at its onset. Not only were the safety, health and employment of loved ones a concern as the country and our state entered lockdown conditions, but the educational needs of their children was a concern as well. The dynamics of family life, school life, and work life converged in family households during this unique time in our history, with parents taking on multiple roles at home—parent/employee/teacher’s assistant—while educators used their creativity in providing instruction to the state’s children through the use of technology. Government and business leaders, health care workers, and educators also scrambled to address the enormous disruptions presented by the pandemic. Some of those disruptions to normalcy remain today.
Jennifer and Jason Reinoehl (the Reinoehls) are the parents of S.R. and L.R., two high-school aged children with diagnoses that require adjustments to their educational instruction even during “normal” times. The Reinoehls’ experiences during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic are likely similar to those of other parents of children with disabilities. Today we discuss their disagreement with how their state and local governments, as well as their children’s school system, responded to the COVID-19 pandemic, the impact those decisions had on their children, and the trial court’s thoughtful and patient approach to hearing out the Reinoehls’ frustrations, expressing genuine compassion for them, while tasked with informing them that they had no legal remedy for their troubles.
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The following restated issues arise from the Reinoehls’ claims:
I. Did the Reinoehls’ Amended Complaint state an actionable claim of “failure to accommodate” under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act1 (Section 504) and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), challenging the School Corporation’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic as respects their daughters’ educational needs? [Footnote omitted].
II. Did the holding in Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017) require the Reinoehls to exhaust their administrative remedies required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act3 (IDEA) before filing their claim under Section 504 and Title II because their claim alleged a denial of a “free and appropriate public education” (FAPE)?
III. Does a private cause of action exist such that private citizens can sue county health departments alleging a violation of Governor Holcomb’s Executive Order 20-02, and if so, did the Health Department violate Executive Order 20-02 by recommending that schools be closed to in-person instruction due to the pandemic?
IV. Did the Health Department’s and School Corporation’s respective actions–recommending and closing schools to in-person instruction–violate the Indiana Home Rule Act, by preventing the Indiana Department of Education (IDOE) from fulfilling its statutory duty?
V. Did the Reinoehls’ Amended Complaint state legally cognizable claims of “procedural due process,” “substantive due process,” and “equal protection” violations based on the Health Department’s recommendations and the School Corporation’s decision to follow those recommendations regarding in-person instruction?
VI. Did the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA) bar the Reinoehls’ negligence claims against Dr. Einterz and Dr. Fox because their recommendations against in-person instruction were made within the scope and course or their employment?
VII. Did Governor Holcomb’s Executive Order 20-02 require Dr. Einterz and Dr. Fox to follow CDC guidelines, and, if so: did the Reinoehls’ Amended Complaint plead facts showing that they failed to do so, and, if so, did that failure create a legally cognizable duty owed to the Reinoehls such that it could support a common-law negligence claim?
VIII. Did the court abuse its discretion by dismissing the Reinoehls’ Amended Complaint without giving them the opportunity to engage in discovery?
IX. Did the court abuse its discretion by dismissing the Reinoehls’ Amended Complaint without offering them the opportunity to file a Second Amended Complaint, where such opportunity had not been requested and further amendment would not have cured the legal deficiencies of their claims?
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IX. Opportunity To File Another Amended Complaint
Last, the Reinoehls argue that the court abused its discretion by dismissing their Amended Complaint without first giving them the opportunity to file a Second Amended Complaint. The Reinoehls offer that they are pro se litigants who do not have access to the same resources as a lawyer would have at a law firm and that they may have used some legal terms in a “non-standard way.” Appellants’ Br. p. 46. They contend that it would be a waste of time and resources to deny them the opportunity to correct any errors found in their Amended Complaint and the court erred by dismissing their Amended Complaint.
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In this case, the court did a tremendous job of navigating that fine line of upholding the law and facilitating the ability of all the litigants to be fairly heard, especially the Reinoehls, who appeared in court as pro se litigants. The court patiently and helpfully responded to Jennifer Reinoehls’ requests for guidance during the hearing on the motion to dismiss. For instance, when referring to case law, Jennifer asked the court “do I just say like Coons v. Kaiser, or do I need to do 517 N.E.2d[?]” Tr. Vol. II, p. 9. After asking if the case was cited in her written submissions, the court responded, “you can just refer to the case. Frankly, even the first name is fine.” Id. at 10. Jennifer also asked the court another procedural question, asking, “we prepared something together, and is it okay if I just read it for our part of our oral argument?” Id. at 9. The court agreed, responding “Sure.” Id. The hearing concluded with the trial court’s statement, thanking “the parties for their written offerings. And also for the oral arguments today, which are very helpful. So[,] thank you all very much.” Id. at 23. Each party was allowed to present their arguments to the court without interruption.
The court’s compassion for the Reinoehls’ arguments was further expressed in its order, which we have previously set forth, but which bears repeating here.
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is detailed and it well articulates the hardships that millions of families have been forced to endure throughout this global Covid-19 Pandemic which has now entered its thirteenth month in the United States. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is particularly well-stated as to the unique hardships this Covid-19 Pandemic has imposed on school aged children in general and special needs children in particular as well as their parents. However, no matter how well stated Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is as it relates to the hardships endured by both Plaintiffs and their children in this cause, that is different and distinct from stating an actionable, legal cause of action against Defendants Einterz, Fox, St. Joseph County Health Department, and Penn Harris Madison School Corporation. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts I through VII of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is DISMISSED.
Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p. 20. The court acted with fairness and compassion to the parties. Indeed, we find the court’s handling of this matter to be a model of empathy to the plights of the litigants before it while impartially applying the law to the facts before it. We commend the court for its efforts.
Additionally, we agree with the Defendants that the Reinoehls’ Amended Complaint was dismissed because the legal bases for their claims were unavailable to them. The Amended Complaint was not dismissed because improper procedure or improper legal terminology was used. The trial court did not err.
Consequently, the court’s decision to dismiss the Reinoehls’ request for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief was also proper.
Conclusion
For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
Affirmed. May, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.