Riley, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Plaintiff, Tracey Wheeler (Wheeler), appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his civil tort complaint against Appellees-Defendants, the State of Indiana and the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC), (collectively, DOC). [Footnote omitted.]
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
ISSUE
Wheeler presents the court with two issues on appeal, one of which we find to be dispositive and restate as: Whether the trial court improperly dismissed his entire complaint with prejudice.
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Wheeler’s two central arguments on appeal are that he properly sought redress for the deprivation of his property by pursuing a claim under the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA) and that the DOC only argued in its motion to screen that he was an abusive filer. These arguments miss the mark. There is no question that the ITCA applies to Wheeler’s claims. See I.C. § 34-13-3, et seq. The DOC did not argue in its screening motion, and does not argue on appeal, that Wheeler failed to comply with the strictures of the ITCA. In addition, Wheeler mischaracterizes the DOC’s motion to screen arguments in that the DOC did not contend that Wheeler’s history of litigation subjected his complaint to dismissal. Rather, the DOC argued that Wheeler had failed to allege acts constituting negligence and that it could not be held liable for any § 1983 claims under a theory of respondeat superior.
On appeal, the DOC has abandoned its contention that Wheeler failed to state a claim by failing to plead any acts constituting negligence in favor of its new argument that Wheeler’s complaint was subject to dismissal because he failed to show in his complaint that he had exhausted his administrative remedies. The DOC also argues that any federal claims brought by Wheeler were properly subject to dismissal because the exhaustion requirement also applies to federal claims, the named defendants were not “persons” under federal law amenable to suit, and that the named defendants are not liable for § 1983 claims under a theory of respondeat superior. Wheeler has clarified in his reply brief that he is not pursuing any federal claims in his complaint. Therefore, we frame the substantive issues before us as: (1) Whether Wheeler sufficiently alleged a tort in his complaint; and (2) Whether Wheeler’s failure to show in his complaint that he had exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing suit subjected his complaint to dismissal under the Screening Statute.
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On appeal, Wheeler presents us with no legal authority that Indiana recognizes the independent tort of retaliation. The gravamen of his complaint is that he was damaged by the DOC’s negligent failure to return his property in a timely manner. “A plaintiff seeking damages for negligence must establish (1) a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant, (2) a breach of the duty, and (3) an injury proximately caused by the breach of duty.” Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392, 398 (Ind. 2011). Wheeler alleged in his complaint that (1) the DOC owed him a duty to protect his property, (2) it breached that duty after admittedly wrongfully confiscating his property by retaining the property until it was no longer capable of being consumed, and (3) that the DOC’s actions proximately caused damage to, and loss of, his property. In light of these allegations, we conclude that Wheeler adequately stated a cause for negligence in his complaint. The DOC appears to concede as much by abandoning their challenge to the sufficiency of Wheeler’s negligence allegations on appeal Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of Wheeler’s entire complaint and hold that he may proceed on his negligence claim. In doing so, we express no opinion as to the validity of Wheeler’s claim or the likelihood that it will withstand further pre-trial motions by the DOC, should any be forthcoming.
B. Exhaustion of Remedies
The DOC argues that the trial court properly dismissed Wheeler’s complaint because he failed to show that he had exhausted his administrative remedies prior to bringing suit, which the DOC contends resulted in a failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to Indiana Code section 34- 58-1-2(a)(2). We agree with the DOC that an offender-litigant is generally required to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing suit against the State on both state and federal claims. See, e.g., Higgason v. Stogsdill, 818 N.E.2d 486, 489-90 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that prisoners must exhaust available administrative remedies prior to bringing any federal claims in either federal or state courts), trans. denied; Higgason v. Lemmon, 818 N.E.2d 500, 503 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (applying a similar analysis to state tort claims), trans. denied.
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We reach a similar conclusion here. While the instant action is one sounding in negligence, not a replevin action in small claims court, and this is an appeal from a dismissal pursuant to the Screening Statute rather than an appeal from a judgment on the evidence, we believe that Alkhalidi and its reasoning apply. A failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not an element of a claim for negligence. See Pfenning, 947 N.E.2d at 398. Therefore, Wheeler was not required to plead exhaustion of remedies in order to state a claim for relief, and his negligence claim was not subject to dismissal on that basis. The cases relied upon by the DOC, Adams v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., 48 N.E.3d 1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 60 N.E.3d 1022 (Ind. 2016), and Burks-Bey v. State, 903 N.E.2d 1041 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (relying on Young), are both factually distinguishable. Adams was an appeal from a summary judgment ruling, a later stage of litigation not procedurally equivalent to a dismissal under the Screening Statute, and Burks-Bey was an appeal from the denial of a motion for educational credit-time determination of the type we found distinguishable in Alkhalidi. Adams, 48 N.E.3d at 9-12; Burks-Bey, 903 N.E.2d at 1042. As such, we do not credit the DOC’s argument. [Footnote omitted.]
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Wheeler’s complaint for negligence against the DOC may proceed. We affirm the trial court inasmuch as it dismissed any other putative claims contained in Wheeler’s complaint.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
Najam, J. and Brown, J. concur