Pyle, J.
Jonathan Nolan (“Nolan”) appeals the restitution order imposed following his plea of guilty to domestic battery, a Level 6 felony.1 Nolan argues that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to pay restitution to his domestic battery victim for her lost wages; and (2) the trial court erred when it failed to inquire into his ability to pay restitution. However, the State argues that Nolan has waived his right to appeal the restitution order because he signed a plea agreement leaving all terms of his sentence to the trial court’s discretion. Concluding that Nolan has waived his right to appeal the restitution order due to the terms of his plea agreement, we affirm the trial court’s order.
We affirm.
…
Nolan argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Nolan to pay restitution to the victim of his domestic battery. Nolan also argues that the trial court erred when it did not inquire into his ability to pay restitution. However, the State argues that Nolan “waived the right to challenge the amount of restitution imposed[.]” (State’s Br. 8). The State contends that Nolan waived his right to appeal the restitution because of the terms of his plea agreement. We agree with the State.
…
Our review of the record shows us that Nolan clearly waived his right to appeal the restitution order. Specifically, the plea agreement provided “[t]otal sentence: All terms shall be open to the court.” (App. Vol. 2 at 15). The plea agreement also provided that Nolan “hereby waives his right to appeal any discretionary portion of the sentence entered pursuant to and in accordance with this plea agreement and further acknowledges and affirms that this waiver is knowing and made voluntarily.” (App. Vol. 2 at 17). Finally, the plea agreement provided that “[t]he defendant hereby waives his right to appeal the sentence so long as the Court sentences him within the terms of the plea agreement.” (App. Vol. 2 at 17).
Nolan agreed to waive his right to appeal any discretionary portions of his sentence in his plea agreement and thereby waived his right to appeal the restitution as ordered by the trial court. See Creech, 887 N.E.2d at 75. We decline to address Nolan’s arguments on appeal due to his waiver of his right to appeal his restitution order.
Nolan’s plea agreement left all terms of his sentence to the trial court’s discretion and Nolan waived his right to appeal any discretionary portion of his sentence in his plea agreement. Restitution is at the discretion of the trial court, thus, we affirm the trial court’s restitution order.
Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.