Vaidik, J.
Case Summary
Beginning in March 2020, the Indiana Supreme Court issued a series of orders relating to the COVID-19 pandemic that granted emergency relief to courts throughout the state, including an order allowing courts to “use audiovisual communication to conduct proceedings whenever possible to ensure all matters proceed expeditiously and fairly under the circumstances,” so long as the remote proceedings are consistent with the parties’ constitutional rights. In this case, the trial court held a remote final hearing on the petition to terminate the parental rights of S.T. (“Mother”). During the hearing, some technological and logistical issues arose—witnesses referenced unauthorized notes, had unknown persons present, or were inaudible during parts of their testimony. Following the hearing, Mother’s parental rights were terminated. She now appeals and argues that the remote proceedings deprived her of due process and that the evidence was not sufficient to terminate. We disagree and affirm, concluding that the minor errors, which were all quickly addressed by the trial court, do not amount to a due-process violation and that the evidence was sufficient to terminate.
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Mother first argues the remote termination hearing violated her due-process rights. Her argument focuses largely on the technological and logistical issues that occurred during the hearing. To the extent she is attempting to make a broader argument regarding the constitutionality of remote hearings, she has failed to develop it beyond vague generalities, nor does she cite to any relevant authority. As such, she has waived that argument for our review. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a); see also Lyles v. State, 834 N.E.2d 1035, 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding appellant had waived argument due to his failure to develop the argument and support it with citations to authority and the record), reh’g denied, trans. denied. We therefore limit our due-process analysis to the specific issues that arose in Mother’s hearing.
Parents do not have a constitutional right to be physically present at a final termination hearing. In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 921 (Ind. 2011). However, under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-6.5(e), which governs hearings for petitions to terminate a parent-child relationship, the court shall provide a parent “an opportunity to be heard and make recommendations to the court at the hearing.” Furthermore, Indiana Code section 31-32-2-3(b) provides that in proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship, “[a] parent, guardian, or custodian is entitled: (1) to cross-examine witnesses; (2) to obtain witnesses or tangible evidence by compulsory process; and (3) to introduce evidence on behalf of the parent, guardian, or custodian.”
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In balancing the three-prong Mathews test, we first note that the private interest affected by the proceeding is substantial—a parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of her child.” In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 917. “We also note the countervailing Mathews factor, that the State’s parens patriae interest in protecting the welfare of a child is also substantial.” Id. This includes an interest in prompt adjudication, as delays have “an intangible cost to the life of the child involved.” In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d at 852. And at the time of the termination hearing, the continuing COVID-19 pandemic created serious safety concerns regarding in-person hearings. These important interests are entitled to significant weight.
We then turn to the risk of error created by the challenged procedure. Mother cites to specific limitations caused by the Zoom hearing and contends these issues deprived her of her constitutional right to due process. These issues include that: (1) some of Mother’s testimony was cut off due to a technical issue, (2) witnesses referenced personal notes, (3) witnesses had third parties present during testimony, and (4) counsel could not properly object to testimony. However, in this circumstance, we do not believe these issues rise to the level of a due-process violation.
Although Mother contends portions of her testimony were not heard by the court, the record reflects only one instance in which she apparently could not be heard. [Footnote omitted.] At that point, the trial court noted the technical issue for the record, stated the last part of the testimony it heard, and had Mother continue from that point once the technical issue was resolved. This brief interruption in her testimony did not deny Mother an opportunity to be heard. Mother also argues some witnesses were referencing notes during their testimony. However, the record indicates the witnesses used notes to confirm dates and other benign details early in their testimony, and that this was quickly brought to the trial court’s attention and the witnesses were instructed to testify only from memory. And while two witnesses did initially appear on Zoom in the presence of another person, both were instructed to have that person leave and did not testify until they confirmed they were alone. Finally, Mother points to an instance during a witness’s testimony where the State attempted to object but could not be heard due to the Zoom software only picking up one voice at a time. First, we note this issue was experienced by an attorney for the State, and Mother does not contend her counsel experienced a similar issue. Additionally, the State’s attempt to object—while inaudible—was noticed by the trial court, who stopped the witness from answering the challenged question so the State had an opportunity to state their objection. Ultimately, while there were errors in the proceedings, they were minor and quickly remedied, so the risk of an inaccurate result was low.
We do not see how these errors, standing alone or together, deprived Mother of an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time and manner. We do not doubt that conducting a termination hearing by remote technology could—in some situations—violate a parent’s due-process rights. See In re C.G., 933 N.E.2d 494, 506 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“We can foresee circumstances under which an incarcerated parent’s in-person participation in a termination proceeding would be necessary” and depriving them of in-person participation “could deprive parents of their right to due process in those circumstances.”), aff’d, 954 N.E.2d 910 (Ind. 2011). Here, however, Mother was afforded substantially similar procedures as would have been available to her at an in-person hearing. She was fully and diligently represented by counsel, who entered exhibits, cross-examined witnesses, and presented witness testimony including live testimony from Mother. Mother also communicated privately with counsel during the hearing. Under these circumstances, the risk of error decreases significantly. See id. (holding denial of the mother’s request to continue termination hearing until she could appear in person did not violate her due-process rights where she was able to be present telephonically and her counsel could cross-examine witnesses and introduce evidence).
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The remote termination hearing did not violate Mother’s due-process rights.
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Affirmed.
May, J., and Kirsch, Sr.J., concur.