Kirsch, J.
Kelsie L. West (“West”) was charged with computer trespass 1 and conversion, 2 both Class A misdemeanors. In this discretionary interlocutory appeal, West raises the following restated issue: whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to dismiss the computer trespass charge.
We affirm.
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West argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion to dismiss the computer trespass charge because, according to West, a single computer cannot constitute a “computer system” to satisfy the elements of the computer trespass offense. West argues the trial court abused its discretion two ways: 1) by concluding, as a matter of law, that a single computer can qualify as a “computer system” for purposes of Indiana Code section 35-43-2-3, the computer trespass statute; and 2) in finding that it is for the trier of fact and not the trial court to decide whether West’s use of East’s laptop falls within the meaning of “computer system” – defined as “a set of related computer equipment, software, or hardware” – because a definition of the word “set” is not found in case law and is not provided in the computer trespass statute.
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While the question West presents regarding the interpretation of Indiana Code section 35-43-2-3 is one of first impression in Indiana, it is well-settled that in interpreting a statute, we first decide if the statute is ambiguous.
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The computer trespass statute, under which West was charged, provides that a person who knowingly or intentionally accesses “(1) a computer system; (2) a computer network; or (3) any part of a computer system or computer network” without consent from the owner commits computer trespass as a Class A misdemeanor. Ind. Code § 35-43-2-3(b).
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West argues that the trial court erred in determining as a matter of law that a single computer meets the definition of a computer system under Indiana Code section 35-43-2-3(b), the criminal statute. According to West, Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-55 “solely exists to clarify that a single device can be a computer system [] under that statute alone, [but] not [under] the criminal statute.” Appellant’s Br. at 16. West maintains that the legislature “was so fixated on ensuring there was no confus[ion] behind [its] intent with defining ‘computer system’ that it codified a second statute with a subsection specifically speaking to the criminal statute’s definition of ‘computer system.’” Id. West contends that the legislature “never intended for a computer system to count as a single device or laptop[] under [the criminal statute,]” and the “distinguishing provision in [Indiana Code section] 35-31.5-2-55(b), and the plain, ordinary, and usual meaning of the words ‘set’ and ‘related’ [under the criminal statute] provide overwhelming support for this contention[.]” Id. at 17.
The State counters, arguing that the trial court “acted well within its discretion when it found as a matter of law that an individual computer system could fall within [the criminal statute.]” Appellee’s Br. at 11-12. Specifically, the State contends that when the language of the criminal statute is given its “full effect,” the statute “clearly contemplates that a defendant can be convicted of computer trespass if she accesses another person’s laptop computer and steals intimate images of a third party from that device without permission[.]” Id. at 11. The State maintains that “[n]owhere in the statute’s plain text did our legislature indicate either explicitly or implicitly that it intended to limit the crime of computer trespass to apply only in cases where a defendant accesses multiple devices[,]” and, “[i]n fact, the statute’s language presumes the opposite, that breaches of a computer system will implicate only a single device.” Id.
We turn our focus to whether a single computer, specifically, a laptop computer, falls within the definition of computer system as set forth in Indiana Code section 35-43-2-3. At issue is the meaning of the terms “set” and “related” as used in the statute. Ind. Code § 35-43-2-3.
When, as here, the legislature has not provided the meaning of a term in a statute, we may consult English dictionaries to determine a word’s plain and ordinary meaning.
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Putting the definitions together gives us the meaning of “computer system”: a group of the same computer equipment, sequence of instructions, or physical parts of a computer that belong together, are used together, and are connected. Using this definition, we cannot say that a single computer, such as a laptop computer, was meant to be excluded from the definition of computer system under Indiana Code section 35-43-2-3. We reject West’s position that the language of the statute suggests otherwise.
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Applying the principles of statutory construction, we conclude the legislature intended a single computer to fall within the definition of “computer system” under Indiana Code section 35-43-2-3. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding, as a matter of law, that a single computer can qualify as a “computer system” for purposes of Indiana Code section 35-43-2-3, the computer trespass statute.
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We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying West’s motion to dismiss the computer trespass charge. We affirm the trial court’s ruling.
Affirmed.
May, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.