Altice, J.
In this interlocutory appeal, Justin Blake challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for discharge and suppression of evidence. Blake argues that his constitutional right to a fast and speedy trial was violated and that an appropriate remedy is either discharge or suppression of any evidence accumulated by the State after the expiration of seventy days from his request for a speedy trial.
We affirm.
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In his original motion for discharge and supporting memorandum, Blake argued that the Covid-19 pandemic did not constitute an emergency under Crim. R. 4.
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To the extent Blake claims he is entitled to discharge under Crim. R. 4(B)(1), we disagree. Crim. R. 4(B)(1) provides: “If any defendant held in jail on an indictment or an affidavit shall move for an early trial, he shall be discharged if not brought to trial within seventy (70) calendar days from the date of such motion.” Exceptions to this requirement include, among other things, “where there was no sufficient time to try him during such seventy (70) calendar days because of the congestion of the court calendar.” Crim. R. 4(B)(1). While court congestion generally requires a motion from the prosecutor, a trial court “may take note of congestion or an emergency without the necessity of a motion, and upon so finding may order a continuance.” Id. (emphasis added). Where the trial court’s finding of an emergency is based on undisputed facts, our standard of review—like for all questions of law—is de novo. Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1039. The ultimate reasonableness of the trial court’s finding of an emergency depends very much upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. See id. (citing Wilkins v. State, 901 N.E.2d 535, 537 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied).
Blake “strongly asserts that the ten-month old COVID-19 pandemic d[id] not qualify as an emergency sufficient to violate his speedy trial rights.” Appellant’s Brief at 10. Blake was originally scheduled to be tried on December 4, 2020, a date within the seventy-day time-period applicable to his request for an early trial pursuant to Crim. R. 4. On November 10, 2020, the Supreme Court issued the Emergency Order in which it noted “[l]arge outbreaks” and continued spread of Covid-19 infections within the judicial system, including judicial officers, courts staff, jurors, non-participants, and family members. Id. The Supreme Court reminded trial judges of their “obligation to help protect their communities by taking proactive, responsible steps to minimize the potential exposure and infection in—and from—their courtrooms by reducing in-person proceedings.” Id. Ten days later, the trial court continued Blake’s jury trial, noting the current conditions within Morgan County with regard to Covid-19 infections and positivity rate coupled with the complexity of the case against Blake. The court explained that “at that point in time, the reality was it was just unable to meet the minimum requirement of public safety necessary to subpoena and summons a jury in to hear the case.” Transcript at 7. Despite the fact that the pandemic had been occurring for approximately ten months, it continued to present a very real danger. Indeed, less than a month later, the Supreme Court took the drastic measure of halting all jury trials in the State until March 1, 2021.
As noted above, the Court’s order applied for purposes of Crim. R. 4 requests. The trial court’s finding that an emergency existed was reasonable in light of the circumstances relating to the Covid-19 pandemic that existed at the time. The trial court did not err by continuing Blake’s jury trial and denying his motion for discharge.
Judgment affirmed.
Bradford, C.J. and Robb, J., concur.