Bailey, J.
Dustin R. Paul (“Paul”) brings this consolidated appeal concerning the calculation and allocation of credit time. In this case, Paul was incarcerated and simultaneously awaiting the resolution of multiple matters, i.e., pending matters in Cause Nos. 34D02-1004-FB-74 (the “First Cause”), 34D02-1607-F4- 174 (the “Second Cause”), and 34D01-1909-F4-2836 (the “Third Cause”). As required by Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2(e) under the circumstances, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences across the causes so that the sentence in the Third Cause ran consecutive to the sentence in the Second Cause, which ran consecutive to the sentence in the First Cause. When the court calculated good time credit, it used the earning rate associated with the Third Cause. The court then applied that credit time to the Third Cause. Although the approach to credit time did not affect the aggregate length of the sentence, the approach prolonged the time it would take Paul to satisfy the sentence in the First Cause.
Paul appeals, arguing that the trial court should have calculated and allocated the credit time on a “first in, first out” basis. We agree. When a person has been simultaneously confined in connection with multiple causes and the court must impose consecutive sentences across those causes, Indiana law requires the trial court to (1) calculate credit time at the rate associated with the first sentence in the sequence of sentences and (2) allocate the time to that first sentence. Concluding that Indiana law contemplates a “first in, first out” approach under the circumstances, we reverse the trial court’s calculation and allocation of credit time and remand for the court to address credit time issues consistent with this opinion. We otherwise fully affirm the sentencing orders.
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Just as the trial court generally lacks discretion with respect to the calculation and allocation of credit time, see Roberts, 998 N.E.2d at 747, the trial court is also bound by Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2(e), which requires consecutive sentences when a person “commits another crime . . . before the date the person is discharged from probation, parole, or a term of imprisonment imposed for the first crime[.]” Consecutive sentences are “sentences . . . to be served in sequence.” Consecutive Sentences, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Moreover, a sequence is a “chronological succession.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2071 (2002). Thus, when the trial court imposes consecutive sentences, those sentences must be served in a chronological succession.
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Turning to the matter at hand, Paul does not argue that he was entitled to have his credit time applied more than once. Rather, Paul contends that the trial court should have focused on the First Cause when calculating and applying credit, taking a “first in, first out” approach. That is, in this case, the trial court used the good time credit earning rate applicable to the Third Cause and then applied the credit to the sentence imposed in that cause, which was the last of the consecutive sentences. This approach to credit time had no impact on the overall aggregate length of Paul’s sentence. Indeed, as Paul continues to serve time in the DOC, he will satisfy each sentence in turn, positioned to earn good time credit at the applicable rate as he fulfills each sentence. Nonetheless, by applying credit time to the last of the three sentences, the court has prolonged the time until Paul will satisfy the sentence in the First Cause. That is, during the period of simultaneous incarceration, Paul essentially “stood idle” with respect to the sentence in the First Cause while “traveling down the road” with respect to the Third Cause.
Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2(e) requires consecutive sentences under the circumstances. Moreover, as earlier noted, consecutive sentences are “sentences . . . to be served in sequence,” Consecutive Sentences, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019), i.e., in a chronological succession. In other words, the statute requires that consecutive sentences run in order. In this case, the trial court applied the credit time to the sentence in the Third Cause, thereby deviating from the proper sequence. Indeed, the court essentially allowed Paul to partially serve the sentence in the Third Cause rather than first satisfy the sentence in the First Cause and, next, the sentence in the Second Cause. This approach did not comport with the plain mandate of Section 35-50-1-2(e). 6 We therefore conclude that the court erred in calculating and allocating credit time.
Having concluded that the trial court erred with respect to credit time, we reverse those portions of the orders addressing credit time. We remand with instructions to calculate and allocate credit time consistent with this opinion by focusing on the First Cause, i.e., the first sentence in the sequence of sentences. We otherwise affirm as to the matters addressed at the consolidated hearing.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur.