Goff, J.
In this case we consider an issue we resolved last year, but in a different context. In Humphrey v. Tuck, we held that a party arguing for a mitigation-of-damages jury instruction “need only point to some evidence in the record that when viewed most favorably [to the party] would suffice for a reasonable juror to decide the issue in the party’s favor.” 151 N.E.3d 1203, 1207 (Ind. 2020). In this case, we consider whether the same type of evidence is sufficient to uphold a trial court’s judgment when entered after a bench trial. We hold that it is and therefore affirm the trial court’s decision to reduce its damages award based on plaintiff’s failure to mitigate her damages and failure to show that the accident caused all of her damages. But because the trial court inadequately addressed the eggshell-skull rule, and treated plaintiff’s prior injuries as separate incidents, rather than as contributing to her injuries and damages arising from the auto accident at issue, we ultimately hold that the trial court abused its discretion in calculating damages. We, therefore, remand to the trial court to take the eggshell-skull rule into account and recalculate damages.
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In resolving whether the trial court’s award of damages was inadequate, we consider three issues. First, we consider whether the trial court improperly reduced Sydney’s award for her post-accident failure to mitigate damages. See infra Section I.A. Second, we consider whether the trial court properly concluded Trevor’s negligence was not the sole cause of all of Sydney’s injuries. See infra Section I.B. Finally, we consider whether the trial court improperly reduced Sydney’s award for the two concussions she sustained before the accident. See infra Section II.
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I. The trial court properly reduced Sydney’s damages because she failed to mitigate her damages and failed to show the accident caused all of her injuries.
A plaintiff in a negligence case must show “a reasonable connection between a defendant’s conduct and the damages which a plaintiff has suffered.” Daub v. Daub, 629 N.E.2d 873, 877 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). Even when the plaintiff makes such a showing, the defendant’s liability can be reduced if he shows that the plaintiff failed to mitigate her damages. Tuck, 151 N.E.3d at 1208.
A. The trial court properly reduced Sydney’s award for her failure to mitigate damages after the accident.
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When, as here, a defendant claims a plaintiff aggravated their own injuries by failing to follow medical advice, the defendant must prove that such neglect caused the plaintiff “‘to suffer a discrete, identifiable harm arising from that failure, and not arising from the defendant’s acts alone.’” Id. (quoting Willis, 839 N.E.2d at 1188). But that requirement “does not mean the defendant must prescribe a specific numerical value to the plaintiff’s increased or prolonged harm.” Id. at 1209. And in Tuck, we clarified that a plaintiff’s prolonged suffering or “continuing symptoms” may qualify as “an identifiable harm attributable not to [the defendant’s] negligence but to the [plaintiff’s] failure to follow [their] doctor’s orders.” Id. at 1208–09 (noting that the “issue, though, is not only whether Humphrey’s failure to follow orders ‘increased’ his harm but also whether it prolonged the suffering of which he complains—and which he attributes to defendants’ negligence—in any discreet, measurable way”).
Here, we find that the evidence of Sydney’s post-accident behavior was sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that she failed to exercise reasonable care and that her failure caused harm.
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Overall, viewing the evidence most favorably to the trial court’s judgment, the trial court properly concluded that Trevor carried his burden to show both elements of his mitigation-of-damages defense. The evidence presented shows that Sydney negligently disregarded her doctors’ recommendations to avoid physical activity and busy environments and to fill her eyeglass prescription to help with her headaches. Based on this evidence, it was reasonable for the trial court to infer that Sydney’s failure to follow her doctors’ instructions exacerbated her symptoms and prolonged her recovery. Although Trevor could not quantify how much harm Sydney suffered from her decisions to disregard her doctors’ orders, this evidence, as in Tuck, was sufficient for the finder of fact to reasonably conclude that Sydney’s failure to follow her doctors’ orders caused “a discreet, identifiable harm.” See Tuck, 151 N.E.3d at 1208 (quoting Willis, 839 N.E.2d at 1188).
B. Sydney failed to show that Trevor’s negligence caused all of her injuries, symptoms, and poor academic performance.
Trevor next argues that Sydney failed to demonstrate that all of her suffering resulted from the accident. He further contends that the trial court properly concluded that Sydney “failed to prove that her poor grades were a result of anything other than her poor school/work/life balance.” Pet. to Trans. at 13 (emphases omitted).
While Trevor presented no expert witnesses to rebut Sydney’s claims for damages, and while a failure to present such evidence will often prove fatal to a defense, the record provides ample support for his claims.
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Based on this evidence, we conclude that it was within the trial court’s discretion to find that Sydney failed to meet her burden to prove her claimed damages.
II. The trial court should not have reduced Sydney’s damages for her two pre-accident concussions.
Finally, Sydney argues that the trial court should not have reduced her damages for her two pre-accident concussions. We agree.
Under the “eggshell skull” rule, a defendant “takes his victim as he finds him.”…
In its order denying Sydney’s motion to correct error, the trial court noted that Trevor “is not excused from liability just because Renner had suffered previous concussions.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 28. However, the following paragraph shows that, at a minimum, the court did not properly apply the eggshell-skull rule. “The extent of [Trevor]’s liability,” the order states, “is determined by causation. Renner’s injuries arose from the cumulative effects of at least five documented instances of mild traumatic brain injury.” Id. at 29. The court concluded that “[a]ll of these traumas contributed to her present condition” and, therefore, denied Sydney’s motion to correct error. Id.
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Because the evidence, taken favorably to the trial court’s judgment, did not show that Sydney’s prior concussions independently caused the harm she suffered after the accident, the trial court should have applied the eggshell-skull rule and should not have reduced Sydney’s damages on account of her two prior concussions.
Conclusion
For the reasons above, we affirm the trial court’s reduction of its award due to Sydney’s failure to mitigate her damages. We further affirm the trial court’s determination that Sydney failed to prove Trevor’s negligence proximately caused all her damages. But we find the trial court erred in failing to apply the eggshell-skull rule. We therefore remand this matter to the trial court to recalculate its award of damages considering the eggshell-skull to determine the extent to which Trevor’s conduct resulted in an aggravation of Sydney’s pre-existing condition.
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Slaughter, JJ., concur.