Friedlander, S.J.
This matter stems from the 2010 adoption of Natalia Barnett by Kristine Barnett and Michael Barnett (collectively, “the Barnetts”)1 and a subsequent change in Natalia’s birthdate from 2003 to 1989. In 2019, the State of Indiana charged the Barnetts, in separate cases, with multiple counts of neglect of a dependent, and the Barnetts filed separate motions to dismiss all charges alleging grounds that included res judicata, collateral estoppel, and statute of limitations. The trial court granted the motions in part, dismissing some but not all of the charged counts. The State filed motions seeking to have the trial court certify its orders, and the trial court granted the motions. The State then sought permission to file interlocutory appeals, and this Court granted its request and consolidated the appeals.
On appeal, the State presents two issues for review, which we restate as: 1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by finding that the State was precluded from presenting evidence to the jury of Natalia’s age to prove that she was a dependent of the Barnetts during the charged period? 2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by dismissing three of the counts charged against the Barnetts as being outside the statute of limitations period?
We affirm.
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[T[he State argues that the trial court abused its discretion by giving preclusive effect to the Marion County Probate Court’s 2012 age-change order, thus preventing the State from presenting to the jury evidence of what the State believes to be Natalia’s true age. The State’s argument is two-fold, presenting issues of void judgment and res judicata.
First, the State argues that the trial court erred by finding that the age-change order was entitled to preclusive effect. According to the State, the Barnetts were required to return to the Hamilton County Superior Court (the “adoption court”) to request a change in Natalia’s age because the adoption court had, in 2010, found Natalia’s birthyear to be 2003 when it issued its adoption decree. The State contends that by filing the age-change petition in the Marion County Probate Court, instead of in the adoption court, the Barnetts collaterally attacked the adoption court’s 2010 order. The State asserts that the trial court in the instant criminal case—in finding the probate court’s age-change order was entitled to preclusive effect—“failed to recognize that the [probate court] could not enter an order purporting to establish Natalia’s age because the [adoption court] had already entered such an order[.]” Appellant’s Br. p. 22. Thus, the trial court erred by giving the probate court’s age-change order preclusive effect, as the order should have been found to be void ab initio. We disagree.
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Here, neither the adoption court nor the probate court lacked authority to provide the relief ordered. The subject matter and judgment of the adoption court pertained to the adoption of Natalia, and the adoption proceedings effected the Barnetts’ adoption of Natalia.
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When the Barnetts filed their petition in the probate court, they initiated the action to change Natalia’s birthyear from 2003 to 1989, not to set aside the adoption. Natalia was physically located in Marion County at the time the age change was sought.
While the matters addressed in the adoption court and in the probate court may have required consideration of facts relevant to both cases, there was no overlap of claims between the two cases. The adoption proceeding and the age-change action were two different claims. Each court had the authority to provide the relief ordered. As such, the age-change action was not an impermissible collateral attack on the adoption proceeding, and the 2012 age-change order is not void ab initio.
Next, the State argues that, notwithstanding this Court finding that the age change order is not void, the trial court still erred in applying issue preclusion to exclude evidence that Natalia was a minor when the Barnetts adopted her because: (1) the State was not a party to the age-change order proceedings; (2) the State did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate Natalia’s age; and (3) applying issue preclusion would be unfair.
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Regarding the first requirement, that there be a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction, the Marion County Probate Court was a court of competent jurisdiction, 6 and we have already determined that the adoption proceeding and the age-change action were two different claims such that the age-change order was not void ab initio. The probate court’s judgment was a final one because it disposed of all issues as to all parties, thus ending the case See Georgos v. Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448, 451 (Ind. 2003); see also Ind. Appellate Rule 2(H)(1). And, the judgment was on the merits. While the original 2012 age-change order was issued without a hearing, a full evidentiary hearing—at which all interested parties were (or had an opportunity to be) present—was held in 2017, at the conclusion of which the probate court reaffirmed the 2012 order. See Creech v. Town of Walkerton, 472 N.E.2d 226, 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (quoting 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments § 478 (1969)) (“If the case is brought to an issue, heard on evidence submitted pro and con, and decided by the verdict of a jury or the findings of a court, the judgment rendered is on the merits.”). The first requirement of collateral estoppel is met.
The second requirement of collateral estoppel is that there be an identity of the issues. This requirement is met when an issue that was necessarily adjudicated in the prior proceeding is the same issue presented in the subsequent lawsuit…Here, quite clearly, the issue of Natalia’s actual age was litigated and determined in the probate court proceedings. In the instant criminal matter, the issue the trial court precluded the State from litigating is Natalia’s age. Thus, the “identity of issues” requirement of the collateral estoppel doctrine is met.
Regarding the third requirement, that the parties to the two actions be the same parties or privies, the State maintains that it was not a party to any litigation in which Natalia’s age was decided and that “although various governmental entities interacted with Natalia and the Barnetts, [the instant] case was the first opportunity the Tippecanoe [County] Prosecutor’s Office had to bring criminal charges relating to neglect after it finally untangled the full extent of the Barnetts’ complicated web of deceit.” Appellant’s Br. p. 18. The Barnetts argue that the State was the privy of the Marion County prosecutor and Adult Protective Services at the age-change proceedings, and the State was either a party to the 2013 HCDCS CHINS proceeding or the privy of the HCDCS for the CHINS proceedings.
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Applying our Supreme Court’s reasoning in Becker to the instant case, we find that the Tippecanoe County Prosecutor’s Office (“TCPO”) is in privity with the MCAPS (Marion County Adult Protective Services, as represented by the Marion County Prosecutor’s Office through Deputy Prosecutor Oetjen). TCPO has the same interest in its criminal action against the Barnetts as MCAPS had when it filed a petition for appointment of guardian ad litem for Natalia in the Marion County Probate Court—that is, protecting Natalia from abuse and neglect. And, after judgment was rendered in the age-change proceeding, TCPO acquired an interest in the subject matter affected by the probate court’s judgment—that is, Natalia’s actual age.
Finding that the three requirements for collateral estoppel have been met, we now consider the additional requirements of whether TCPO had a full and fair opportunity to litigate Natalia’s age, and whether it would be otherwise unfair under the circumstances to permit the use of collateral estoppel.
The State argues that it never had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue because it was never a party to a proceeding where that question was litigated.
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The evidentiary hearing to determine whether the probate court’s 2012 age change order should be set aside was ultimately held on March 7, 2017—at which the Manses, Michael, and Natalia (represented by a GAL) appeared. Oetjen did not appear at the hearing on behalf of MCAPS. At the conclusion of the hearing, the probate court determined that Natalia’s birthyear would remain 1989.
We have already determined that TCPO and MCAPS shared the same interest—protecting Natalia from abuse and neglect—and, thus, are in privity. We also find that under these circumstances, TCPO had a full and fair opportunity to litigate Natalia’s age through its privy, MCAPS.
Furthermore, because the State—via MCAPS—failed to appeal the denial of its petition for appointment of guardian ad litem and failed to participate in the evidentiary hearing on the matter of whether the 2012 age-change order should be set aside, the State—via TCPO—is bound by the probate court’s decision that Natalia’s birthyear remains 1989. Returning to Becker, in which our Supreme Court explained:
If the res judicata shoe were on the other foot in this case, Becker would be hard-pressed to avoid its preclusive effects. There is, after all, only one of him, with no alter egos to intervene on his behalf if a law later changed in a way favorable to his position. Final judgments in a criminal case should be similarly binding against “the State”—not just the prosecutor, but also the various alter egos of the State whose substantial interests are adequately represented by the prosecutor. In this case, the DOC is also “the State”—not because it is a State agency, but because it has the same substantial interests as the prosecutor in maximizing a sex offender’s registration obligations. The DOC, being in privity with the prosecutor, is thus bound by the unappealed 2008 final judgment in Becker’s favor.
Becker, 992 N.E.2d at 701-02 (emphasis added). While the TCPO may be unhappy with the result of the age-change litigation, in light of the circumstances of this case, we find no reason why the TCPO should be allowed to determine whether its evidence regarding Natalia’s age would have resulted in the probate court setting aside the 2012 age-change order.
A final consideration in the application of collateral estoppel is whether it would be otherwise unfair under the circumstances of the particular case to apply collateral estoppel…The State argues that the application of collateral estoppel is unfair because: (1) the Hamilton County adoption decree and the Marion County Probate Court’s 2012 age-change order are in conflict, and (2) the State “should be able to hold [the Barnetts] to account for abandoning a child to fend for herself without receiving the medical care she desperately needs” and for using deception to prevent others from helping her.
First, there is no conflict between the adoption decree and the probate court’s age-change order, as we already have determined that the adoption proceeding and the age-change action involved two different claims. Second, our conclusions in the case before us do not prevent the TCPO from pursuing prosecution of the Barnetts for neglect of Natalia under the theory that she was a dependent because of physical disability. Our conclusions prevent the TCPO from litigating Natalia’s age.
In sum, we find no error in the application of defensive collateral estoppel. The initial requirements for collateral estoppel to apply have been met, and the record reflects that TCPO, through its privy, had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of Natalia’s age. And, under these circumstances, it is not otherwise unfair to permit the use of collateral estoppel in this case.
Next, we address whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting the Barnetts’ motions to dismiss Counts I, III, and V against them based upon the statute of limitations.
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Specifically, beginning in 2012, the Barnetts were investigated by the HCDCS for possible abuse or neglect of Natalia, and the Barnetts subsequently informed HCDCS staff that they were seeking to have Natalia’s age changed. In 2013, HCDCS filed a request for authority to file a CHINS petition, based on its belief that Natalia was a child who had been abandoned and was in need of services, and the trial court dismissed the petition, finding that it lacked jurisdiction because Natalia had been judicially determined to be an adult by the Marion Probate Court. Later in 2013, Tippecanoe County Adult Protective Services conducted an investigation into whether Natalia was an endangered adult. Investigators interviewed Natalia and the Barnetts and became aware of the probate court’s 2012 order that changed Natalia’s birthyear. In 2014, the Tippecanoe County Sheriff’s Department received a complaint that questioned Natalia’s age classification as an adult; an investigation ensued that included meetings with the TCPO.
In 2016, the Manses filed a petition in the Tippecanoe County Circuit Court seeking guardianship of Natalia, and Michael filed an objection with the court. The Manses then filed in the Marion County Probate Court a combined motion to vacate the probate court’s 2012 age-change order and motion for relief from judgment. A hearing on the matter was held in March 2017, at which the Manses and Michael appeared, and Natalia was present and represented by a GAL. At the hearing, a detective with the Tippecanoe County Sheriff’s Department testified that the TCPO wanted to help stabilize Natalia’s situation; at least two meetings regarding the matter were held in the prosecutor’s office; and the prosecutor’s office attempted to enlist local attorneys to assist in the matter pro bono.
The State did not file charges against the Barnetts until September 2019. However, the State’s ability to investigate the crimes and develop a case was not thwarted. Moreover, the Barnetts “did not engage in any positive act calculated to conceal the fact” that they allegedly committed neglect of a dependent; thus, the statute of limitations was not tolled and Counts I, III, and V should have been dismissed. iSee Study, 24 N.E.3d at 957-58. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court properly granted, in part, the Barnetts’ motions to dismiss and did not abuse its discretion in so doing.
In conclusion, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving preclusive effect to the Marion County Probate Court’s 2012 age-change order and the March 7, 2017 order reaffirming same, thus preventing the State from relitigating Natalia’s age; and the trial court did not err in dismissing Counts I, III, and V against the Barnetts because the charges were filed outside of the five-year statute of limitations period, and the State failed to allege sufficient facts to constitute an exception to the statute. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Robb, J., and Crone, J., concur.