Altice, J.
Case Summary
In December 2019, a nurse employed by St. Vincent Carmel Hospital (the Hospital) reported that, the prior evening, she had smelled alcohol on the breath of Rebecca J. Denman, M.D. (Dr. Denman) while Dr. Denman was on call and had stopped at the Hospital to check on a patient. About ten days later, Dr. Denman’s employer, St. Vincent Medical Group (SVMG), placed Dr. Denman on leave and required her to submit to an alcohol assessment, which ultimately led to an evaluation and six weeks of treatment.
Dr. Denman sued the Hospital, the nurse, and SVMG (collectively Defendants), for, among other things, defamation, fraud, constructive fraud, negligent misrepresentation, tortious interference with an employment relationship, and civil conspiracy. Following the trial court’s denial of Defendants’ motions for summary judgment and directed verdict, the jury found in Dr. Denman’s favor on all her claims except civil conspiracy, awarding her $4.75 million. The trial court granted Dr. Denman’s motion for an award of prejudgment interest, but tolled accrual of post-judgment interest for several months pursuant to a COVID-related Indiana Supreme Court emergency order. Defendants then filed a motion to correct error or for remittitur which the trial court granted in part, finding that the fraud/constructive fraud and negligent misrepresentation damages were duplicative.
In this consolidated appeal, Defendants raise three issues that we combine and restate as:
I. Should the trial court have granted a directed verdict on (1) Dr. Denman’s defamation claim, (2) her three reliance-based claims of fraud, constructive fraud, and negligent misrepresentation, and (3) her claim of tortious interference with employment relationship?
Dr. Denman raises the following restated issues:
II. Did the trial court err when it reduced the verdict and judgment against SVMG for fraud, constructive fraud, and negligent misrepresentation from $2.25 million to $1 million?
III. Was Dr. Denman entitled to post-judgment interest on the trial court’s award of prejudgment interest, and, if so, was the trial court required to amend the original judgment to add the award of prejudgment interest to it?
IV. Did the trial court err when it temporarily suspended the accrual of post-judgment interest pursuant to the emergency order?
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
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Dr. Denman also challenges the trial court’s decision to temporarily toll the accrual of post-judgment interest. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Dr. Denman on January 16, 2020. According to Indiana Code § 24-4.6-1-101, “interest on judgments for money whenever rendered shall be from the date of the return of the verdict or finding of the court until satisfaction at . . . an annual rate of eight percent (8%) if there was no contract by the parties.”
Shortly after judgment was entered, the unprecedented and developing nature of the COVID-19 pandemic prompted our Supreme Court to enter a series of emergency orders (collectively, Emergency Orders) pursuant to Indiana Administrative Rule 17. See, e.g., In the Matter of Administrative Rule 17 Emergency Relief for Indiana Trial Courts Relating to the 2019 Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), 20S-CB-123 (Mar. 16, 2020). [Footnote omitted.] On March 13, 2020, the Supreme Court issued an order granting Marion County’s petition for emergency relief. In the Matter of the Petition of the Courts of Marion County for Administrative Rule 17 Emergency Relief, 20S-CB-00113 (Mar. 13, 2020). Among other things, the March 13 order stated that “no interest shall be due or charged during the tolled period[,]” beginning on March 16, 2020. Id. The Supreme Court reiterated this same provision ten days later in a generally applicable order. In the Matter of Administrative Rule 17 Emergency Relief for Indiana Trial Courts Relating to the 2019 Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), No. 20S-CB-123 (Mar. 23, 2020).
On March 30, 2020, the trial court applied the Emergency Orders to Dr. Denman’s case, stating “any post-judgment interest accruing on the final judgment is tolled during the pendency of the judicial emergency as declared by the Indiana Supreme Court, which shall last at least through May 1, 2020.” Denman’s Appendix Vol. II p. 30. The trial court later extended its order on post-judgment interest through June 19, 2020, at which time the tolling period ended. Id. at 74.
Dr. Denman contests as unconstitutional the trial court’s order tolling the accrual of post-judgment interest. Her argument, as well as the trial court’s ruling, assumes the Emergency Orders mandated that post-judgment interest be tolled. [Footnote omitted.] But the Emergency Orders cannot reasonably be construed in such a manner.
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Post-judgment interest is a creature of statute, borne of legislative authority. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. State, 124 N.E.3d 1187, 1190 (Ind. 2019); I.C. § 24-4.6- 1-101. The statutory language is mandatory: interest “shall be” rendered from the date of judgment. See Daugherty v. Robinson Farms, Inc., 858 N.E.2d 192, 197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (construing “shall”). Unlike prejudgment interest, trial courts have no discretion over whether post-judgment interest will be awarded; prevailing plaintiffs are automatically entitled to it. See Gurbnich v. Renner, 746 N.E.2d 111, 114-15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (finding a right to post-judgment interest even where the trial court did not specifically award it).
The post-judgment interest statute is substantive rather than procedural, meaning it “creates, defines, and regulates rights” rather than “prescrib[ing] the method of enforcing a right or obtaining redress” for its invasion. See Johnson v. Johnson, 849 N.E.2d 1176, 1179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that post-judgment interest is “substantive part of the money judgment, not merely a mechanism to enforce the judgment”); Morrison v. Vasquez, 124 N.E.3d 1217, 1222 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Hayden v. State, 771 N.E.2d 100, 102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). An appellate court cannot change a rule of substantive law without a case before it. Square D. Co. v. O’Neal, 225 Ind. 49, 72 N.E.2d 654, 655 (Ind. 1947) (“No rule which we could adopt would repeal [substantive law]. This court cannot change a rule of substantive law nor could the General Assembly vest us with such legislative power.”); Horner v. Curry, 125 N.E.3d 584, 589 (Ind. 2019) (“Unlike its federal counterpart, the Indiana Constitution imposes no case or controversy restriction on the judicial power of the State. But the express distribution-of-powers clause in our fundamental law performs a similar function, serving as a principal justification for judicial restraint.” (cleaned up)).
Despite the potential breadth of the term “interest” in the Emergency Orders, we do not interpret that language to include post-judgment interest. The words “tolled period” are instructive, because post-judgment interest – being automatic and continuous – cannot be tolled. Our conclusion is in keeping with our practice of presuming that each branch of our government acts within their constitutionally prescribed boundaries. Cf. Ind. Newspapers, Inc. v. Miller, 980 N.E.2d 852, 860 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (interpreting a Supreme Court rule under the rules of statutory construction and presuming its rules are constitutional); [Footnote omitted. Daniels v. FanDuel, Inc., 109 N.E.3d 390, 396 (Ind. 2018) (interpreting a statute’s terms broadly to avoid constitutional issues). In this case, the trial court erred in interpreting the Emergency Orders to apply to post-judgment interest because so doing would give the Emergency Orders effect beyond the power constitutionally and statutorily allocated to the courts.
Interpreting “no interest shall be due or charged” to exclude post-judgment interest is also consistent with the restraint our Supreme Court has demonstrated when invoking its emergency powers in other ways during the pandemic. See, e.g., In re Petition to the Indiana Supreme Court to Engage in Emergency Rulemaking to Protect CARES Act Stimulus Payments From Attachment or Garnishment from Creditors, No. 20S-MS-258, 20S-CB-123 (April 20, 2020) (acknowledging the Court’s authority “to suspend issuance of all hold, attachment, or garnishment orders” during the emergency but, instead, choosing “a much narrower and more carefully tailored subset of that relief . . . .”). Id. Given the Court’s reticence to exercise the full width of the expansive powers it possesses, we cannot find that our Supreme Court intended to exercise powers it undoubtedly lacked. We would be foolish to infer such intent simply because the Court did not designate every type of “interest” it was tolling. Reason dictates that the Court did not intend its order to apply to post-judgment interest which is mandated by the legislature. This seems particularly likely in light of other, less invasive measures available to the Court if it intended to grant temporary post-judgment interest relief, i.e., requiring the deposit of post-judgment interest into clerks’ office or escrow accounts.
Moreover, excluding post-judgment interest from the Orders satisfies the Supreme Court’s emergency purpose. In an emergency, the Supreme Court’s inherent authority to supervise all courts of the state allows it to suspend trial courts’ discretionary decision-making, like the grant of prejudgment interest. Ind. Admin. R. 17; Wisner, 984 N.E.2d at 1209. As the March 23 Order observed, the COVID-19 emergency “impede[d] litigants’ and courts’ ability to comply with statutory deadlines and rules of procedure.” See In the Matter of Administrative Rule 17 Emergency Relief for Indiana Trial Courts Relating to the 2019 Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), No. 20S-CB-123 (Mar. 23, 2020). Permitting grants of prejudgment interest would have cost litigants for a delay they did not cause. As we explained above, Indiana’s Tort Prejudgment Interest Statute is meant to influence litigants’ behavior. Supra Part III. To award prejudgment interest for delays not attributable to any party would not advance that goal. Post-judgment interest, on the other hand, arises just as automatically during a pandemic as it does any other time—and it will continue to do so until the legislature decides otherwise. For all these reasons, we find that the trial court erred in tolling the accrual of Dr. Denman’s post-judgment interest.
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Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Robb, J. and Weissmann, J., concur.