Pyle, J.
In this interlocutory appeal, the State appeals the trial court’s order denying the State’s motion to amend the charging information against twenty-three-year-old Anthony Neukam (“Neukam”) to include eight additional child molesting charges that were alleged to have occurred when Neukam was under the age of eighteen. These eight additional charges had been originally filed in the juvenile court but were dismissed pursuant to our Indiana Supreme Court’s holding in D.P. v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1210 (Ind. 2020). The State argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion to amend, asserting that the trial court had jurisdiction over Neukam and the additional child molesting charges where Neukam was over the age of eighteen at the time of the proposed amendment. Concluding that the relevant juvenile statutes set forth by our legislature do not provide the trial court with the necessary jurisdiction under the specific facts of this case, we affirm the trial court’s order.
We affirm.
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The State challenges the adult criminal court’s interlocutory order denying the State’s motion to amend the complaint in Neukam’s adult criminal case. Specifically, the State argues that “[t]he [adult criminal] court erred by denying the State’s motion to amend the charges merely because Neukam was under age 18 at the time of the alleged offenses.”
While this interlocutory appeal comes to this Court from an order on the State’s motion to amend, the crux of this appeal involves jurisdiction. This appeal requires this Court to answer the question left unanswered by our supreme court in the D.P. opinion. Specifically, we are asked to determine “whether the State [may] directly file charges . . . in adult criminal court if a juvenile court does[] n[o]t have subject matter jurisdiction to conduct a waiver hearing.” See D.P., 151 N.E.3d at 1217 n.2. Stated differently, this appeal involves the question of whether, under relevant statutes, an adult criminal court has jurisdiction over child molesting allegations that were alleged to have occurred when an individual was under eighteen years of age but is now over the age of twenty-one. The answer to the question presented on appeal depends on jurisdiction.
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Here, the parties focus on the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. The State acknowledges that Neukam, who is now over twenty-one years old, is “beyond the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts for the acts he committed before he was 18” years old. (State’s Br. 7). Instead, the State asserts that this fact “does not mean [Neukam] is beyond the power of the State of Indiana to enforce the criminal law at all.” (State’s Br. 7). The State reasons that Neukam “is an adult, and like all adults, he is subject to the general criminal jurisdiction of the criminal courts of Indiana to answer for his violation of the criminal law.” (State’s Br. 7). Thus, the State suggests that subject matter jurisdiction of the juvenile delinquency allegations should transfer to the adult criminal court in Neukam’s adult criminal case because, as a circuit court, it had original and concurrent jurisdiction in all criminal cases under INDIANA CODE § 33-28-1- 2(a)(1).
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On the other hand, Neukam asserts that the State cannot file the charges in adult criminal court because the alleged acts occurred when he was a “child” and that the legislature has not provided the adult criminal court with subject matter jurisdiction over acts or offenses that were alleged to have been done by a “child.” See I.C. § 31-9-2-13(d) (defining “child” for juvenile law purposes). Neukam further asserts that “Indiana Courts only have jurisdiction to the extent that jurisdiction has been granted to them by the constitution or by statute.” (Neukam’s Br. 9). In addition, Neukam contends that “[h]ad the legislature intended to allow the State to amend adult charges for offenses allegedly committed by Neukam, as a child, and bypass the waiver provisions . . . , there would be statutory direction to allow such an action, such as provided in I.C. [§] 31-30-3-4, involving the allegation of Murder.” (Neukam’s Br. 7). Neukam argues that “[i]t is not for the State to create statutory authority to address factual situations that are silent in the law” and that, instead, it “is a function of the legislative branch.”
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In this appeal, we are faced with such vagaries and confusion due to the juvenile statutory law, or lack thereof. We agree with Neukam that the current juvenile statutory scheme set forth by our legislature does not explicitly provide for the State’s proposed action of amending the charging information in Neukam’s adult criminal case to add eight additional child molesting charges that were alleged to have occurred when he was under the age of eighteen.
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As set forth by INDIANA CODE § 33-28-1-2, the legislature has provided a circuit court with “original and concurrent jurisdiction . . . in all criminal matters[.]” I.C. § 33-28-1-2(a)(1). Thus, this statute granted the adult criminal court here, as a circuit court, subject matter jurisdiction over all criminal cases. See D.P., 151 N.E.3d at 1213 (“Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s constitutional or statutory power to hear and adjudicate a certain type of case.”). A “crime” is defined as “a felony or a misdemeanor.” I.C. § 35-31.5-2- 75.
Here, the allegations that the State sought to add to the charging information in Neukam’s adult criminal case were child molesting charges that were alleged to have occurred when Neukam was under the age of eighteen. Thus, the proposed charges were allegations of delinquent acts. See I.C. § 31-37-1-2(1) (defining a delinquent act, in relevant part, as an act that “would be an offense if committed by adult” and that is committed by a “child . . . before becoming eighteen (18) years of age”).
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Here, in INDIANA CODE § 31-30-1-11, the legislature set forth a specific restriction on an adult criminal court’s jurisdiction. Specifically, INDIANA CODE § 31-30-1-11, provides that “if a court having criminal jurisdiction determines that a defendant is alleged to have committed a crime before the defendant is eighteen (18) years of age, the court shall immediately transfer the case . . . to the juvenile court.” I.C. § 31-30-1-11(a) (emphasis added). Thus, in this instant case, the adult criminal court could not grant the State’s motion to amend because it would not, based on the allegations that Neukam committed the alleged child molesting offenses before he was eighteen years old, have had the necessary jurisdiction over such allegations.
While it is clear, pursuant to our supreme court’s opinion in D.P., that based on Neukam’s age, a juvenile court would no longer have jurisdiction to enter a delinquency adjudication or waive Neukam to adult court, we cannot rewrite or insert provisions into our juvenile statutes. See D.P., 151 N.E.3d at 1217 (declining to “violat[e] bedrock separation-of-power principles” by rewriting statutes set forth by our legislature). See also K.C.G., 156 N.E.3d at 1285 (declining to “rewrit[e] the legislature’s narrow enactment” of juvenile statutes).5 Our legislature has not yet provided the statutory authority to grant subject matter jurisdiction to an adult criminal court in the situation of this case where the adult criminal court is aware that an individual is alleged to have committed a delinquent act of child molesting when he was under eighteen (a child) but is twenty-one or older at the time the State seeks to file charges against him. Until that time when the legislature provides an adult criminal court with jurisdiction over such a situation, we cannot interpret the existing statutes to fill that void. “If today’s result was not the intent of the legislature, then it—not we—must make the necessary statutory changes.” D.P., 151 N.E.3d at 1217. Accordingly, we affirm the adult criminal court’s order denying the State’s motion to amend the charging information in Neukam’s adult criminal case.
Affirmed
Najam, J., and Tavitas, J., concur