Robb, J.
Kennic Brown is charged with battery against a public safety officer, a Level 6 felony. He moved to dismiss the charge against him on the basis that double jeopardy bars this criminal prosecution because he has already been subject to administrative sanctions by the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) for the same actions that give rise to this charge. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and this court granted Brown’s motion for interlocutory appeal. On appeal, Brown raises a single issue: whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because the criminal prosecution constitutes double jeopardy. Concluding the administrative punishment does not preclude a subsequent prosecution, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Brown’s motion to dismiss.
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Brown contends that the criminal prosecution for battery must be dismissed because otherwise, he will be subjected to multiple punishments for the same act due to the disciplinary action already taken by the DOC.
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Brown argues that the deprivation of good time credit and placement in restrictive housing are sanctions that are so punitive in nature they constitute a jeopardy. Brown relies heavily on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Halper, in which the Court applied the Double Jeopardy Clause to a sanction without first determining that it was criminal in nature, instead focusing on the proportionality of the sanction. 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989) (holding that “a civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals of punishment”). Halper raised the question of whether prison disciplinary sanctions “might ever be considered sufficiently excessive to constitute criminal punishment for double jeopardy purposes.” U.S. v. Mayes, 158 F.3d 1215, 1220 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1185 (1999). But circuit courts distinguished Halper in this context and continued to reject prisoners’ double jeopardy challenges. Id. (collecting cases). And the Supreme Court subsequently disavowed Halper due to its “ill considered” and “unworkable” “deviation from longstanding double jeopardy principles[.]” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 95, 101. Instead, Hudson reaffirmed the previously established rule requiring the court to first ask whether the legislature indicated a preference that a particular sanction be civil or criminal and, in cases where the intent was to establish a civil penalty, to then consider whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to transform what was intended as a civil penalty into a criminal penalty. Id. at 95 (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)). We will consider Brown’s arguments in this context.
As for the legislative intent, we look to Indiana Code chapter 11-11-5, which addresses conduct and discipline within the DOC. The chapter authorizes DOC to “adopt rules for the maintenance of order and discipline among committed persons.” Ind. Code § 11-11-5-2. The chapter also clearly contemplates the possibility that violations of the conduct code could result in criminal prosecution, as it includes a provision regarding the admissibility in court of statements made by the prisoner during the course of a disciplinary investigation. Ind. Code § 11-11-5-5(d). Given the non-punitive purpose (“maintenance of order”) of the disciplinary provisions, the clear acknowledgement that criminal prosecution could follow, and the delegation of disciplinary authority to an administrative agency, the statutory scheme indicates a preference that the sanctions be considered civil.
The DOC’s authority to maintain order and discipline includes the authority to administratively punish conduct within the prison by imposing disciplinary sanctions. Lyons, 475 N.E.2d at 723. The range of disciplinary actions DOC is authorized to take includes as little as a report to be made part of the person’s record or extra work to segregation from the general population for a fixed period of time and deprivation of good time credit. Ind. Code § 11-11-5-3.
However, the DOC may not lengthen a prisoner’s term in prison.
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An inmate does not have a constitutional right to credit time, Brown v. State, 947 N.E.2d 486, 492 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied; rather, credit time “is a bonus created by statute and the deprivation of credit time does nothing more than take that bonus away[,]” Mullins, 647 N.E.2d at 678. Therefore, in the terms used in Ward, deprivation of credit time is not so punitive either in purpose or effect that it constitutes a criminal penalty that would subject a person to double jeopardy. 448 U.S. at 249.
Brown also argues that his 360-day confinement in the restrictive housing unit is punitive in nature because it was psychologically and physiologically detrimental to him.
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All disciplinary actions are to some extent intended to punish an inmate for violating DOC rules. And some disciplinary actions are more severe than others. As acknowledged in Lyons, that is how DOC ensures peace and order within its facilities. 475 N.E.2d at 723; see also Mayes, 158 F.3d at 1224 (noting that in this context, “a prison’s remedial and punitive interests are inextricably related”). But the question when considering a double jeopardy claim is not whether the discipline is punitive, but whether it is so punitive as to essentially be a criminal punishment. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 95.
In Williams, the defendant escaped from the county jail and was both placed in administrative segregation in the jail for thirty-one days and prosecuted for escape. 493 N.E.2d at 432. He argued in a petition for post-conviction relief that by being administratively punished with confinement in segregated housing and being charged with escape, he was punished twice for the same offense. Our supreme court disagreed and held the trial court correctly concluded the defendant was not subjected to double jeopardy. Id. Thus, our supreme court applied the general rule that an administrative punishment does not preclude subsequent prosecution to discipline by placement in segregated housing. Although the defendant in Williams was only so confined for thirty-one days as opposed to Brown’s 360-day confinement, Brown does not argue that the length of his confinement made it punitive, only that the fact of his confinement was punitive. Williams held otherwise. See also Garrity, 41 F.3d at 1152 (“Changes in the conditions of incarceration, such as [defendant’s] placement in segregation . . ., do not constitute a second punishment for the original offense.”).
The disciplinary action taken by the DOC against Brown for his conduct violation does not preclude the State’s criminal prosecution of him for the same act. Accordingly, the trial court correctly denied Brown’s motion to dismiss the criminal charge against him on double jeopardy grounds.
Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.