David, J.
Police may not interrogate a person in custody without proper Miranda warnings or else the State risks having those custodial statements suppressed in a criminal trial. But not every station house interview implicates Miranda. Miranda warnings are only required when a person is in custody—i.e. when his or her freedom of movement is curtailed to a level associated with formal arrest and when he or she is under the same inherently coercive pressures in the police station as those at issue in Miranda v. Arizona.
Two years ago in State v. E.R., 123 N.E.3d 675, 683 (Ind. 2019), we determined a defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation at a police station house because, based on the totality of objective circumstances, the curtailment of his freedom of movement was akin to formal arrest and he was subjected to overt coercive pressures throughout the interrogation. In the present case, which incidentally involves the same detective and the same police department as in E.R., the trial court found the circumstances amounted to custodial interrogation and suppressed statements made by the defendant during a police interview.
Today, we call on E.R. to answer a similar question: Was defendant Axel Domingo Diego’s freedom of movement in this case curtailed to a level akin to formal arrest when he had a free-flowing exchange in a detective’s personal office? We find it was not. We therefore reverse the trial court’s suppression order and remand this matter for further proceedings.
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The question before us today is whether Domingo Diego was “in custody” such that Detective Munson should have read him Miranda warnings prior to the interview. “Custody under Miranda occurs when two criteria are met. First, the person’s freedom of movement is curtailed to the degree associated with formal arrest. And second, the person undergoes the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” E.R., 123 N.E.3d at 680 (quotations and citations omitted).
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Custody, therefore, is “a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion.” Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S 499, 508, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1189, 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012) (emphasis added). There is no bright line rule requiring Miranda warnings be given prior to an interview simply because a particular defendant is questioned in a police station. Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States has advised: Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him “in custody.” Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d. 714 (1977) (per curiam); accord California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (per curiam).
With this focus, we dispose of today’s question under the first of E.R.’s two-factor test: the freedom-of-movement inquiry. See Howes, 565 U.S at 509, 132 S.Ct. at 1190 (observing the freedom-of-movement test is a “necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody”). “Under Miranda, freedom of movement is curtailed when a reasonable person would feel not free to terminate the interrogation and leave.” E.R., 123 N.E.3d at 680 (citation omitted). The benchmark for this inquiry is whether the level of curtailment is akin to formal arrest. Id. To make this determination, we examine the totality of objective circumstances surrounding the interrogation, including “the location, duration, and character of the questioning; statements made during the questioning; the number of law-enforcement officers present; the extent of police control over the environment; the degree of physical restraint; and how the interview begins and ends.” Id.
In E.R., we observed there was substantial, probative evidence that, under the totality of objective circumstances, the defendant in that case was not free to end police questioning and leave the building. Id. First, the detective told the defendant he needed to be interviewed at the police station and did not inform him that any other time or place would suffice. Id. Second, the detective led the defendant through the lobby to a secured entry door, to a police squad room, up an elevator and stairs, through a second, propped-open door, and into a small interview room with no windows. Id. at 680-81. This effectively “cabined” the defendant into a small compartment with officers positioned near the single door. Id at 681. Third, a second detective entered the room thirty minutes into the interview; police outnumbered the defendant two-to-one. Id.
Although the detective told the defendant a single time that he was free to walk out the door, we noted three reasons a reasonable person would not feel free to leave: (1) officers told the defendant to “sit tight” multiple times; (2) officers led the defendant through a labyrinthine route and did not explain security doors were unlocked going in the opposite direction; and (3) there was a dramatic change in the interrogation atmosphere with the arrival of a second officer. Id. This, combined with the character of the detectives’ questioning and prolonged interview lasting almost an hour, added up “to a situation in which a reasonable person would not feel free to end the interrogation and leave.” Id. at 681-82. In other words, taken together, these factors showed curtailment akin to formal arrest where a reasonable person would not feel free to leave.
The present case admittedly resembles certain circumstances in E.R. Like E.R., Domingo Diego and Martin testified that an officer told them Domingo Diego “needed” to come to SPD to talk to “Mr. Troy.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 45. The couple arrived at the police station a few days later, perhaps by appointment.
To start, the tone and tenor of the interview was certainly less dramatic than the E.R. interrogation. At the start of the interview, Detective Munson informed—and Domingo Diego understood—that he was free to leave at any time. Detective Munson’s interview style remained constant; no additional statements like “sit tight” were made throughout the interview that would have made a reasonable person feel that they could not leave. See id. at 681. The interview took place in the detective’s personal office with two exterior windows and family photos as opposed to a “standard” interview room with a couch, table, and chairs. The translator was dressed in civilian clothes. Overall, this presented a more casual atmosphere than the pressure cooker present in E.R.
Next, Detective Munson asked questions about the incident, truthfully telling Domingo Diego he had listened to a conversation between Domingo Diego and the victim’s father and that lying about the situation wouldn’t help. Although the detective suggested he had personally talked to the victim, he had in fact reviewed the LPD interview of the victim to hear her version of the alleged events. Toward the end of the interview, Munson asked Domingo Diego if he wanted to write an apology letter to the victim but did not require him to do so. Taken as a whole, Detective Munson’s line of questioning was exploratory rather than accusatory or aggressive. See id.
Additionally, at the end of the interview, Detective Munson told Domingo Diego he was not going to jail and wished the couple a good day. Domingo Diego and Martin left SPD unaccompanied. Other than the secure door from the lobby to the rest of the police station, there is no evidence the couple had to overcome additional significant barriers. See id. at 680-81 (describing entry to a “police squad room”, up a set of stairs after the elevator, and into a windowless room behind a keyed door). This suggests Domingo Diego was not sequestered deep in the building with no hope of independent exit.
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As tempting as it may be to inject a subjective viewpoint into this inquiry, we must consider this purported factor from the objective shoes of a reasonable officer. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 270, 131 S.Ct. at 2406. Contrary to the suggestion that the SPD dispatcher was an unqualified officer in disguise, post at 9, the transcript of the interview reveals very little meaningful difference between the interpreter’s live translation and an after-the-fact certified forensic transcript translation. Though Domingo Diego had some trouble forming responses and perhaps lacked perfect comprehension of Detective Munson’s questions, “the evidence does not suggest that it would have been apparent to a reasonable officer that [Domingo Diego] was not understanding what was being said.” Burden, 934 F.3d at 695. So, unlike a situation in which a language barrier presented a high degree of confusion, see, e.g., Koh v. Ustich, 933 F.3d 836, 845-46 (7th Cir. 2019), the transcript reveals a fluid, conversational exchange between all parties involved. Blunt, yes, but coercive, no.
Focusing only on the freedom-of-movement inquiry, we think there is considerable daylight between E.R. and the present case that directly undercuts Domingo Diego’s claim of custodial interrogation. The interview took place in Detective Munson’s personal office, not an interview room. The approximately forty-five minute interview—while certainly lengthy—was not particularly hostile; it was exploratory and conversational rather than accusatory. Domingo Diego and Martin left the station unaided, which gives rise to a reasonable inference that Domingo Diego was not cabined into a remote place in the police station. Although blunt, the interview would not have revealed to a reasonable officer that Domingo Diego did not understand what was being said.
True, the couple was told they “needed” to come to the police station, Detective Munson did carry his gun, Domingo Diego was outnumbered in the interview room, and the couple had to move through several barriers. But given the casual atmosphere, exploratory and conversational line of questioning, and relatively unimpeded pathway to the room, the totality of these objective circumstances does not represent a curtailment akin to formal arrest. See E.R., 123 N.E.3d at 683 (observing “a person is not in custody simply because he is questioned at a police station, or because he is an identified suspect, or because he is in a coercive environment”); see also Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714 (same) and Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125, 103 S.Ct. at 3520 (same).
We find that the totality of objective circumstances surrounding the interrogation would make a reasonable person feel free to end the questioning and leave. Thus, the limited curtailment of Domingo Diego’s freedom of movement was not akin to formal arrest. We reverse the trial court’s suppression order and remand this matter for further proceedings.
Rush, C.J., and Massa and Slaughter, JJ., concur.
Goff, J., dissents with separate opinion.
Goff, J., dissenting.
Is a Miranda warning necessary when a limited-English-speaking suspect, having been summoned to a police station by a fully uniformed officer, endures a prolonged and accusatory interrogation by an armed detective in a visually cabined office with no clear path to the office door and with no knowledge of his ability to freely exit the secured stationhouse entrance?
Under these facts, I would answer that question in the affirmative. My colleagues on the Court, however, would not. And for that reason, I respectfully dissent.
Nearly two years ago, this Court decided State v. E.R., establishing a benchmark for Indiana courts to use in conducting a custody analysis. See 123 N.E.3d 675 (Ind. 2019). In that case, two officers questioned the defendant in a secured room at the police station without informing him of his Miranda rights. Id. at 677. While the officers told E.R. that he could “walk out” of the room “at any time,” we found that statement insufficient “to make a reasonable person feel free to leave.” Id. at 681. In support of that conclusion, we first observed that the officers instructed E.R. several times to “sit tight,” effectively contradicting “any prior indication that [E.R.] was free to go.” Id. We further noted that “the circuitous path by which” the police led E.R. to the interrogation, and their failure to inform him that he could freely exit the secured door through which he entered, created “a labyrinthine” of “obstructions to egress.” Id. Finally, we concluded that “the police significantly undercut any initial message of freedom” when a second officer entered the room and “took over as the main, and more aggressive, interrogator.” Id. This evidence, we determined, along with “[o]ther statements the officers said or omitted” and “the character of their questioning,” clearly supported the trial court’s conclusion that the interrogation was custodial. Id.
Today, we consider the same question of custody in a case involving the same detective at the same police station conducting an interrogation under strikingly similar circumstances. The Court, however, finds “considerable daylight between E.R. and the present case,” ante, at 11, ultimately concluding that the circumstances here amount to something less than custodial interrogation.
But the record, in my opinion, paints a different picture, supporting few—if any—distinctions. And to the extent there are factual differences between this case and E.R., those differences, I believe, fall far short of showing that the trial court’s decision was contrary to law. There is, however, one important factor that distinguishes this case from E.R.—a factor that bolsters the trial court’s conclusion that police conducted a custodial interrogation: Diego’s limited-English proficiency.
For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court’s order to suppress Diego’s statements to police.
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Our law-enforcement officers play a critical role in keeping us safe. And their jobs, no doubt, are incredibly difficult. But for well over fifty years, our courts have clearly established that statements made during a custodial interrogation may not be admitted as evidence unless the suspect received an adequate Miranda warning. The expedient of this warning, so ubiquitous and “so simple” in its application, ensures a privilege “fundamental to our system of constitutional rule.” Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966). And the specificity of this warning “benefits the accused and the State alike,” outweighing any burden on law-enforcement agencies by reducing unnecessary disputes over the suppression of otherwise probative evidence at trial. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 430 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted).
These principles, I believe, extend to a custodial interrogation of a suspect with limited-English proficiency. So, upon electing to interrogate such a suspect, a prudent officer, in my opinion, should consider whether the suspect’s language barrier might reasonably bear on the suspect’s understanding of his freedom of action. See Burden, 934 F.3d at 695. If so, a Miranda warning would greatly assist a judge tasked with ruling on the admissibility of any statements made during the interview.
Under these facts, and absent such a warning, I cannot find the trial court’s suppression order contrary to law.