Tavitas, J.
Case Summary
Rebekah Atkins appeals the dismissal of her complaint against the Crawford County Clerk, the Clerk’s office, and its employees (collectively “Appellees”). Atkins composed and filed a lengthy complaint in the Crawford Circuit Court. Among its many claims, Atkins’ complaint alleged that Appellees were withholding (and possibly creating) records pertaining to Atkins, in violation of Indiana’s Access to Public Records Act (“APRA”). Atkins then filed a variety of motions, including a motion to waive the filing fee and a motion for appointed counsel, all of which were denied by the trial court. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss Atkins’ complaint, arguing that it failed to state grounds upon which relief could be granted. The trial court agreed and dismissed Atkins’ complaint with prejudice. Because we disagree with the trial court’s denial of Atkins’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis and the decision to dismiss her case, we reverse. We affirm, however, the trial court’s determination to deny Atkins’ motion for appointed counsel.
Issue
Atkins purports to raise thirty-three issues, which we consolidate and restate as [footnote omitted.]:
I. Whether the trial court erred by denying Atkins’ motion to waive the filing fee.
II. Whether the trial court erred in denying Atkins’ motion to appoint trial counsel.
III. Whether the trial court exhibited bias against Atkins.
IV. Whether the trial court erred in granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss.
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It is unclear from the record on what basis the trial court denied Atkins’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis and to waive the filing fee. “Indigency determinations present a subject for the sound discretion of the trial court, and a very clear case of abuse must be shown before this discretionary power can be interfered with.” Campbell v. Criterion Grp., 605 N.E.2d 150, 159 (Ind. 1992) (internal citations omitted).
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Curiously, our jurisprudence regarding Indiana Code Section 33-37-3-2 and its legislative forefathers is largely bereft of cases in which courts have addressed waiver of the filing fee at the trial court level; most fee issues arise at the appellate level. We endeavor today to fill that gap, given that some version of a statute allowing persons lacking sufficient means to proceed with suits has been on our books for more than a century and a half. See, e.g., Kerr v. State ex rel. Wray, 35 Ind. 288, 290 (1871).
The reasoning set forth in Campbell—a case pertaining to appellate filing fees— carries no less force when the fee at issue is the trial-court-level filing fee. As Justice DeBruler once remarked “[f]rom the date of its admission to the Union down to this day, Indiana has been a leader in providing indigent persons with free access to her courts and in providing them with fair treatment while in court.” Thompson v. Thompson, 259 Ind. 266, 273, 286 N.E.2d 657, 661 (1972). We reiterate that sentiment and observe that the dearth of cases regarding trial-court-level-filing fees may simply indicate that the application of our pauper statutes to such fees is so axiomatic as to escape reasonable challenge. We also note that the Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct gives guidance to trial courts and provides: “[a] judge may make reasonable efforts, consistent with the law and court rules, to facilitate the ability of all litigants, including self-represented litigants, to be fairly heard.” Ind. Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.2. To vindicate the ability to be fairly heard, the obstacle of the filing fee must first be removed for those without the means to surpass it.
Our review of Indiana authority suggests several ways exist in which trial courts can determine a litigant’s indigency. In the context of adult guardianship services, for example, trial courts are instructed to determine whether the litigant “has an annual gross income of not more than one hundred twenty-five percent (125%) of the federal income poverty level as determined annually by the federal Office of Management and Budget under 42 U.S.C. 9902. . . .” Ind. Code § 12-10-7-2.
In the criminal context, our Supreme Court has held:
The determination as to the defendant’s indigency is not to be made on a superficial examination of income and ownership of property but must be based on as thorough an examination of the defendant’s total financial picture as is practical. The record must show that the determination of ability to pay includes a balancing of assets against liabilities and a consideration of the amount of the defendant’s disposable income or other resources reasonably available to him after the payment of his fixed or certain obligations. The fact that the defendant was able to post a bond is not determinative of his non-indigency but is only a factor to be considered. The court’s duty to appoint competent counsel arises at any stage of the proceedings when the defendant’s indigency causes him to be without the assistance of counsel.
Moore v. State, 273 Ind. 3, 7-8, 401 N.E.2d 676, 679 (1980). Indeed, we have endorsed the approach articulated in Moore even in the civil context, as has our Supreme Court. See, e.g., Sholes v. Sholes, 760 N.E.2d 156, 161 (Ind. 2001); Zimmerman v. Hanks, 766 N.E.2d 752, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
Just as was the case in Campbell, a search of the record in this case reveals no justification for denying Atkins’ motion to proceed as a pauper or for denying the filing fee waiver. The chief locus of this inquiry is whether Atkins has made a showing of indigency, which is to say, whether she demonstrated that she is “unable to make payments or give security for them.” Ind. Code § 33-37-3-2. The trial court made no findings and offered no reasoning for denying Atkins’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Moreover, the trial court did not hold a hearing to investigate whether Atkins’ filings regarding her indigency were accurate, despite the fact that one was requested. We are, thus, confined to a scant record in order to determine whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion.
Under oath and in writing, as required by Indiana Code Section 33-37-3-2(a), Atkins filed a “Verified Affidavit of Indigency.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 44-45. Therein, Atkins averred that “. . . because of my poverty I am unable to make payment of the costs of the proceeding or to give security for them.” Id. at 44. Atkins further indicated that she owns “no personal property other than [her] clothing and other personal belongings of minimal value.” Id. Additionally, Atkins filed documentation establishing that her cash assets totaled $3.09, that she received social security disability benefits in the amount of $874.00 per month, and that she receives food assistance. We note that Atkins filed a motion to proceed with this appeal in forma pauperis and that we granted that motion.
If the trial court had any doubt about Atkins’ indigency, the trial court could have exercised several options. A trial court may waive a filing fee, and, upon a later discovery that the litigant has the means to pay, order reimbursement of the waived fee; or a trial court may hold a hearing to examine the litigant’s potential indigency. Either method will safeguard the longstanding, fundamental obligation to allow access to the courts by all, regardless of one’s financial standing. By any standard, Atkins proved her indigency, and the trial court abused its discretion by denying Atkins’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis and to waive court filing fees. Atkins is entitled to proceed with her suit without paying the filing fee.
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Conclusion
The trial court erroneously denied Atkins’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis and erroneously granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss. We, therefore, reverse those determinations. We affirm the trial court’s denial of Atkins’ motion for appointed counsel. [28] Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Najam, J. and Pyle, J. concur.