Brown, J.
In this interlocutory appeal Donnie Louis Sawyer challenges the validity of Ind. Code § 35-40-5-11.5, which became effective on March 18, 2020, and argues the statute, which restricts a defendant’s ability to take the deposition of a child less than sixteen years of age who is the victim or alleged victim of a sex offense, conflicts with the Indiana Trial Rules. We agree and reverse.
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Sawyer argues that, in this case of first impression, the trial court abused its discretion in denying him an opportunity to depose the children. Specifically, he argues that Ind. Code § 35-40-5-11.5 restricts the use of depositions, “significantly alters the ability of those accused of . . . particular sex crimes to investigate the allegations against them,” and irreconcilably conflicts with the Ind. Trial Rules and, thus, is without force or effect. Appellant’s Brief at 12. He claims it “simultaneously and unlawfully imposes new burdens” on him as he seeks to depose the children, “thus restricting his access to critical pre-trial discovery,” a burden “at odds and incompatible with clear and unambiguous rules for discovery depositions” through Indiana’s Trial Rules. Id.
The State contends the court did not err and argues in essence that Ind. Code § 35-40-5-11.5 is a substantive provision and “part of a deliberate decision by the General Assembly to address the rights of Children affected by vigorous litigation over a crime.” Appellee’s Brief at 22. It argues that the statute substantively protects children from the experience of a deposition which, in the context of the litigation environment, is “free to delve into any and every aspect of a child’s life and experiences that fits into the far-reaching phrase ‘relevant to discovery.’” Id. at 23 (internal quotations removed).
The Indiana Supreme Court “has recognized on multiple occasions that the Indiana Trial Rules ‘are designed to allow liberal discovery.’” Beville v. State, 71 N.E.3d 13, 18 (Ind. 2017) (quoting Richey v. Chappell, 594 N.E.2d 443, 445 (Ind. 1992) (some internal quotations omitted)). “Trial courts have broad discretion on issues of discovery.” Id. (citing Hardman v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1201, 1206 (Ind. 2000)). The “standard of review in discovery matters is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Hale v. State, 54 N.E.3d 355, 357 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Crawford v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1165, 1169 (Ind. 2011)). Matters of statutory interpretation present pure questions of law and are thus reviewed de novo. Matter of M.S., 140 N.E.3d 279, 282 (Ind. 2020) (citing In re Adoption of B.C.H., 22 N.E.3d 580, 584 (Ind. 2014)). We “presume[ ] that the legislature intended for the statutory language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the statute’s underlying policy and goals.” Id. (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 129 N.E.3d 789, 793 (Ind. 2019)). Both parties cite the 2016 case, Hale v. State, in which the Indiana Supreme Court discussed depositions, indicating they are a routine component of pre-trial practice, both in civil and criminal matters. See Ind. Trial Rule 30(A) . . . ; Ind. Crim. Rule 21 (“The Indiana rules of trial and appellate procedure shall apply to all criminal proceedings so far as they are not in conflict with any specific rule adopted by this court for the conduct of criminal proceedings.”); see also Ind. Code § 35-37-4-3 (2014) (“The state and the defendant may take and use depositions of witnesses in accordance with the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure.”). Typically, leave of court is not required in order to depose a witness, see Ind. Trial Rule 30(A), but as we noted in Murphy[v. State], “inasmuch as the defendant here was an indigent and the cost of such action would ultimately have had to have been paid from public funds, subject to the approval of the court, it was altogether appropriate for counsel to seek prior approval.” [265 Ind. 116, 120, 352 N.E.2d 479, 482 (1976))]…
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Ind. Code § 35-40-5-11.5, which was enacted in a public law for which an emergency was declared and became effective on March 18, 2020, see Pub. L. No. 62-2020, § 9 (2020), is titled “Depositions of certain child victims or alleged victims of a sex offense.” The statute is part of an article construed to preserve and protect the rights to which a victim is entitled “without interfering with the rights of the accused to receive a fair trial . . . .” Ind. Code § 35-40-3-1. It provides that it applies only to criminal cases involving a child less than sixteen years of age who is the victim or alleged victim of a sex offense, and it lists definitions that apply throughout the section. Ind. Code § 35-40-5-11.5(a)-(b). It then provides a defendant “may depose a child victim only in accordance with this section,” but
(d) . . . may not take the deposition of a child victim unless the defendant contacts the prosecuting attorney before contacting the child, and one
(1) or more of the following apply:
(1) The prosecuting attorney agrees to the deposition. The prosecuting attorney may condition the prosecuting attorney’s agreement to the deposition upon the defendant’s acceptance of the manner in which the deposition shall be conducted.
(2) The court authorizes the deposition after finding, following a hearing under subsection (f), that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child victim will be unavailable for trial and the deposition is necessary to preserve the child victim’s testimony.
(3) The court authorizes the deposition after finding, following a hearing under subsection (g), that the deposition is necessary:
(A) due to the existence of extraordinary circumstances; and
(B) in the interest of justice.
(e) If the prosecuting attorney does not agree to the deposition, the defendant may petition the court for authorization to depose the child victim under subsection (d)(2), (d)(3), or both subsection (d)(2) and (d)(3). Upon receipt of the petition, the court shall notify the prosecuting attorney and set a hearing to determine whether to authorize a deposition of the child victim, and, if applicable, to determine the manner in which the deposition shall be conducted.
(f) The court shall authorize the deposition of a child victim under subsection (d)(2) if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child victim will be unavailable for trial and the deposition is necessary to preserve the child victim’s testimony.
(g) The court may not authorize the deposition of a child victim under subsection (d)(3) unless the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the deposition is necessary:
(1) due to the existence of extraordinary circumstances; and
(2) in the interest of justice.
Ind. Code § 35-40-5-11.5(c)-(g). The section provides a list of factors for the trial court to consider following an authorization of the deposition of a child victim under subsection (f) or (g). See Ind. Code § 35-40-5-11.5(h). Based upon our review of these statutes, we find that Ind. Code § 35-40-5-11.5 is a procedural law. See State ex rel. Blood v. Gibson Cir. Ct. (1959), 239 Ind. 394, 400, 157 N.E.2d 475, 478 (noting that, unlike substantive laws, procedural laws “prescribe the manner in which . . . rights and responsibilities may be exercised and enforced in a court.”), reh’g denied.
Before turning to Indiana’s relevant trial rules, we note, as did the Hale Court, that Indiana Criminal Procedure Rule 21 provides the “Indiana rules of trial and appellate procedure shall apply to all criminal proceedings so far as they are not in conflict with any specific rule adopted by this court for the conduct of criminal proceedings.” See Hale, 54 N.E.3d at 357; see also Brewer v. State, 362 N.E.2d 1175, 1177 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (“Trial Rules 30 and 31 provide for the taking of depositions in civil cases, and these rules apply to criminal cases through Ind. R. Crim. P. 21.”). “It is a fundamental rule of Indiana law that when a procedural statute conflicts with a procedural rule adopted by the supreme court, the latter shall take precedence.” Key v. State, 48 N.E.3d 333 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Bowyer v. Ind. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 798 N.E.2d 912, 917 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)).
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Considering Ind. Code § 35-40-5-11.5 in light of the Indiana Trial Rules, we find that they are incompatible to the extent that both cannot apply in Sawyer’s situation. The former contemplates that a defendant “may depose a child victim only in accordance with this section,” whereas Ind. Trial Rule 26 provides that, unless in the case of protective orders, the frequency of use of the discovery methods including depositions “is not limited,” and Ind. Trial Rule 30(A) provides that “any party may take the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon oral examination” after commencement of the action. (Emphasis added). The statute further conflicts with the Indiana Trial Rules when it necessitates the prosecutor’s permission, compare Ind. Code § 35-40-5- 11.5(d), with Ind. Trial Rules 30 and 45(D), and when it requires a defendant to move for a hearing when the permission sought is not forthcoming and otherwise places the burden of proof on the defendant at the contemplated hearing. Compare Ind. Code § 35-40-5-11.5(e)-(g), with Ind. Trial Rule 26(C). Because the procedural provisions in the statute conflict with those of the Indiana Trial Rules, the provisions of the Indiana Trial Rules govern. See McEwen v. State, 695 N.E.2d 79, 89 (Ind. 1998) (citing Humbert v. Smith, 664 N.E.2d 356, 357 (Ind. 1996)).
To the extent that the State argues the General Assembly enacted Ind. Code § 35-40-5-11.5 to address and protect victim’s rights, we note that the “General Assembly itself has recognized that we have sole authority over ‘practice and procedure in all the courts of Indiana,’ and that ‘all laws in conflict with the supreme court’s rules have no further force or effect.’” Holtsclaw, 977 N.E.2d at 350 (quoting Ind. Code § 34-8-1-3 (added by Pub. L. No. 1-1998, § 3 (1998))). Similarly, to the extent that the State relies on Humbert v. Smith, we note that Humbert stated: The Court of Appeals was correct in applying appropriate law to void the portion of the paternity statute that conflicts with Rule 803(6). Any other conclusion would have been inappropriate for an intermediate court of appeal. This Court is persuaded, however, that we should assent to provisions the General Assembly has placed in the paternity statute, treating them as an exception to the requirements of Rule 803(6). 664 N.E.2d at 357 (emphasis added).
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order denying Sawyer’s petition for depositions.
Reversed.
Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.