Tavitas, J.
Case Summary
AO Alfa-Bank (“Bank”) appeals the trial court’s grant of a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum issued to a non-party, L. Jean Camp (“Camp”), by a Florida trial court. Without following the procedures outlined in the Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act, see Indiana Code Chapter 34-44.5-1 (“the Act”), the Bank issued a Florida non-party subpoena duces tecum to Camp related to litigation filed in a Florida trial court (“Florida Subpoena”). Camp filed a motion to quash the Florida Subpoena in the Monroe Circuit Court. The Monroe Circuit Court considered the merits of the issue and granted Camp’s motion. The Bank appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by granting the motion to quash. We conclude, however, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address the motion to quash. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order and dismiss this appeal.
Issues
The Bank raises two issues, but we sua sponte address one dispositive issue, which we restate as whether the Indiana trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider the motion to quash the Florida Subpoena. [Footnote omitted.]
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Foreign subpoenas6 are governed by the Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act, see Indiana Code Chapter 34-44.5-1….
The Comments to the Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act (“Uniform Act”) provide:
Presenting a subpoena to the clerk of court in the discovery state, so that a subpoena is then issued in the name of the discovery state, is the necessary act that invokes the jurisdiction of the discovery state, which in turn makes the newly issued subpoena both enforceable and challengeable in the discovery state.
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The act of the clerk of court is ministerial, yet is sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the discovery state over the deponent.
Comment to UNIF. INTERSTATE DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY ACT § 3, Issuance of Subpoena. [Footnote omitted.]
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We are faced with the initial issue of whether the claim advanced—the motion to quash the foreign subpoena—falls within the general scope of authority conferred upon the court by the constitution or a statute. See Blanck, 829 N.E.2d at 508. There is no indication that the claim falls within the general scope of authority conferred upon the Monroe Circuit Court by the constitution, and likewise, there is no statutory authority giving the Monroe Circuit Court authority to consider a motion to quash a foreign subpoena.
The record provided to us is devoid of any indication that the Bank submitted the Florida Subpoena to the Monroe County Clerk for the issuance of an Indiana subpoena, which is the necessary act to invoke the jurisdiction of the Indiana courts. Indiana courts are not granted general, unqualified jurisdiction and authority to enforce or quash foreign subpoenas. Rather, Indiana courts are granted the authority to address foreign subpoenas only where the foreign subpoena has been domesticated pursuant to Indiana Code Chapter 34-44.5-1. An Indiana trial court has no authority to enforce a subpoena issued by The Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, unless properly domesticated as provided under the Act.
The lack of domestication is a jurisdictional threshold, not a procedural error that can be avoided by waiver or consent of the parties. The parties obviously waived and/or consented to the trial court’s consideration of the motion to quash without following the requisite procedure. While we recognize that parties may consciously waive formalities for convenience purposes, under this Act, the formalities confer subject matter jurisdiction on Indiana courts, and subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived.
Because the Bank failed to domesticate the Florida Subpoena, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider Camp’s motion to quash. Accordingly, the trial court’s order is void, and we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Conclusion
The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the motion to quash the Florida Subpoena. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s void order and dismiss this appeal. [18]
Vacated and dismissed.
Najam, J., and Pyle, J., concur.