Vaidik, J.
Case Summary
The primary issue in this case is whether an indemnity claim by a healthcare provider against another healthcare provider based on alleged medical negligence is subject to Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act. We hold that it is.
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We begin by addressing Franciscan’s argument that the trial court erred by concluding Franciscan’s claim against Lake Imaging is one for medical malpractice and therefore subject to the MMA. Franciscan contends its claim is a straightforward indemnification action that did not accrue until 2018, when Lake Imaging refused to indemnify it for the Shaughnessy settlement. According to Franciscan, the claim is subject to the ten-year statutory limitation period for actions on written contracts, see Ind. Code § 34-11-2-11, meaning Franciscan had until 2028 to file it. Franciscan argues the MMA covers only claims brought by injured patients or their representatives. Lake Imaging, on the other hand, contends Franciscan’s claim is subject to the MMA—including its statute of limitation and the medical-review panel requirement—because it is based on alleged medical negligence by Lake Imaging. Based on the text and purpose of the MMA, we agree with Lake Imaging.
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However, other provisions in the MMA show it applies more broadly. The statute of limitation provides, in part:
A claim, whether in contract or tort, may not be brought against a health care provider based upon professional services or health care that was provided or that should have been provided unless the claim is filed within two (2) years after the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect, except that a minor less than six (6) years of age has until the minor’s eighth birthday to file.
I.C. § 34-18-7-1 (emphases added). Franciscan’s claim falls neatly under this statute: it is (1) “in contract,” (2) “against a health care provider,” and (3) “based upon professional services or health care that was provided or that should have been provided.”
In addition, Indiana Code section 34-18-8-4, which establishes the medical-review-panel requirement, references a “claimant,” not a “patient”…
These provisions leave us convinced the legislature did not intend to limit the MMA’s coverage to the “typical” medical-malpractice action—one brought by an injured patient or the representative of an injured patient. Rather, the language of these statutes is broad enough to include an indemnification claim by one healthcare provider against another healthcare provider, if the claim is based on the alleged medical negligence of the latter.
Our interpretation of these statutes is consistent with the purposes underlying the MMA. The overall purpose of the MMA was to combat “the reduction of health care services available to the public” that resulted from “increased malpractice claims and the difficulty in obtaining malpractice insurance.” Havens v. Ritchey, 582 N.E.2d 792, 794 (Ind. 1991). The statute of limitation was an important part of this response. The legislature made the medical malpractice statute occurrence-based rather than discovery-based, like many other statutes of limitation. See I.C. § 34-18-7-1(b) (providing the two-year period begins to run “after the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect”).2 This indicates our legislature believed the reasons for a statute of limitation— “to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost”—are “even stronger in the medical malpractice context.” Havens, 582 N.E.2d at 794. The statute was also enacted for the more general purpose of “limiting patient remedies against health care providers[.]” Id. at 794-95. This rationale applies regardless of whether the defendant healthcare provider is sued by a patient who has been injured or by another healthcare provider seeking indemnification based on alleged medical negligence.
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For these reasons, the trial court properly concluded Franciscan’s indemnity claim, which is based on the alleged medical negligence of Lake Imaging, is subject to the requirements of the MMA. [Footnote omitted.]
Of course, our holding means that healthcare providers with a right to indemnification in situations like this will often have to sue before they have actually suffered a loss, in order to satisfy the medical-malpractice statute of limitation…
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Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.