Najam, J.
Statement of the Case
Logansport/Cass County Airport Authority (the “Airport Authority”) appeals the trial court’s grant of Jerra Kochenower’s Trial Rule 60(B) motion to set aside default judgment. The Airport Authority raises the following two issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law when it relied on unverified and otherwise not-authenticated documents in setting aside the default judgment.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it set aside the default judgment.
We affirm.
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The Airport Authority first alleges the trial erred when it granted Kochenower’s Rule 60(B) motion because Kochenower failed to submit admissible evidence in support of his asserted meritorious defense. The Airport Authority’s argument on this issue is that the trial court misapplied or misinterpreted Trial Rule 60(B). We review such questions de novo. Morrison v. Vasquez, 124 N.E.3d 1217, 1219 (Ind. 2019).
Again, Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) provides that a party moving for relief for “mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect” must “allege a meritorious claim or defense.” Concerning the meritorious defense requirement, the Indiana Supreme Court has said that
Rule 60(B)’s requirement of a meritorious defense . . . merely requires a prima facie showing of a meritorious defense, that is, a showing that “will prevail until contradicted and overcome by other evidence.” The movant need only “present evidence that, if credited, demonstrates that a different result would be reached if the case were retried on the merits and that it is unjust to allow the judgment to stand.”
Outback Steakhouse of Fla., Inc. v. Markley, 856 N.E.2d 65, 73-74 (Ind. 2006) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Smith v. Johnston, 711 N.E.2d 1259, 1265 (Ind. 1999)).
Our Supreme Court has not held that the meritorious claim or defense requirement means that the moving party’s submission must be in an admissible form at the time of the Rule 60(B) motion. Indeed, in Outback Steakhouse, the Court relied on a treatise for the proposition that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) requires the moving party to simply show that “vacating the judgment will not be an empty exercise.” Id. at 73 (citing 12 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 60.24[1] (3d ed. 1997) (hereinafter “Moore’s Federal Practice”))… The moving party need only state the factual basis for his alleged meritorious claim or defense. That statement need not rise to the level of admissible or persuasive evidence.
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We conclude that our opinion in Shane corresponds with the Indiana Supreme Court’s guidance in Outback Steakhouse and Smith v. Johnston. Trial Rule 60(B) provides that a movant “must allege a meritorious claim or defense” when he seeks relief under Rule 60(B)(1); while mere conclusory statements will not suffice under the Rule, neither must the movant prove an asserted meritorious claim or defense. Rather, as stated in Moore’s Federal Practice, such allegations may be satisfied when the moving party “state[s] enough facts to give a court an opportunity to measure whether the claim or defense has any potential.” Moore’s Federal Practice, supra, at § 60.24[2]. And, as we stated in Shane, it is for the trial court to determine whether the moving party has such a prima facie showing. 869 N.E.2d at 1238.
Here, our conclusion is also consistent with Trial Rule 60(B) as a procedural mechanism for the trial court to exercise its equitable authority, within its discretion, based on the facts and circumstances before the court…
Therefore, we hold that, to successfully allege a meritorious claim or defense pursuant to Rule 60(B), a party seeking relief from a default judgment must state a factual basis for his purported meritorious claim or defense, but at this initial stage such a showing is not governed by the rules of evidence. [FN: Of course, a party may be well advised to present admissible evidence, if available, in support of a motion to set aside a default judgment under Trial Rule 60(B).] Our conclusion is consistent with the manner in which the trial court applied Rule 60(B) in this case, and, thus, the court did not err as a matter of law in its application of the Rule.
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Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Crone, J., concur.