Najam, J.
Statement of the Case
Paul Poppe and Susan Poppe appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for Angell Enterprises, Inc. (“Angell”) on the Poppes’ complaint alleging Angell’s negligence. The Poppes present a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment for Angell.
We affirm.
On August 15, 2015, the Poppes went grocery shopping at Baesler’s Market in Sullivan. When they exited the store and walked through a marked crosswalk to reach their minivan, which was parked in a spot reserved for the handicapped, they saw a truck coming towards them. They tried to run to get out of the way, but the truck was moving fast and pinned them both against their parked minivan. The Poppes sustained injuries as a result of the accident.
Police officers arrived at the scene and interviewed the driver of the truck, Davis Hughes, who claimed that he had struck the Poppes when he lost control of his truck. Hughes was under the influence of cocaine and alcohol at the time of the accident, and he subsequently pleaded guilty to two counts of causing serious bodily injury to another person while operating a vehicle while intoxicated, as Level 6 felonies.
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Here, the Poppes base their negligence action on premises liability. In particular, they allege that Angell owed them a duty of reasonable care for their safety as invitees on the property, breached that duty, and proximately caused their injuries. See Burrell v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 637, 639 (Ind. 1991)). The parties dispute, however, whether the Poppes’ injuries resulted from a condition on the premises or the criminal act of a third person. If it was the former, we apply the analysis in Burrell, which adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 343, to determine whether a duty exists. Hoosier Mountain Bike Ass’n v. Kaler, 73 N.E.3d 712, 716 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Rogers, 63 N.E.3d at 322-23). If it was the latter, we apply the analysis in Goodwin, which considers the broad type of plaintiff and the broad type of harm when determining whether a duty exists. 62 N.E.3d at 393-94.
The Poppes allege that they were injured “by a condition on the land,” namely, “the funneling of pedestrian and vehicular traffic” into the crosswalk without “protective features” such as “bollards.”1 Appellant’s Br. at 19. But we agree with Angell that the Poppes were injured by the criminal conduct of Hughes, namely, his driving while intoxicated. Accordingly, we apply the Goodwin analysis here. In Goodwin, our Supreme Court held that foreseeability as a component of duty turns on the “broad type of plaintiff and harm involved, without regard to the facts of the actual occurrence.” 62 N.E.3d at 390. Applying that analysis here, the broad type of plaintiff is a grocery store patron using a crosswalk, and the broad type of harm is a random intoxicated driver losing control of his vehicle and striking a patron.
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While Fawley predates Goodwin by more than two decades, the duty foreseeability analysis is largely the same in both cases, and we apply it here. Angell could not have known or reasonably foreseen that the Poppes would be struck by an intoxicated driver in the Baesler’s parking lot. See id. To conclude otherwise would be “to impose a blanket duty on proprietors to afford protection to their patrons” and, thus, require proprietors to be “insurers of their patrons’ safety,” contrary to the public policy of this state. Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 394; see also Cavanaugh’s Sports Bar & Eatery, Ltd. v. Porterfield, 140 N.E.3d 837 (Ind. 2020) (holding bar owed no duty to protect patron from sudden parking lot brawl when no evidence showed that the bar knew a fight was impending). Here, it was not a condition on the premises that caused the Poppes to be injured but a random criminal act that Angell could not have prevented. Accordingly, we hold that Angell had no duty to protect the Poppes from being struck by an intoxicated driver. 2 The trial court did not err when it entered summary judgment for Angell.
Affirmed.
Pyle, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.